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Abstract
The work presented in this thesis is an attempt at applying the principles of
Radical Embodied Cognition (REC) to the study of social interaction and com-
munication while respecting the surrounding theoretical and practical context of
wider cognitive science.
In the first two chapters REC is introduced in two ways. First, REC’s histor-
ical roots are briefly presented in order to show that it is a theoretical strand at
least as ancient as its primary opponent – Traditional Cognitive Science (TCS).
It is further noted that both REC and TCS are driven by the same motivation of
trying to explain how the mind fits into the natural world but that they under-
stand this project differently. That is, they are more than competing approaches
to specific cognitive phenomena, they are fundamentally distinct views on the
meaning of “mind”, “nature” and “explanation”. Appreciating this fact highlights
the great care that needs to be taken when trying to communicate or argue across
the dividing line.
The historical summary is followed by a discussion of the basic commitments
of REC: a rejection of representations and an emphasis on extendedness and dy-
namics of cognitive processes. In summary, to REC theorists cognition is not
about the mind (or the brain) creating models of the world that can be used to
produce behavior. Rather, cognition is about the whole organism behaving adap-
tively in constant interaction between the brain, the body and the environment
and it is all of these components that are crucial to explaining any particular
cognitive achievement. It needs to be noted, however, that despite the significant
development that REC has enjoyed in the past two decades, it still remains a
minority view. Part of the reason for this state of affairs is that the ideas and
methodologies of REC have not been made accessible to the wider cognitive sci-
ence community and that TCS objections are not sufficiently addressed. The
remainder of the thesis is an attempt to bridge the gap by tackling such objec-
tions on three issues: (1) the model of explanation adopted by REC and the
phenomena it is allegedly unfit to explain, i.e. (2) joint action and (3) language.
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These are tackled by different chapters as indicated below.
The third chapter focuses on the methodological commitments of REC with
regard to explaining social interaction and social cognition. Specifically, in TCS to
explain social cognition is to provide a description of individual mechanisms that
allow people to predict and understand each other or to adjust mutual behavior
in order to produce joint actions. REC focuses instead on dynamical regularities
that hold on the level of a social unit and rejects the need to specify underlying
mechanisms. Some of the reasons for this rejection of a mechanistic framework
in explaining complex cognitive systems is that mechanisms are seen as reductive
(all that matters are simple system components), unable to allow for emergence
and self-organization (of systemic properties), unfit to capture dynamics or spe-
cial top-down influences (of system on its components). It is argued, however,
that the notion of a mechanism can accommodate these concerns and therefore a
REC-y mechanistic explanation of (social) cognition is possible. Furthermore, it
is also desirable as it provides a more complete multi-level explanation of the phe-
nomenon and makes REC and TCS explanations comparable, promoting further
theoretical and empirical development.
The fourth chapter presents a sketch of a REC-y account of a specific type of
social interaction, namely joint action – an activity of accomplishing a shared goal
such as bringing about certain effects in the environment (think of moving a table
together or cooking dinner). Given the TCS focus on internal mechanisms and the
mind’s principal capacity to represent the world and other people in it, the basic
TCS explanation for joint action relies on processes of representing the co-actor’s
part of the task (co-representation) of theorizing about or simulating her beliefs,
intentions and goals (mindreading). The alternative presented in this chapter is
to view joint actions as emerging from a process of the mutual shaping of how
people perceive their common environment and the action possibilities it provides.
That is, in a joint activity of cooking dinner, one person starting to peel potatoes
might prompt the other person to chop the vegetables without requiring them
to mind each other’s contribution to the overall goal of making a stew. On the
other hand, one person lifting one end of a table might present the opportunity
to the other person to move the table that she would not be able to move on
her own. However, it also requires that the co-actor’s contribution is taken into
account, the actions need to interlock in some way (temporal, spatial). In other
words, it is proposed in chapter four that joint action can be accomplished by the
co-actor producing a reduction or an enhancement of one’s own space of action
possibilities. The first case is dubbed distributive action coordination while the
second contributive action coordination. The next two chapters present two case
studies of these two types of coordination.
The fifth chapter is a behavioral study of distributive action coordination re-
alized as a so-called Joint Simon Task. In this task people are required to produce
complementary responses to two distinct types of stimuli and it is often found
that even though they can perform the task completely independently, they are
xiv
nevertheless affected by the task share of the co-actor. It is then often argued that
this is evidence for one person representing the other’s part of the task and that,
furthermore, this process is automatic and pervasive. Such a finding goes against
the proposal that in distributive action coordination the environment perception
is shaped in such a way that co-actor’s action possibilities are eliminated from
one’s own set. The study presented in this chapter implements a version of the
Joint Simon Task that is closer to a continuous nature of real-life joint action
by asking people to execute responses via moving a computer mouse rather than
pressing discrete buttons. It is found that the so-called Joint Simon effect does
not arise under such conditions. While this does not eliminate the need to explain
the emergence of the effect in other settings, it at least casts doubt on its perva-
siveness and therefore creates room for genuine distributive action coordination
cases.
The sixth chapter is an agent simulation study of contributive action coordi-
nation in a joint target tracking task. In a behavioral version of this task people
are asked to produce complementary actions in order to control the movement
of a tracker and follow a continuously moving target. It has been suggested that
successful performance in this task, again, requires representing something of the
co-actor’s contribution, such as her upcoming complementary action. The study
presented in this chapter reports on a population of pairs of simulated agents
controlled by Continuous Time Recurrent Neural Network submitted to artificial
evolution in the context of this task. The results show that such agents are able
to evolve a successful tracking behavior despite not having a built-in ability to
represent each other’s actions. However, it is also found that some neural activity
of one agent is predictive of the upcoming action of another agent. Whether this
can be interpreted as representation of the type proposed in joint action literature
requires further study.
Finally, in the seventh chapter the focus is shifted from joint action to basic
communication that can emerge on top of it in evolution. A particular recent
theory is examined that claims that language emerged from gestures and that a
crucial role in a transition from pre-hominid gestural communication to gestural
protolanguage to multi-modal language proper was played by a system of complex
action recognition and imitation. The latter is conceptualized along TCS lines
as a system for interpreting other people’s intentions and a resulting language
is viewed as a system for encoding and recovering intended meanings. As such,
the theory is not compatible with REC and therefore an alternative is proposed
in which a gestural protolanguage emerges from a simpler process in which the
main explanatory factors are the participants’ embodied history of interaction
and socio-cultural environment.
The thesis concludes by outlining the possible research directions in order to
further advance the ideas presented here and the reach of REC.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
[Cognition and language] are my starting point because I must be
in them in any explanatory attempt; they are my problem because I
choose to explain them; and they are my unavoidable instruments be-
cause I must use cognition and language in order to explain cognition
and language (Maturana, 1990, p. 47).
Anything said is said by an observer to another observer (Maturana,
1980, p. 8).
The variety of Embodied Cognition that forms the theoretical background
of this thesis emphasizes the circularity implied in any study of cognition: the
fact that cognitive systems are studied by cognitive systems. This circularity
has many theoretical consequences, such as casting doubt on cognitive science’s
aspirations to objectivity and a need to account for the role of the observer and
human experience in the study of cognition. However, I believe it also has a
practical consequence for doing science: the need to be explicit about biases,
preferences, intuitions and assumptions that inform one’s own research. This, of
course, is perhaps just a mark of being a good scientist in any discipline, but it is
even more important for a field as circular as the study of cognition. Therefore, in
this short introduction I simply lay my cards out in the open by listing a number
of beliefs that inform the work presented in this thesis. I then proceed to give a
short overview of the chapters that follow.
1.1 A personal credo
1. A cognitive system is a special kind of machine: living, dynamic and adap-
tive, but a machine nonetheless.
2. The cognitive machine construction is such that the proper explanandum of
cognitive science is in fact the organism-environment system, not just the
organism, let alone its brain.
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
3. Cognitive systems are part of the natural world. Thus, explanation of cogni-
tion cannot invoke non-natural processes or entities and cannot be circular
(presuppose what it tries to explain).
4. Notions like ‘representation’ as they are used in cognitive science are place-
holders in need of further specification.
5. The best form of explanation in cognitive science is that of a proposal
of a mechanism. Mechanisms, however, can be complex, dynamical, non-
representational and extended, contrary to what some presuppose them to
be.
6. Radical Embodied Cognition (REC, described in Chapter 2) is the most
promising1 approach in cognitive science.
7. REC can succeed only by entering a dialog with contemporary Traditional
Cognitive Science (TCS), not by carving out a separate domain of study.
These beliefs are what constitutes my academic background and commit-
ments. They are not argued for in this thesis, as I do not believe an argument
can be had for why anyone considers certain explanations sufficiently explanatory
or what types of entities they find naturalistic.2 There are many brilliant people
working in REC ranks that argue these points. There are also many brilliant
people in the TCS quarters that argue against them or those that are sympa-
thetic to REC but feel that something in this paradigm is missing and therefore
are unwilling to change sides. I am not interested in contributing to cognitive
science by entering abstract debates. What I am interested in is taking REC as
a point of departure and contributing to its development by showing how it can
lead to new studies and ideas that are REC-compatible but at the same time
comprehensible to a traditional cognitive scientist. This thesis is an expression of
this motivation.
1.2 Thesis overview
The thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter (Chapter 2) makes an at-
tempt to further explain the credo presented above by discussing the approach
that came to be known as Radical Embodied Cognition. I provide a brief histor-
ical introduction to both REC and TCS and discuss the main theoretical pillars
1I take promising here to mean “explanatory satisfying while respecting the naturalistic
constraints in points 1-5 above”.
2It is not even clear to me at this point what type of argument this would be: a philosophical,
a psychological, a sociological one? Is “satisfactory explanation” a matter of a convincingly
defined theoretical construct, a warm fuzzy feeling one gets when reading one, a socially agreed
upon currency like money?
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of REC. I then summarize REC’s take on particular domains of cognition: so-
ciality and language. I next outline what I believe to be the main limitations
of REC that this thesis attempts to address, that is, a divergence in explanans
and explanandum between REC and the rest of cognitive science. The remaining
chapters are an attempt to bridge this divergence.
Chapter 3 deals with the model of explanation adopted in REC and TCS.
While the same model within each of the approaches would apply to any behavior
or aspect of cognition, I specifically discuss the case of explaining social cognition,
which is the main topic of this thesis. In this chapter it is argued that there does
not seem to be sufficient reason for REC-ers to reject an explanatory framework
most frequently adopted in TCS, i.e. that of mechanistic explanation. This
argument should be seen as a basis for work described in subsequent Chapters 4
to 6, and to some extent also Chapter 7, which try to provide the beginnings of
a mechanistic account of social cognition and language compatible with REC.
Chapters 4 to 6 center around the topic of social cognition or rather, how
it is instantiated in a particular variety of social interaction, that is joint ac-
tion. All three chapters in some way deal with a particular explanatory con-
struct posited by TCS as necessary to understanding the mechanisms underlying
joint action performance that is not compatible with REC. That construct is
co-representation, which is a representation of the joint task/goal/action plan3
and how it is divided between the co-acting individuals. Chapter 4 addresses
this issue from a theoretical perspective, presenting the idea that joint action can
be viewed as people altering each other’s perceived environment and achieving
common goals without needing to construct representations of task division in
their heads.
Chapter 5 reports on a behavioral study that employs one of the most widely
used TCS tasks designed to investigate co-representation, the Joint Simon Task.
The study modifies the original setup to make it more REC-y and the results
show that the effects found in the less REC-y setups do not arise. Although this
does not directly challenge the existence of co-representation, it at least points to
the fact that (1) it might not be as widespread as tends to be presented in the
literature and that (2) the details of the task design matter a lot to the results
that can be obtained and conclusions that can be drawn from it.
Chapter 6 employs another TCS task, success in which is claimed to involve a
version of co-representation (albeit a very minimal one), specifically, representa-
tion that allows one to adjust to predicted complementary actions of the co-actor.
The study reported in this chapter is an agent-based simulation in which artifi-
cial minimally cognitive agents are evolved to solve such a task. We first show
that even such agents can be successful in these settings, suggesting that the task
is at least in principle solvable with very minimal cognitive resources. Second,
3There is significant variety in how co-representation can be construed and what shared
parts it specifically involves. Chapters 4 to 6 can be seen as an exploration of that variety.
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we attempt to define a method of identifying something that could be called
co-representation in such agents with the aim of making the discussion of this
concept more explicit.
Finally, Chapter 7 takes a leap forward and presents a REC-compatible sce-
nario of language evolution from minimal joint action coordination routines. It
takes a gestural language evolution theory as a point of departure and discusses
the shortcomings of relying on representation-heavy TCS mechanisms in con-
structing such an account. The alternative REC scenario is then presented that
shows that similar effects can be had with leaner cognitive mechanisms if socio-
cultural scaffolding is taken into account.
Chapter 2
Radically Embodied Cognition, Sociality
and Language
This thesis is written from a perspective of and as a contribution to Radically
Embodied Cognition (REC). This approach is to be distinguished from both
standard, Traditional Cognitive Science (TCS) and weak, non-radical Embodied
Cognition (EC).
In broadest strokes, TCS is a view that cognition is about retrieving, process-
ing and storing information from the environment, building some sort of internal
world model and using it to produce adequate behavior. This picture is often
called a “sandwich model” with all the most relevant bits of processing (cognition)
hidden inside between input (perception) and output (action) that are peripheral,
subordinate to cognition and separate from each other (Hurley, 2001). Percep-
tion in such a sandwich is passive and can only deliver rough data that needs to
be elaborated upon to be usable for guiding behavior (think of raw 2D retinal
input transformed into 3D scene perception). Action is merely an execution of
commands issued by the central processor, typically identified with the brain.
REC, instead, is an approach that conceives of perception, cognition and
action as more continuous and interdependent. Perception is usually seen as more
direct and closely tied to action, action as shaping perception, and cognition as
basically a matter of production of adaptive behavior rather than an elaboration
of internal world models. This comes with a greater emphasis on the role of the
body and the environment in the whole process, with the brain as just one of the
contributors, not the controller. More on the particular commitments of REC
will be said in Section 2.2 but here it is important to distinguish REC from a
non-radical variety of EC.
An ever-growing portion of research in cognitive (neuro-)science goes under
the banner of embodiment. A typical aim of this research is to show that what has
been considered “higher”, more abstract cognition, such as language, reasoning,
conceptual knowledge, is somehow grounded in the neural systems of perception
and action. For example, it has been shown that reading verbs related to particu-
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lar actions activates corresponding areas in the brain (such as manual action verbs
activating hand motor areas; Hauk et al., 2004) and therefore perhaps language
comprehension is based on sensori-motor circuits (Barsalou, 2008). Similarly,
from showing that perceiving actions of others activates analogous areas in one’s
own brain (Rizzolatti et al., 1996) it was suggested that the sensori-motor system
plays a role in social understanding (Gallese, 2007). In this type of EC the contri-
butions of perception and action are more important than in TCS but still “all the
hard work is done in the head” (Wilson and Golonka, 2013, p. 11) and cognition
is primarily a matter of representing the world internally and not maintaining
adaptive behavior (Haselager et al., 2008; van Dijk et al., 2008). Consequently,
non-radical EC does not go against the TCS commitments and is not further
discussed in the present thesis.
Both varieties of EC are often presented as a new development in cognitive
science, perhaps as a reaction to failures of Artificial Intelligence (Dreyfus, 1992),
or a way to produce a more complete explanation of mind and behavior (Ander-
son, 2007; Froese, 2010). However, I believe it is important to clarify that while
this might be accurate in relation to weak EC, its radical strand is as ancient as
TCS. What is more, the ancestral forms of both REC and TCS have emerged in
the first half of the 20th century as an attempt to solve a common puzzle: under-
standing how the mind fits into nature and works according to natural principles,
with no need for magical, soul-like properties. Being aware of this common source
and the ensuing split helps us understand the present debates. Accordingly, the
next section is a very sketchy1, big-picture, historical introduction to REC before
I proceed to describe its present commitments.
2.1 A short history of REC
Naturalism is an idea shared by the majority of scientists and philosophers that
all scientific explanations of how the world works (including mental, biological
and social phenomena) should invoke only natural entities and processes (Horst,
2009; Papineau, 2016). The latter are those that are accepted by the basic natural
sciences (physics, chemistry), that is, those contained in the current best theories
of the physical make-up of the world and bio-chemical mechanisms of the brains
and bodies. As a consequence, super-natural entities and processes, which are
godlike or magical are not admissible as part of scientific explanations even if
they can be part of, for instance, theological explanations.
An acceptance of naturalism is motivated primarily by a belief that physical
effects can only be produced by physical causes. It is further typically believed
that the study of any of the special phenomena (social, biological, chemical)
will bottom out at some kind of physical effect (e.g. behavior when studying
the mind). Therefore, these special phenomena need to be themselves physical
1For a much more extended version consult Boden (2006) and Husbands et al. (2008).
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in order to be valid causes of their effects (Papineau, 2016). For the study of
the mind this means that explanations in cognitive science cannot rely on, for
instance, interventions of the immaterial soul on the material body. Therefore,
any cognitive entities and processes that are not straightforwardly natural are
subject to naturalization, which is a project of conceiving some phenomenon in
a way that makes it cohere with a naturalistic framework. In other words, one
assumes that nature has certain features on offer – like causality, natural laws,
correlations – and then strives to explain how a given bit of cognition is possible
in nature given the features on offer.
The beginnings of the project of mind naturalization2 can be traced to Descartes
(1642/2013) who, famously, separated the rational thinking mind from the ma-
terial body, spurring a number of philosophical headaches. He, also famously,
considered animals to be machines – in the sense of governed by blind physical
causation and amenable to scientific investigation – and advocated vivisection
in order to understand their inner workings Descartes (1649/1989). However,
this machine idea, perhaps less famously, extended for Descartes to the human
body and ‘lower’ human psychology, such as sensation, perception, memory and
learning (Wheeler, 2008).
After Descartes, the pendulum on naturalization swung back and forth be-
tween those trying to resist it (e.g. vitalists, Kant, Goethe) and those trying to
expand it (e.g. Helmholtz, Bernard, Darwin, reflexologists). By the beginning
of the 20th century, the development of neurophysiology eventually pushed the
machine concept to encompass the brain. However, a claim that the mind itself
might also be a machine would still be considered a heresy at that time (see
Boden, 2006, Chapters 2-3).
The situation changed in the 1940s with progress in logic, psychology and
control theory, as well as under the influence of new machines constructed for
war purposes. Almost immediately, historical, practical and theoretical factors
resulted in the rise of not just one but two communities that would pursue the
idea that also the mind can be thought of as a sort of natural machine: the formal-
computational and the cybernetic-dynamic one (to be described below). While
in the beginning these communities interacted freely and amicably, by the 1960s
they split into competing sects. The former became the foundation of artificial
intelligence and computational cognitive science (here referred to as TCS). The
latter was pushed to the background only to re-emerge in the past two decades
as the various strands of REC. What were then the differences between the two
main ways to fit the mind into nature?
The formal-computational view was originated primarily3 by Turing (1937),
2Many treatments of the history of cognitive science (Dupuy, 2000; Boden, 2006; Husbands
et al., 2008) instead speak of mechanization of the mind. However, this creates an unnecessary
link to the current use of the term mechanism (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010; Glennan and
Illari, 2017, cf. also Section 2.3.1 below) and so I will avoid it here.
3Building on top of early practical and theoretical work by Jacques de Vaucanson, Charles
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McCulloch (1943) and von Neumann (1987), all of whom were pursuing a goal of
defining or designing machines that could compute anything that is computable.4
Anything here means not just mathematical formulas but whatever can be ex-
pressed in a set of formal rules that operate on certain well-defined structures, e.g.
logical propositions. Computable, in turn, means obtainable by a mechanical, au-
tomatic procedure defined with a set of rules and operations, akin to calculating
a sum of two numbers using the rules of arithmetic.
While in the beginning these discussions were a matter of mathematical and
logical theorizing or practical wartime concerns, by 1950s a suggestion appeared
that perhaps a machine defined in such a way could replicate a large portion of
human mental capacities (Turing, 1950) and, more controversially, that perhaps
the mind itself is a type of machine (McCulloch, 1955). This idea was conceivable
because the notion of computation was defined abstractly and independently of
its material implementation. That is, if the same operations can be realized in
vacuum tubes, Turing machine tapes, simulated neural nets or brain neurons, it
means that mental processes can be carried out by both artificial devices and
biological brains. Thus, an artificial device can implement operations carried out
by intelligent humans and vice versa – the mind can be conceived of as carrying
out mechanical operations.
It just so happened that the TCS founders were all inspired primarily by de-
velopments in logic (of Frege and Russel) and interested in higher-level cognitive
functions like manipulating the meaning of propositions (statements that assert
something that can be true or false), mathematics, language, problem-solving,
planning. At the same time, they did not consider it relevant to project their
findings onto other biological systems, such as behavior of animals or basic mech-
anisms like digestion. The naturalized mind that emerged from this pot was then
primarily a thinking mind, dissociated from the messiness of bodily needs and
practical concerns.
The cybernetic-dynamic community that includedWiener (1948), Rosenblueth
(1950) and Ashby (1956; 1960), was moving on a parallel track. It was also inter-
ested in machines but of a slightly different kind. Instead of a focus on logic, math
and computation, their main concern was self-regulation of systems that maintain
a certain activity in spite of perturbations. The guiding principle of cybernetic
machines was not computation but a feedback loop, a process whereby one part
of the system affects another part of that system which then again influences the
first part. The utility of feedback in engineered systems (such as the famous Watt
governor in a steam engine) has been recognized from the 18th century. At the
turn of the 20th century this mechanism came to be applied to understanding bi-
ological processes, such as homeostasis (Cooper, 2008) and reflexes (Sherrington,
Babbage, Ada Lovelace, Konrad Zuse and others, see (Boden, 2006, Ch. 2-3).
4A Turing machine for Turing, a neural network for McCulloch and Pitts, an electronic
computer for von Neumann.
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1906).
An extension of the cybernetic views to the mind was based not so much on the
nature of operations but on behavioral similarity. Cyberneticists saw that many
biological and artificial systems display behavior that is adaptive and purposeful
and wondered whether similar principles might explain human voluntary behavior
(Rosenblueth et al., 1943). Importantly, this did not mean behavior mediated by
symbolic representations of goals or manipulation of meaningful propositions.
While a concept of information played a crucial role in cybernetics, it was not
semantic information but Shannon information (Shannon and Weaver, 1949),
which is a measure of statistical uncertainty of a signal and a measure of order in
a system.5 As such it was used for characterizing cybernetic feedback cycles and
organization in the system but not for capturing meaning.
In another contrast to the formal-computational camp, cybernetics did ex-
plicitly aim to provide a unified explanation for the functioning of artificial and
biological systems alike at various levels. Language, concepts or other higher-level
functions were not at the top of their agenda.
In sum, the two approaches differed in their historical sources (propositional
logic versus control engineering and physiology), their technological exemplars
(digital computer versus self-guiding missiles), their interests and how they viewed
the connection between mind and the rest of biology. While cybernetics was fine
with restricting itself to statistical information, the computational strand was
interested in meaning. While cybernetics stayed close to the biological wetware,
computationalists distanced themselves from life and the body.
Over the next several decades computational AI and cognitive science took
center-stage while cybernetics got pushed into the background. The reasons for
this could be analyzed in a variety of ways but one is particularly interesting for
the present discussion. Naturalizing the mind is a tricky endeavor. It suggests
that intelligent, purposeful behavior can be a product of mindless physical pro-
cesses of computation or feedback control, thereby threatening our experience of
ourselves as “truly” intelligent, intentional, feeling beings, capable of creativity
and freedom. In response to this threat, two basic reactions are possible: (1)
explain how the underlying mechanisms are actually intelligent and purposeful,
validating our experience or (2) accept that experience is a mere appearance and
explain the origin (and possibly the function) of that appearance. It has been
suggested (Dupuy, 2000; Froese, 2010) that computational and cybernetic ap-
proaches represent precisely these two types of response. The popularity of the
first one might be partly explained by it being slightly easier to accept.
The formal-computational solution and with it the TCS typically distinguish
5X carries information about Y if we can predict Y with more certainty given X than without
X (because the states of X and Y are correlated). For instance, a person’s ability to ride a bike
while simultaneously holding an umbrella, talking on a phone and carrying a kid on the back
rack is correlated with being Dutch. However, one obviously does not determine the other as
the person could be... well, Danish?
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between the physical level of the brain or artificial hardware and the software
level of basic syntactic operations that compute over meaningful symbols. It is
the causal organization of the computational level and how it is hooked up to the
real world via symbols that allows the possessor of the mind to behave adequately.
Since the inception of cognitive science, the intermediate level was conceived of
as roughly a replication of folk psychology - the terms that the layperson uses
to describe their mental life (emotions, intentions, reasons for action). With a
development of cognitive science the terminology became more technical and fine-
grained but nevertheless it remains intelligible. That is, explanations of particular
cognitive capacities (such as event perception, belief revision, joint action) are
typically framed in terms that in some sense replicate our intuitive understanding
of the problem domain. This ensures that intentionality and rationality that we
care about finds its place on the level of the mechanisms and makes it possible
to, for instance, look for its implementation in the brain.6
Cybernetic tradition instead assumed that there is a purely “mechanical” level
in the basic physical organization and that meaning and teleology either inheres
in that level, as emergent properties of complex systems, or is an appearance at a
higher level of the whole organism (or machine) interacting with its environment.
In any case, there was no in-between level of computations and representations
that would carry the weight of preserving our self-image. The operations consid-
ered to give rise to appearances of intelligence and purposefulness might as well be
random functions that have no recognizable relationship to the behavior they give
rise to. An example of the latter was Ashby’s Homeostat device (Ashby, 1960,
Ch. 8) which was designed to show how a machine can keep certain variables
within set limits and it accomplished it by a set of “stupid”, random processes.
As a consequence, the naturalization that is proposed by cybernetics is in a way
paired with a destruction of a rational subject (Dupuy, 2000).
Further development of cybernetics was then an attempt to deal with such
an extreme result by two means. First, it was thought that perhaps continued
investigation of the underlying mechanisms (on a sub-personal level) could allow
us to appreciate how their organization and complexity is a source of minimal
mentality. Alternatively, it could be that more robust rationality and purpose
was to be established on a higher level: that of a complete person in interaction
with her material and social environment. REC is a continuation of these devel-
opments, each variety emphasizing a slightly different element of the cybernetic
heritage.
Autopoietic theory, developed primarily by Maturana (1980), accepted the
cybernetic outlook that living adaptive systems are in some sense mindless ma-
chines and that meaning and purposefulness are notions appropriate to a higher
6A correlated outcome is that cognitive science discoveries make headlines (“Scientists map
‘bad intent’ in the brain”, Andrei, 2016; “Map of the brain’s word filing system could help us
read minds”, Rutkin, 2016) and excite public imagination since they are easy to relate to.
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personal level. In particular, he held that they were appropriate to only certain
types of systems, those endowed with language (Maturana, 1978). This conclu-
sion, however, did not sit well with a long-time collaborator of Maturana – Varela,
who was dissatisfied with a strict focus on the organization of living and cogni-
tive systems and embarked on a way to recover both intrinsic teleology and the
relevance of human experience (Froese, 2011). This led to an emergence of a va-
riety of REC, enactivism, that culminated in a book entitled The Embodied Mind
(Varela et al., 1991). Enactivism in this work was defined by two commitments:
(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cogni-
tive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that
enable action to be perceptually guided. The overall concern . . . is
not to determine how some perceiver-independent world is to be re-
covered; it is, rather, to determine the common principles or lawful
linkages between sensory and motor systems that explain how action
can be perceptually guided in a perceiver-dependent world (Varela
et al., 1991, p. 173).
Further developments of enactivism led to differentiation within this approach.
The branch established by Varela is now typically called autopoietic enactivism
and it concerns itself primarily with tracing the principles of cognition to the
principles of biological organization and dynamics of life itself. For example, au-
tonomy, threatened by a cybernetic mode of naturalization, is said to be grounded
in the process of autopoiesis of living systems, i.e. a process of self-production of
a unity, in which the production of the unity’s components are enabled by those
very components (Maturana, 1978). To give a simple illustration: every living
cell undergoes a process of metabolism which enables it to continually regener-
ate the cell membrane but at the same time the process of metabolism is made
possible by the existence of a boundary between the cell and everything else –
this very membrane. In this circular web of interconnections, a cell can persist as
an autonomous individual. The autopoietic enactivism project aims to examine
how autonomy and other fundamental properties of mind and life present them-
selves at different levels of organization in order to arrive at an account of human
experience of subjectivity and purposefulness. For example, Thompson (2007)
considers the role of the nervous system which joins a variety of sensory and mo-
tor subsystems into an operationally closed sensorimotor network as a basis for
sentience.
Sensorimotor enactivism (O’Regan and Noë, 2001) realizes a research agenda
of uncovering how perception understood as skillful activity and realized as sen-
sorimotor patterns brings forth the experience of the world. In other words, it
analyzes how the structure and content of perceptual experience is a result of
such patterns. Vision, for example, is conceptualized not as a process of visual
experience emerging from the construction of a 3D impression of the outside
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world but as a “mode of exploration of the world that is mediated by knowledge
of . . . sensorimotor contingencies, [i.e.] the structure of the rules governing the
sensory changes produced by various motor actions” (O’Regan and Noë, 2001,
pp. 940-941). This account tries to explain the qualitative feel of perception in
different sensory modalities (e.g. hearing vs seeing), the perceptual structure
within each modality (e.g. seeing different colors), the basis for the perception of
objects and so on, but it does not address higher-order cognition. In addition, the
particular mechanisms that implement the sensorimotor contingencies and their
mastery are yet to be determined.
Finally, radical enactivism (Hutto and Myin, 2013) is an attempt to unmask
the level confusion of the TCS and spell out the details of the non-representational
view on the mind, using the tools of analytic philosophy as opposed to the more
phenomenology inspired enactivisms presented above. It proposes that basic cog-
nition is a matter of “spatio-temporally extended patterns of dynamic interaction
between organisms and their environments” (p. 5), while semantic representations
are a result of linguistic and socio-cultural scaffolding.
The three enactivisms – autopoietic, sensorimotor and radical – form a large
portion of REC. However, REC currently also includes such approaches as dy-
namical cognitive science (Kelso, Van Gelder, Beer) that continues the cybernetic
work of analyzing the temporal unfolding of behavior, and ecological psychology
(Gibson, Turvey, Chemero) that complements the study of the cognitive system
with a stronger emphasis on the regularities of the environment.
All these strands of REC have their own specialized tools and commitments
(not always perfectly compatible) but they are united in their rejection of TCS
and a commitment to laying bear its fundamental limitations in the study of
mind and behavior. The foregoing historical snapshot tells us, however, that
both approaches are an attempt at solving the same puzzle of how to fit the mind
into nature. The difficulty here is that studying the mind is in an important sense
different from studying rocks or kidneys, because in addition to external probes
and measurements we have another source of data: our own internal subjective
experience. Therefore, the solutions offered to the puzzle are not only a matter
of logical arguments and data collection but depend on the researcher’s views on
the nature of experience and the world, on what we are trying to explain and
what it means to provide a satisfactory explanation. Given this complexity, it is
no wonder that REC-ers and TCS-ers often fail to understand, let alone convince
each other. However, both communities have something to offer and the puzzle
of the mind in nature needs to be solved not only by clashes, but also dialogue.
This thesis is an attempt to build small bridges to promote such a conversation.
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2.2 The components of REC
This thesis is informed by a variety of REC ideas and is not committed to any
particular camp within REC. Therefore, in this section I review the elements that
have been crucial to the work presented in the chapters to follow and that are
shared by all REC-ers, even if conceptualized slightly differently.
As previewed above, REC rejects internal symbolic representations doing the
heavy cognitive job and instead proposes that behavior emerges from an interplay
of resources distributed across the brain, body and environment, evolving over
time. This means that a REC theory of any piece of adaptive behavior or cognitive
skill has to conform to a certain basic template: it has to be non-representational,
extended and dynamical. I will now discuss these in turn.
2.2.1 Non-representationalism
The rejection of representations as explanatory constructs plays a central role
in REC and is its most controversial element. In order to understand REC,
it is therefore important to understand what it is exactly that REC-ers find
problematic with representations. A very short answer is this: according to REC,
there has been a number of ways to define mental representations in a way that
makes them compatible with naturalism, but they all either fail (by violating some
naturalistic assumptions or by being unable to distinguish representations from
other, more naturalistically respectable phenomena) or disintegrate into concepts
that are so REC-y that it makes more sense to go REC all the way rather than
continue operating within a TCS mindset. Now, for a longer answer, we need to
unpack this a bit more.
I have said in the previous section that naturalizing a cognitive phenomenon
means finding a way for it to cohere with natural principles and that it implies a
contrast with the super-natural. It is important to add here that another relevant
contrast for natural in discussions about mental representation is artificial or
cultural, i.e., to be natural in this sense is to not be a product of human activity.
That is, should it turn out that some feature of our mental life is a result of
language and culture, it would not be considered natural (see also Villalobos,
2015, Ch. 1). This is a relevant concern for those cognitive functions, including
processing mental representations, that are supposed to be basic enough to be
occurring in other animals and infants and so cannot be a result of something
that is specific to appropriately socialized human beings.
Now, why should representation not be straightforwardly natural? Because
it is typically understood as some state or process that manages to “stand for”
or “refer to” other things and perform its functions within our cognitive economy
due to this special relationship to whatever it represents and not merely due
to the physical properties as it is realized in the biological or mechanical brain.
That is, representation implies a so-called content-vehicle distinction: there is the
14 Chapter 2. Radically Embodied Cognition, Sociality and Language
something X that does the representing (e.g. some brain state), the something
Y that is represented (e.g. the thought that it is raining) and a relation between
the two. X then is called the representational vehicle and Y its content. It is
important to realize that cognitive operations are cognitive and have their special
properties due to representational content, i.e. if all there is are vehicles (physical
states), there is no point talking about representations. As put by Bechtel (2008):
In most biological disciplines both the phenomena themselves and the
operations proposed to explain them can be adequately characterized
as involving physical transformations of material substances. . . . The
performance of a mental activity also involves material changes, . . . but
the characterization of them as mental activities does not focus on
these material changes. Rather, it focuses on such questions as how
the organism appropriately relates its behavior to features of its distal
environment (pp. 22-23).
This, according to Bechtel, requires an information-processing stance, charac-
terized by a focus on the changes to the content effectuated by causal changes to
the vehicles (p. 25).
That is, there is a variety of transformations that happen in nature (corrosion
of metal, evaporation of water, plant photosynthesis, digestion) that are trans-
formations of physical states but are not considered representational. Although
cognitive mechanisms are undoubtedly physically instantiated, what is important
about their physical transformations (to anyone who holds dear the explanatory
usefulness of representations) is that they carry information about the stimulus
or some further stage in cognitive elaboration. The fact that representations have
content allows us not to merely respond to currently present features of the en-
vironment in some automatic manner (e.g. seeing food and eating). It allows
us to relate to absent things (as in memory or planning) or even non-existent
things (like ghosts or unicorns), combine different thoughts into new thoughts in
a reasonable manner (“if it’s raining tomorrow, the school trip will be canceled”)
and so on. It has been argued again and again that these capacities cannot be
possibly explained without an appeal to information and representational content
(see e.g., Clowes and Mendonça, 2016, for a recent defence). The question is then
how such a relation is possible in nature and what it consists of – a problem
known as the naturalization of mental content.
The attempts to naturalize representations continue and a number of solutions
have been considered so far. A popular move in cognitive science, for example,
has been to shift from talk about representations to talk about information, as
in “activity in brain area Y carries information about X and therefore the sys-
tem represents X”. This, however, raises the question of what is information. A
well-defined notion of information already mentioned in Section 2.1 is Shannon
information, which, however, is not semantic. Shannon and Weaver (1949) cau-
tioned themselves that
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...information must not be confused with meaning.
In fact, two messages, one of which is heavily loaded with meaning
and the other of which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent,
from the present viewpoint, as regards information.
Shannon information, thus, does not give us natural content for free. It is
merely a quantitative measure that can be used, for example, to capture cor-
relation between two variables. It also lacks properties required of true mental
representations. For example, there is no possibility for mis-representation be-
cause if X and Y are correlated, whenever X occurs, Y is the case. The relation is
also symmetric, i.e. whenever X covaries with Y, Y covaries with X and therefore
we could say that an activation of edge-detection cells is represented by edges
just as well as that edges are represented by edge-detection cells.
Other features are then required to make sense of representations. Whatever
answer is provided it has to allow for semantic information, i.e., not just statistical
correlation, and for mis-representation, i.e. representing an external state or event
even if it is not currently the case. Finally, there has to be some asymmetry in
that the internal state represents the external state but not vice versa.
A popular way to fill these requirements and go beyond the notion of informa-
tion has been to consider functions, in so-called teleological theories of content,
mostly associated with Dretske (1981; 1988; 1995) and Millikan (1984; 2004).
That is, X is said to represent Y if X plays some function in the system which it
is part of and that function is specific to the X-Y relationship. The functions are
said to come from evolution or learning. For example, part of the visual system
comes to represent a particular orientation of lines because it has the downstream
function of carrying information about that orientation that, in turn, has further
a downstream function in guiding the agent’s behavior with respect to the fea-
tures in the world that are characterized by this line orientation. Such states can
be false if they do not perform their function correctly and the ensuing activity
ends up not being adaptive to the system.
Several problems have been pointed out regarding this solution. For instance,
one can point out that there cannot be a selection for something to do X unless
it has already been doing X, i.e. no mechanism can be selected to produce Xs
because they indicate Ys unless some Xs indicate Ys (Cummins et al., 2006).
This means that the initial use of the correlation is still shrouded in mystery.
Another concern that has been voiced regarding the use of function is a problem
of content indeterminacy (Fodor, 1990). This problem states that selection works
only with extensional objects, not intensional ones. An extensional definition of
a given concept is provided by listing its examples, while intensional definition
by pointing out necessary and sufficient properties an object must have to fall
under that concept. A frog flicking its tongue to flies and moving black dots
is responding to extensional properties and therefore it seems unclear how to
provide an account of content that differentiates between the two.
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One might wonder how this intricate debate bears on more down-to-earth
practicalities of studying cognition. Here the aim, however, is neither to discuss
the debate in detail nor defend any particular position. The aim is to try to
understand what REC-ers have in mind when they reject representations and
what matters is this: admitting that the user determines representational content
(via functions) to non-representationalists (Hutto and Myin, 2013) means that we
should speak of content-creating rather than content-processing systems. This,
in turn, just starts to look like a version of non-representationalism: content as a
result of the self-organizing activity of entire cognitive systems, whose principal
aim is adaptive behavior and self-maintenance, not information processing.
On this alternative view, the creature’s current tendencies with respect to
the environment are shaped by its ontogenetic and phylogenetic history (“the
organisms are set up to be set off by certain worldly offerings” (Hutto and Myin,
2013, p. 19)). A REC-er will admit that the agent can have internal states.
However, this does not mean that she has representations in the way in which
they are typically understood. The world is not faithfully replicated inside the
agent’s head, it is perceived from the agent’s perspective, relative to her needs and
abilities and her history of interactions with the environment. If this is so, instead
of focusing on internal content-bearing states, a more proper unit of analysis is
the mutually adjusted agent-environment system.
A limitation of REC is that by rejecting full-blown content from such basic
adaptive responding, it does not account for the cases in which TCS finds content
essential, such as when the relevant environmental feature is absent or informa-
tion is combined. Many REC-ers will claim at this point that a non-naturalistic
explanation is required to fill this gap, namely one that invokes language and
socialization (Hutto and Satne, 2015). Without a complete explanation for this
step a REC account cannot yet be considered complete. However, it contrasts
with the TCS assumption that content on many levels and of different complexity
may be naturalized in one fell swoop.
2.2.2 Extension
Rejecting internal representation as a primary explanatory construct in REC
shifts emphasis on the external environment and agent-environment interactions.
This idea is often expressed as the organism-environment system being a more
appropriate explanandum for cognitive science, as a rejection of internalism or
an adoption of an extended or extensive view on the mind. In practice, there are
many ways in which it manifests itself theoretically and how it guides empirical
research. It is not the focus of this thesis to review all of the types or argue for
the superiority of a particular understanding of extendedness. However, some
examples should be instructive.
One of the first appearances of the extended mind idea is Clark and Chalmers
(1998) argument from a parity principle. In short, we are asked to consider a case
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in which some cognitive operation is performed using external tools. The famous
example is a fictional character Otto who has Alzheimer but has learned to use
a notebook to store all important information and uses it as a sort of external
memory. A more realistic example is a person performing calculations using pen
and paper rather than doing them in their head. The parity principle states that:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in rec-
ognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world
is . . . part of the cognitive process (Clark and Chalmers, 1998, p. 8).
The claim is that the external part of the process is not a mere causal influence
on internal operations but actually part of cognition and therefore the mind itself
is extended beyond the boundaries of the skull.
There has been a lot of back and forth on the merits of this idea. However,
what matters for the present purposes is that Clark (1998) in particular does not
consider himself a representative of REC and is more lenient towards accepting
representations. At the same time, it has been argued (Hutto et al., 2014) that
without a rejection of inner representations the extendedness is merely an optional
add-on while for REC the mind is extended – or relational – in essence. How
then does it manifest in REC proper?
In autopoietic enactivism, extendedness shows up at the very core of the or-
ganism’s meaningful activity. This is because the self-production of living systems
is seen as qualified by the necessity to enter material exchanges with the environ-
ment. However, the types of interactions that a system can enter are determined
by the system’s organization. That is, autopoietic organization not only defines
the system’s identity but also specifies the world available to it and the kind
of impact that different elements of that world will have on it. Some allow the
system to continue existing and will be approached, others threaten its survival
and, accordingly, will be avoided. This differentiation turns the physico-chemical
environment into one of meaning and value, in a process enactivists call sense-
making. Defining the roots of meaning this way allows enactivists to claim that it
is neither in the heads nor in the environment but rather is a relational property
residing in the interaction between the organism and the environment (Thomp-
son, 2007). In a way it is a much “lighter” claim than the extended cognition
of Clark and Chalmers (1998) as it does not force us to decide where to draw
the relevant mind boundary. Rather, the question of where the mind is located is
considered nonsensical since relations in general do not have a location (Di Paolo,
2009).
In another flavor, considering sensorimotor interaction, what makes the pro-
cess extended is that environment is in some sense part of the sensori-motor loop.
That is, the system’s behavior is an ongoing process of sensory changes leading to
effector changes (actions) leading to changes in the outside environment leading
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to sensory changes and so on. In between there are changes to the environment
effectuated by the organism. Specifying where the sensorimotor loop starts and
ends – whether with stimuli or responses – is to some extent arbitrary, dependent
on the position of the observer. By the same token, specifying the functional
boundaries of the system as the boundaries of its skin hinges on the position
of the observer outside this system and in the environment. Properly speaking,
however, sensorimotor loop is just that – a loop, functionally closed through the
environment and therefore the environment is part of this process (Villalobos and
Ward, 2015).
Going beyond enactivism, extendedness is also implied in ecological psychol-
ogy, especially when it is combined with the dynamical systems perspective (next
sub-section). Following Gibson (1986), ecological psychologists maintain that
perception is not a process of the passive reception of information mediated by
representation but rather a direct sensitivity to action-relevant patterns called af-
fordances. That is, information from the environment is not something objective
that has to be interpreted by the agent and then used in some way for gener-
ating behavior, rather it is meaningful and geared to action from the start. It
can be this way because the animal and the environment imply each other, affor-
dances lawfully depend on the structure present in the environment and also on
the agent’s properties, abilities, purpose and activity. For example, a person of a
certain height and leg length, that has learned to climb stairs will see some stairs
as climbable depending on the relationship between the person’s leg length and
the step height (as well as whether climbing is relevant in the context of a present
activity). Ecological psychology maintains that such an opportunity for action is
simply perceived, the person does not need to compute the fit between a represen-
tation of her own body and of the stair. Given the animal-environment mutuality,
affordances are often conceptualized as relational (Chemero, 2003) and therefore
their investigation requires considering the extended animal-environment system.
Perception of many affordances depends on the regularities that obtain from
unfolding of the person’s actions over time and therefore an ecological explanation
of some behavior often requires considering how it is produced through agent-
environment interaction. A prominent example, given by ecological psychologists,
is a baseball outfielder catching a fly ball. In analyzing this behavior, an intuitive,
TCS-style solution is that the player detects the initial direction and velocity of
the ball, calculates (or simulates) its trajectory, predicts its landing spot and runs
for it in a straight line without even a need for further perceptual information
about the ball’s position (Wilson and Golonka, 2013). It appears, however, that
what actually happens is that the strategy employed is to keep running while
looking at the ball in such a way that either the speed of the ball or its curvature
is kept constant relative to one’s own movement. This way the outfielder can meet
the ball at its landing position at the right time (Michaels and Oudejans, 1992;
McBeath et al., 1995). Just as in the case of enactive sensorimotor loops, the
interlocking of the agent’s actions and perception produces adequate behavior.
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2.2.3 Dynamics
Evident in the description of the last example is another pillar of REC: dynamics.
This element is also viewed in different ways by various REC sub-communities.
The most basic one is that
a dynamical analysis of a cognitive process seeks to understand the
unfolding of that process over time and the multiple internal and
external influences whose interplay shapes this unfolding (Beer, 2000,
p. 91).
The analysis in question is typically performed using the mathematical tools of
Dynamical Systems Theory (DST), that is, a construction of dynamical models of
the system, and subsequently visualizing, predicting and interpreting its behavior.
A dynamical system is by definition a system that changes over time. A
model for that system is usually a representation of the system as a set of states
S (a state space) that a system can enter,7 a set of times T , and a rule R, often
expressed as a set of equations, that describes the patterns of change of these
states, i.e. how a particular state s1 at time t1 changes into state s2 at time t2.
DST is a mathematical theory and not as such a theory of cognition8, that is,
it does not by itself constrain the types of variables that one could include in the
model of the system or give us insight on how the variables should be related.
One could have a dynamical model of the brain activity, of hand movements,
of an agent interacting with the environment or of two people interacting with
each other. This flexibility is one of the reasons REC-ers prefer DST as their
modeling tool, since it allows them to capture relevant explanatory factors inside
and outside the skin using an integrated model, in which the system and the
environment are conceptualized as coupled, i.e. their rules of evolution include
each other’s variables.
One should note, however, that DST not carrying any theoretical commit-
ments in itself means also that it could in principle accommodate TCS assump-
tions. In a sense, also a (cognitively relevant) Turing machine is a dynamical
system, in which states are representations and transformation is defined as com-
putation over those representations. A rejection of such a possibility is a further
commitment based on one’s preferred view on the nature of cognition.
For example, Van Gelder (1995; 1998) portrays the computational view as
relying on discrete symbolic representations and computational, sequential and
modular operations. Furthermore, he argues that computationalism sees real time
as largely irrelevant, as what matters to the Turing machine is a sequence of tran-
sitions, not how long each of them really takes. He contrasts that with the view
7Of course, no model can capture all the states of the system, the aim is rather to capture
those of interest to the observer.
8In fact, the same is true for information theory and computation theory.
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that cognition itself is non-representational, non-computational, non-modular,
continuous and unfolding in real time on different scales (behavior, development,
evolution). Thus, cognition is best modeled with numerically defined states and
differential equations that specify how the rate of change of one variable changes
depending on other variables. That is, all processes continuously influence each
other’s direction of change, rather than one part of the system delivering occa-
sional static inputs to another part.
On the other hand, even though DST models are not necessarily representa-
tional, one could find representations in them. For example, Spivey (2008) pro-
poses a compromise solution in which representations are allowed but conceived
of as fuzzy, with overlapping boundaries, continuous, constantly changing and
probabilistic. He argues that this in fact invalidates the symbolic-computational
approach and a reliance on discrete, easily labeled representations but prefers to
keep using the word to refer to a “mediating stand-in process” (rather than state)
between perception and action.
On yet another side, many REC-ers add further commitments to the dynam-
ical view, according to which cognitive systems are not just dynamical systems
but complex dynamical systems, i.e., systems composed of multiple interacting
elements that exhibit self-organized emergent behavior (Mitchell, 2009), where
self-organized means lacking a central controller and emergent means not pre-
dictable from properties and operations of the components. For example, bird
flocking behavior is produced by the behavior of individual flying birds. It looks
organized but is not a result of any single bird controlling the flight direction of
other individuals.
Other proponents of the complex system view (e.g., Richardson and Chemero,
2014) emphasize additional properties like soft-assembly (the system reflects a
temporary coordination in which the components roles are context-dependent),
interaction-dominance (a behavior is the result of interactions between the com-
ponents, not their causal roles in isolation) and non-linearity (the system’s output
is more than a simple sum of inputs). There are particular measures (e.g., pink
noise, Gilden, 2001) that allow researchers to detect these properties and it is fre-
quently argued that if a particular phenomenon (be it physiological or cognitive)
exhibits them, then this phenomenon is in fact complex and dynamical. In addi-
tion, it is often taken to reveal the phenomenon as essentially extended. That is,
if a system under study exhibits interaction-dominant dynamics, the components
of the system are coupled so tightly that it cannot be analyzed by decomposition
and therefore the correct level of analysis is the system as a whole, including the
case where the system is composed of an organism and its environment (Van Or-
den et al., 2003; Favela and Chemero, 2015).
The upshot of all of this is that while one can adopt a more or less thoroughgo-
ing attachment to dynamics, as a methodology it implies a particular perspective
on cognition. Approaching a question from the computational stance draws at-
tention to the input and output of the system, the function it computes and
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representations it uses. A dynamical stance allows one to focus on the relevant
variables at different levels, their interaction and evolution in time and an emer-
gence of behavioral patterns from resources distributed across the brain, body
and environment.9 Thus, it is more compatible with other REC commitments.
2.2.4 Metaphysics or methodology?
Before proceeding with this chapter one disclaimer should be made regarding the
REC components outlined above. Namely, for most REC-ers the claim that cog-
nition is non-representational, extended and dynamical is a metaphysical claim,
i.e. a claim about the nature of cognition, what it is in essence. Analogously,
the default working assumption for many cognitive scientists and the lay public
seems to be that the brain is a computer, an information-processing device, and
that cognition is a process of computation over representations.
One could, however, see these claims through a methodological lens, i.e. that
cognitive systems are most usefully described and explained as such and such.
For example, a methodological representationalist claim would be that cognitive
systems are best described as processing internal states with a certain content.
However, one could add that the particular content of those states is an observer’s
construction and we simply do not know what it really is for the system. Similarly,
from the REC side, a methodological extendedness claim could be an acknowl-
edgment that cognition proper really does happen inside the system. However,
the entanglement with the environment is so great that there is no way to pro-
duce an intelligible explanation of any (or some) cognitive feats without citing the
relevant features about the environment and the agent-environment interaction
(Chemero and Silberstein, 2008).
These two ways of looking at the same questions have led to different debates
in cognitive science. A debate on naturalization of mental content is typically
fought on the metaphysical battle ground. On the other hand, the discussions
between dynamical approach to cognition and TCS are more frequently about
the best way to explain behavior and the best tools for the job (dynamical versus
representation-based models). That being said, the metaphysical and method-
ological commitments are often interlinked. Believing that cognition is such and
such typically leads to adopting compatible methodologies. Employing such and
such methodologies is typically motivated by intuitions about the nature of cog-
nition, even if one does not get involved in metaphysical debates.
This thesis is written largely from the latter perspective. While I have strong
intuitions that REC is the most appropriate picture of what cognitive systems
are, I have largely avoided contributing to the fundamental discussions. What
9A good example of this is a study by Beer (2003) of categorical perception in evolved
simulated agents. See also Williams and Beer (2010a) for an analysis of these agents from two
perspectives.
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the thesis is, instead, is an attempt to look at a variety of challenging phenomena
from a REC point of view and see how far it can take us.
2.3 Pushing the limits of REC
Despite advances that have been made in REC over the years, cognitive science
seems to be far from a paradigm shift. This might be due to various reasons.
First, the majority of cognitive science programs is still TCS oriented, continually
producing new generations of students trained to think in terms of representations
and computations. Second, related to that, the methods employed by REC are
typically perceived as more difficult to master and are not routinely introduced
either in education or later during professional development. Third, fast advances
in artificial intelligence (e.g. the recent rise of artificial personal assistants) keeps
the idea of mind as a computer alive in the general public. Certainly, there might
be more ways to explain the failure of REC to take over. What I want to propose,
however, is that it is partially a failure of communication on the part of REC in
the sense of both struggling to make REC ideas accessible to those not already
versed in background theories and debates and in the sense of not taking the TCS
complaints about REC seriously.
Enactivists regularly meet in their own circle to share new ideas or reach
out to other species of REC, like ecological psychologists, in order to promote
within-REC cross-fertilization. Similarly, ecological psychologists have their own
conferences and societies and sometimes reach out to enactivists. However, one
would be hard-pressed to find representatives of REC at the main TCS event,
the yearly Cognitive Science Conference.10 This might be understandable and
beneficial for an approach in its infancy, in search of consolidation, surrounded
by theoretical enemies. However, it means that it remains obscure to the wider
community and might make it impossible to become a key theoretical player on
the scene. How can this state of affairs be overcome? This thesis proposes to
achieve this in two ways and makes a small contribution to both.
2.3.1 Comparable explanations
The first change proposed in this thesis has to do with a view on explanation
adopted by REC and TCS, that is, an issue of what both approaches consider
explanatory when studying cognition and what types of methodological tools they
think should be used to understand it. Certainly, what one finds explanatory is
to some extent a subjective matter, dependent on the knowledge of the inquirer,
her motivations, her larger set of beliefs etc. When a child asks about that arc
10And if they are present, they usually end up gathering in a REC-y circle, catching up
and complaining about all the representation-talk of the main event. I am guilty of this tribal
behavior myself so this is not an attack on fellow REC-ers.
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of colors in the sky after the rain, a range of answers is possible, such as “it
is called a rainbow”, “little colorful fairies just flew across the sky”, “there is a
rainbow because it rained” or “it is an optical illusion caused by sunlight being
reflected, refracted and dispersed by droplets of water relative to you looking at
them with your human eyes at a 42 degrees angle”. Clearly, which of these will feel
explanatory to the child will depend on the child’s age, knowledge and interests.
Similarly, asking about a bacterium feeding on sucrose molecules or an outfielder
catching a ball can receive different answers. What matters here is that different
kinds of answers about these phenomena will feel satisfactory to representatives
of REC and TCS. Therefore, the two communities propose not just different
explanations for cognitive phenomena, but different kinds of explanations.
One difference in adopted explanatory frameworks has to do with the elements
of REC described in the previous section. While positing representations as part
of the explanation is fine for TCS, it is deemed incomplete at best (and akin to
invoking fairies at worst) by REC. While focus on the environmental factors and
temporal unfolding of the cognitive process is essential for REC, it is typically
only an optional extra for TCS, that is happy to restrict explanations of cognition
to what is going on inside the agent’s mind/brain at a given moment. These
differences have to do mostly with the types of entities that are possible and
necessary as part of the explanation.
Another major difference is more about the style of explanation that is ac-
cepted by the two communities. Very roughly put, a large portion of TCS favors
a mechanistic framework of explanation, according to which a given phenomenon
is explained when we have identified the working parts and operations of the sys-
tem in question and their, often multi-level, organization. For example, providing
a mechanistic explanation of spatial memory is explained by the structure and
functioning of the hippocampus and its connection to other brain regions, as well
as the mechanism of long-term potentiation on yet lower level (Craver, 2002).
REC, by contrast, explicitly or implicitly rejects mechanistic explanations and
replaces them with dynamical or historical explanations. Dynamical explanations
are those in which a given phenomenon is explained when we have described a
dynamical law under which it falls (as described in the previous section). For ex-
ample, in the famous HKB model of bimanual coordination (Haken et al., 1985)
provides an explanation for a range of features that arise as participants try to
coordinate the movement of their index fingers. In particular, it is found that if
the movement starts in an anti-phase mode and the speed is increased, a spon-
taneous switch to an in-phase mode occurs and no switch back to the anti-phase
mode upon speed decrease is observed. In contrast, in-phase movement mode
remains stable across speed variation. It appears that all the relevant factors of
this phenomenon can be captured by a single dynamical model that relates rela-
tive phase between moving fingers (or limbs, or legs) and movement rate to the
stability of the system. Furthermore, a model can be combined with a mathe-
matical description of the oscillating limbs (in terms of amplitude, frequency and
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velocity) and their coupling.
Historical explanations so far have not been developed as an explicit explana-
tory framework within REC but are implied in such quotes:
[Radical enactivism] is . . . committed to the Developmental-Explanatory
Thesis, which holds that mentality-constituting interactions are grounded
in, shaped by, and explained by nothing more, or other, than the
history of an organism’s previous interactions . . . with environmental
offerings. . . . Nothing other than its history of active engaging struc-
tures or explains an organism’s current interactive tendencies. (Hutto
and Myin, 2013, p. 8).
That is, a cognitive phenomenon is explained if we can describe a history
of agent-environment interactions (on behavioral, developmental or evolutionary
scales) that led to it.
An example of such an explanation is provided by Di Paolo and De Jaegher
(2012) who describe an experiment on false belief understanding, in which a
toddler is more likely to show excitement about a toy that was hidden while the
parent was absent versus when the parent was present (O’Neill, 1996). They
contrast a standard explanation as a “child’s sensitivity to a parent’s knowledge
state when making requests” (the original paper’s title) with an explanation that
holds that the infant merely exhibits greater readiness to interact with the toy and
the parent given that previously only the infant saw the toy and its interactive
possibilities. The authors conclude:
This explanation does not involve postulating hidden internal “mental
states”, but is based on what is available to each participant, namely
their mutual attention, what happens to the toy, and the interactive
potentialities and actualities that change in the situation (p. 11).
In sum, a historical explanation of a given behavior at a certain time requires
attention to how the situation and interactions have unfolded up to that point.
It is not my intention to argue that dynamical or historical explanations are
inferior to mechanistic explanations (e.g. that they are mere descriptions) or that
they are unnecessary. One could, in fact, adopt a pluralistic attitude, according
to which we should be providing all sorts of explanations for any phenomenon in
an effort to obtain the most complete picture (Dale et al., 2009). It could then
be accepted that different communities within cognitive science can be busy with
their own preferred explanatory frameworks complementing each other. However,
it does not seem that REC-ers ambition is to be merely a TCS’s equal partner.
Rather, the ambition seems to be to provide a TCS replacement, both method-
ologically and metaphysically (cf. Section 2.2.4). Replacement obviously requires
that the cognitive science community as a whole switches to REC as the “right”
view on cognition. It would seem that this will be incredibly difficult if REC is
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not able to convince the members of this community that REC-y explanations
are somehow better or more complete than TCS explanations. This, in turn, is
most likely impossible if they are so incommensurable that it is impossible to pit
them against each other. For example, the hallmark enactive explanation of social
interaction discussed in Chapter 3 is notoriously difficult to understand for the
TCS folk and provokes mostly puzzled looks, hand-waving and business as usual.
Since both REC and TCS are an attempt to mechanize the mind, there should
be no principled reason why REC explanations cannot be mechanistic, provided
that the mechanisms in question are sufficiently REC-y, i.e., non-representational,
extended and dynamic.11 Chapter 3 goes into a more detailed argument to this
end when applied specifically to the study of social cognition.
2.3.2 Comparable explananda: Sociality
Varieties of REC sociality
In addition to a rift in the kinds of explanations offered by REC and TCS, there
is also a rift in the kinds of explananda they are most interested in. This issue
shows up in two ways. The first difference has to do with a different conception
of cognition and behavior adopted by the two communities. Namely, different
characterization of what these are, amounts to adopting different explanatory
targets, e.g., the brain/mind versus the organism-environment system. The sec-
ond difference is a tendency to focus the investigation not simply on differently
conceived phenomena but on different sets of phenomena altogether. Both of
these varieties of an explanandum split are especially evident with regard to the
topics that TCS is most comfortable with and that are continuously posed to
REC as a so-called scaling-up challenge: sociality and language. The result is a
continuously reinforced impression that REC is fine as an approach but only up
to a point.
With regard to sociality, many recent accounts within REC focus on the idea
that rather than searching for (representational) mechanisms inside individual
heads, the right level of analysis is the self-organizing supra-individual organism-
environment-organism system, in accordance with the view that cognition is non-
11There are other types of explanation in TCS, such as computational explanations, in which
the focus is rather on the type of computation carried out during a certain cognitive task (how
input gets mapped into output) and the constraints it imposes on the computing system (Marr,
1982). There is ongoing work looking into compatibility of REC with non-representational
computationalism (Dewhurst and Villalobos, 2017; Villalobos and Dewhurst, 2017), i.e., a view
that computations do not necessarily operate on representations. However, first, the jury is still
out on whether computational explanations are a type of mechanistic explanation (Rusanen
and Lappi, 2007; Piccinini, 2006). Second, it is not clear at present whether computational
explanations in cognitive science can be non-representational. Therefore, at least at this stage
it seems more fruitful to me to focus on mechanisms rather than computations in trying to
reconcile the explanatory strategy of REC and TCS.
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representational, extended and dynamical.
In the ecological branch of REC, this view goes under the heading of a social
synergy approach and it proposes that people acting together form “a wholly new
perception-action system that cannot be understood merely from understanding
the individuals from which the system emerged” (Marsh et al., 2006, p. 19). In
other words, such a system has properties and capabilities not reducible to its
components. Just like circular connections in a perception-action loop on the in-
dividual level give rise to adaptive behavior of the organism-environment system,
circular causal influences between perception and action of multiple agents give
rise to an adaptive organism-environment-organism system, which, however, goes
beyond the individual perception-action contributions. Emergence of this level
and its patterned activity is self-organized because it is not driven by any single
individual. Rather, coordination is a result of simpler individual motivations or
a response to common external constraints. Once the unit is created, it is said to
exert “downward causation” (Campbell, 1990) on the participating components,
changing their behavior.
The study of such emergent sociality can be complemented, on this view, with
individual processes as long as they are REC-y themselves. That is, individual
cognition should not involve representations, inferences and predictions about
the other’s behavior and it should not replicate the social level in a way that it
becomes redundant. An example of this strategy is an explanation of a termite
nest building (Kugler and Turvey, 1987), in which the complex nest structure is
not a result of a pre-defined plan coordinated by some master constructor. What
happens is that individual termites move towards and deposit building materials
at the point of strongest pheromone concentration while the pheromone is left
by the termites themselves. While the initial movements and deposit sites are
random, over time a number of preferential spots with larger concentration of
building material develops and these turn into nest pillars. Thus, the lower level
of production and perception of the pheromone gradient leads to an emergent
structure at the higher level.
Now, since perception and action are relevant to capturing the individual level,
a REC theory on sociality includes a discussion of how individual perception is
affected by social situations (Marsh et al., 2006). This research goes under the
heading of “social perception” or “direct social perception” as it came to be called
(Wiltshire et al., 2014). It is based on the idea that in addition to physical
affordances in the environment, like climbability of stairs or sittability of chairs,
there also exist social affordances (McArthur and Baron, 1983), which include
perceiving what the other individual affords me (Kenny and Albright, 1987),
opportunities for joint action (Richardson et al., 2007a), and affordances for other
agents (Ramenzoni et al., 2008). The claim that perception of social affordances
is direct means that there are no inferences or other cognitive mediations required
in this process. This requires that there are lawful correspondences between the
social factors (properties of other people, also in relation to their environment)
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and their outward characteristics (static or dynamic cues that can be perceived;
Runeson and Frykholm, 1983). The explanation for the correspondence is that
underlying causes produce particular patterns of human motion. For example,
carrying a box of a certain weight alters the center of gravity and observers are
able to accurately judge the weight of the box based on the motion produced
by this fact, even if this motion is presented in a simplified form like patch-light
display. Furthermore, since perception is for action, perceiving affordances of
or for other people should also guide one’s own behavior directly, removing one
further mediation step in social behavior. On such an account, social behavior is
not a result of having and manipulating representations of other agents and their
intentions but of other people changing one’s perception of affordances leading to
appropriate actions.
Finally, a concept that seems to straddle the emergent and the individual levels
is interpersonal movement coordination, i.e. correlation between people’s behavior
in an interlocked action-perception loop. An assumption behind this research
is that a lot of movement has oscillatory nature, e.g., walking, postural sway,
heartbeat (Kelso, 1995). It is then suggested that people can directly (without
inference or calculation) pick up on each other’s oscillation phase and adjust to it
such that, for example, they can walk together in a coordinated manner. Research
shows that the same HKB model that captures the within-individual bimanual
coordination can be applied to inter-individual coordination of people swinging
pendulums (Schmidt et al., 1998) or rocking in chairs (Richardson et al., 2007b).
These coordination dynamics are said to be evidence for the emergence of the
supra-personal level as they exhibit typical signatures of synergies that cannot
be explained by an assumption of independent cognitive processes (Riley et al.,
2011).
Similar supra-personal commitments have been adopted by enactivists, al-
beit argued from considerations of autonomy and experience and, as a conse-
quence, with some differences compared to the ecological variety (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007). First of all, enactivists highlight the difference between
perception of the physical environment and social perception. They do not agree
that mere coordination is sufficient for genuinely social interaction because it is
ubiquitous in both physical and biological systems and achievable through simple
mechanical coupling. What is needed in addition is that the interaction becomes
an autonomous level in itself, i.e., a self-sustaining pattern that is generated by
its components and that in turn enables the “production” of components. In this
case it means that interaction is social when it both modifies and is modifiable
by the intentions of the individuals involved, such as their disposition to continue
to interact (or not), and when it creates them as interactors. For example, inter-
action can be experienced as demanding a particular mode of participation from
one of the interactants such as in cases with emerging leader-follower division of
roles. Similarly, the previous history of interaction can shape one’s readiness to
interact with another which in turn can shape one’s behavior. At the same time,
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individuals must remain autonomous, and must perhaps even be treated as such,
as agents (Froese et al., 2011), otherwise what remains is an engagement of one
agent with a non-social world.
Analogous to the ecological-dynamical strand, enactivists have argued for di-
rect perception and with similar extensions of concern for meaning. For instance,
they postulate that since from a phenomenological perspective a living body is
not a mere physical thing but an entity that is inherently intentional, perceiving
bodily expressions enables direct perception of their mental states (Gallagher,
2008; Gangopadhyay and Schilbach, 2012). Furthermore, the enactive view im-
plies that an organism is an active agent engaged with the world and therefore
we immediately perceive the other agents not in terms of perceptual stimuli to
be interpreted (with or without inference) but directly in terms of how we could
respond to them (Gallagher and Varga, 2014; McGann and De Jaegher, 2009).
Another line of concern has been with the emergence of meaning. It has been
argued that since individuals are engaged in sense-making and sense-making is
fundamentally an embodied activity, coordination of individual’s bodies may fos-
ter coordination of sense-making, leading to not just physical correlation but to
social understanding.
TCS challenges
Having reviewed the basic features of REC accounts of cognition in social con-
texts, we are now in a position to consider what a typical TCS-er’s reaction might
be and what prevents the REC proposals from attracting the broader cognitive
science audience.
First of all, a TCS-er might well accept the relevance of the supra-personal
level but they would consider such an explanation incomplete if it does not specify
what exactly is the contribution of the individual capacities. This is naturally
mostly because a TCS-er considers the individual brain/mind to be the seat of
cognition – a commitment that a REC-er might not be willing to satisfy. However,
there are two reasons for why this concern should not be brushed aside easily. For
one, without a solid REC proposal on the individual mechanisms an avenue is
open for TCS to fill it in with representation-based processing. This can then even
be combined with a claim that these representation-based mechanisms do all the
heavy lifting and the supra-personal dynamics are just emergent effects with no
explanatory value on their own and therefore can simply be reduced to individual
mechanisms (Herschbach, 2012; Michael and Overgaard, 2012). Furthermore,
even in discussions of supra-personal explanations, both ecological and enactive
proposals mention individual-level constructs (motivations, emotions, readiness
to interact, experience). Without a clear picture of how these are to be construed
and how they are related to emergent effects, one risks theoretical incompleteness
or even inconsistency (Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009a).
At this point, a REC-er could point out that there is a REC story also on the
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individual level – as direct perception. However, this again is likely to be met with
resistance. Appeals to affordances in REC are most typically combined with a
non-mechanistic explanatory strategy, as described in the previous section. That
is, when, for example, describing responsiveness to stair climbing affordances as
depending on a particular relationship between leg length and the stair height,
reference is only made to measurable behavior-level variables, not to how exactly
affordance is perceived and what is the brain’s contribution to the process. Sim-
ilarly, explaining the sensitivity to the joint plank-lifting affordance involves a
description of a joint behavioral variable (mean arm span). However, it is not
clear whether this implies that perception itself is somehow shared between the
individuals or through which process the relevant individual perception is shaped
– might it, for instance, require perspective-taking in order to compute how the
environment is represented by the co-actor and then combine with one’s own
representation? Again, the possibility is left open to re-construe such affordance
perception in representational terms (Pezzulo et al., 2013).
Furthermore, and here we come to the issue of focusing on different sets of
phenomena, TCS-ers are quick to point out that the majority of REC exam-
ples are limited to certain kinds of situations, such as situations when perceptual
information about each other’s movements is available, action is dyadic (not in-
volving objects) and continuous (swinging legs rather than engaging in discrete
sub-tasks). This allows one to adopt a reconciliatory approach by incorporating
embodied mechanisms in their accounts but insisting that they need to be sup-
plemented with more representational processes (Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009a).
For example, synchronization, coupling and affordance perception are delegated
to the role of “coordination smoothers” – processes that are helpful in achiev-
ing joint goals and perhaps even necessary but definitely not sufficient (Knoblich
et al., 2011b; Vesper et al., 2010).
Now, what is required, according to TCS to scale up joint action? A popu-
lar filler for this role are forms of shared action representation, also termed co-
representation, which is a representation of the joint action desired outcome, task,
other agents and possibly role distribution (own and other’s required actions) by
the agent. Co-representation has been argued to be functionally equivalent to
an individual task representation. That is, when I act with another person, co-
representation allows me to integrate their role in the task into my own action
planning system and can then be used to control the joint endeavor flexibly, mon-
itor each other’s contribution, predict each other’s actions and thereby coordinate
in real time, even in the absence of continuous perceptual feedback. Therefore,
co-representation is not shared in the sense of sharing a single representation by
some supra-personal entity (as one would share a blanket). It is rather that there
are two copies of representation of a complete task that each of us has, just that
complementary parts of it are filled in by me and another. It is not clear, however,
whether the other’s parts are represented from the inside, so to speak, in terms
of hidden mental states (intentions, goals, motor representations) associated with
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each or from a bird’s eye point of view (Dolk et al., 2016).
Action co-representation seems to be invoked both for cases in which people
have to do a task in which coordination is not strictly required and cases in
which they are explicitly asked to coordinate. An example of the first situation
is a famous Joint Simon Task (Sebanz et al., 2005), in which two people are
asked to respond to complementary cues (e.g. different colors or arrows pointing
in different directions) by carrying out two complementary actions (e.g. press
left and right button). It is found in a variety of settings that even though the
task can be carried out without taking into account the partner’s cue-response
pairing, people are affected by it just in a way that they are affected when they
are asked to perform such a task on their own, and what is more, regardless of
the perceptual access to the co-actor’s behavior.
An example of a joint action in which people are asked to coordinate is Vesper
et al. (2013). It was tested how well people can synchronize landing time when
performing one-legged jumps together in a situation where jumping distances are
different for each of the participants. The task was complicated by the fact that
each of the participants could not see their partner, only the cues, which indicated
how far each of them has to jump. What the study showed is that people who had
to jump a shorter distance than their partner typically waited a bit longer before
initiating their own jump so that the landing time was coordinated. Furthermore,
participants also modulated their jump movement trajectory, i.e. those jumping
shorter than their partner, jumped longer, higher and farther than if they were
to execute a similar jump on their own (not in a social task). Such results are
typically interpreted in terms of motor simulation. That is, the participant with
a shorter jump simulates the task of the co-actor and this simulation leaks into
the planning and execution of their own movement.
Co-representation is clearly not acceptable as part of the REC toolkit for a
number of reasons. First, because it is non-trivially representational. That is,
while REC might accept some lean teleosemiotic “representations”, i.e., correla-
tions with an organism-created function (without calling them “representations”),
it remains completely unclear how to construe of co-representations in these terms.
Co-representing the co-actor’s task, intention or action does not seem to be a mat-
ter of mere covariance. This requires a relatively stable pattern of co-occurrence
between certain internal and external states while co-representation is supposed
to be implementable on the fly in a wide variety of novel situations. Furthermore,
co-representations are highly horizontally structured as they require each partic-
ipant to construct a full representation of the task that includes her own and her
partner’s share of it, to differentiate between the two parts and their ownership
and then plan her own action taking such a representational structure into ac-
count (Dolk et al., 2016). They might also be vertically structured if one is to
allow that the partner’s task is represented from their point of view, that is, I have
to represent how my partner represents the task. In sum, it is completely unclear
how such a structure can be based on simple co-variance and function and with-
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out such an account a REC-er cannot accept these representational explanations
at face value.
Second, once co-representation is formed, it is largely static as it is often
argued that it can persist even in the absence of online information from how the
task is proceeding. Thus, the dynamics is also out of the picture in two senses.
First, the unfolding of our actions, positions in the shared environment, tendencies
to persist in a certain action mode etc. are not given a place in the explanation.
That is, co-representation type of experiments are typically not accompanied by
a detailed study of environmental and bodily resources or how they structure the
coordination over time (as in the example of the outfielder problem). Second,
there is little attention paid to the potential of joint action task requirements to
change over time. In a typical experimental situation participants are asked to
perform the same type of coordination throughout the whole experiment, e.g. one
person responds to square stimuli and another to triangles. In real life, however,
the roles might change from one moment to the next, e.g. now I am putting a
cover on one pillow and you pull on the sheets and in the next moment you are
taking care of the other pillow while I manage the blanket.12
Finally, the whole explanation is completely internal to the heads of the two
agents rather than extended between them and the environment. That is, if the
task is “A and B have to do X, by A doing Y and B doing Z”, the co-representation
based explanation implies that this is achieved by each A and B having a complete
“do X by A doing Y and B doing Z” in their heads. Rather than, say the overall
X emerging from some more basic, local, distributed mechanisms, akin to termite
nest building. The social level is re-instantiated inside the agents.
If co-representation cannot be accepted as part of REC, some way to deal
with a large body of research that has been explained using this notion has to be
found. REC cannot simply deny a need to provide an explanation for these cases
because the patterns that fall under the notion of co-representation seem robust
over a number of variations. If the aim is to replace TCS, there needs to be a
REC account also for those phenomena that seem to be co-representation-hungry,
to borrow Clark’s term (Clark and Toribio, 1994). The thesis contains three ways
in which precisely this task is attempted: a theoretical proposal (Chapter 4), a
behavioral study (Chapter 5) and a simulation study (Chapter 6).
RECtifying joint action
Before outlining these contributions it is worthwhile to recapitulate the target,
i.e., what it would mean to provide a REC account for a given phenomenon.
A REC account of sociality needs to acknowledge the interactive effects at the
supra-personal level and complement it with non-representational and dynamic
12The attention to dynamics does not of course preclude that some instances of joint action
are relatively more stable and static. However, dynamical systems approach does come with
tools to analyze such stabilities.
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processes at the individual level. It can include internal states as long as they are
not alleged to have discrete, complex, easily labelable contents and it must fore-
ground perception-action loops and environmental factors. Finally, coordination
must not be pre-figured in the individual heads but emerge through interaction.
Methodologically, the study of sociality requires applying appropriate dynamic
and relational measures, in order to capture the process of self-organization and
the properties that obtain at that level (Marsh et al., 2009). It also includes
paying close attention to the task specifics and environmental resources available
in the situation (Wilson and Golonka, 2013).
A theoretical proposal presented in Chapter 4 (and published as Abramova
and Slors, 2015) builds upon the suggestion of Marsh et al. (2006) that joint
action can be seen as a case of affordance perception, in which co-actors influence
each other’s environment. In both REC and TCS research on affordances they are
often investigated in isolation, zooming in onto a particular action possibility like
sitting, grasping, passing through apertures. In reality, however, environment is
more usefully thought of as a field of affordances, an array of possibilities that are
navigated according to current context and concerns of the agent (Rietveld and
Kiverstein, 2014). We argue that actions or action possibilities of other people
can shape one’s own field of affordances, decreasing or increasing their number
or relevance to current action.
In order to facilitate the discussion we consider two ways in which action
coordination can unfold. One is a case in which the agents share a given task en-
vironment but there is no need to keep close track of each other’s actions because
the task can be neatly divided into separable sub-tasks. For instance, cleaning
a house can be accomplished by one person taking care of the bathroom while
the other vacuum cleans the living room. We call this situation distributive ac-
tion coordination and analyze it as one person making certain portions of the
other person’s field of affordances disappear or become less salient and therefore
a complementing behavior is guided by a field of affordances that conveniently
matches the other’s person activity leading to a coordinated task solution emerg-
ing. In other words, rather than being pre-figured in the heads of the participants
and controlled top-down by their respective mental structures, coordination is of-
floaded into environment and can take shape on the fly.
A more challenging case is when a close coupling between individual actions is
required: the action most likely needs to start simultaneously and proceed while
taking into account the co-actor’s movements. We call this contributive action
coordination and suggest that what happens can be described as one person’s
field of affordances being augmented by the perceivable affordances available to
the other person. For instance, seeing the co-actor at the other side of the big
table while we are moving furniture makes the table appear liftable to me where
no such affordance existed before the social situation.
It is important to note that the proposal to distinguish the types of action
coordination and consider them through the lens of the changes to the field of
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affordances is not yet an explanation but merely an explanandum, a re-description
of joint action in REC-friendly terms. It is meant to replace appeals to mind-
reading or co-representation in discussions of joint action, especially the types of
joint action that concern collaborating in a shared environment while executing
complementary tasks, possibly with respect to objects. We argue that such a
description is more parsimonious and can better accommodate the dynamics or
real collaboration in which coordination strategies can change continuously in
response to both the actions of other agents and changes in the environment.
In order to make headway with providing an actual explanation for joint
action re-described in the way presented above, the thesis includes two chapters
that focus on the mechanisms that could possibly underlie phenomena previously
described using the notion of co-representation.
Chapter 5 presents a behavioral study that employs the Joint Simon Task,
which, according to our distinction, is an example of distributive action coordi-
nation. The results of this task are often presented as evidence for the fact that
people cannot help but form co-representations regardless of how it affects their
own performance (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006). In this case, even though the task
can be divided among the participants, who are responsible for complementary
stimulus-response pairings, they nevertheless are affected by each other’s part
of the task, contradicting our claim that in distributive action coordination the
co-actor’s actions lead to a reduction in one’s own field of affordances. In our
preliminary attempt to deal with this contradiction we investigate whether the
Joint Simon effect is first of all as robust as claimed in the literature. Specifically,
we probe whether it generalizes to more REC-y modes of interaction.
We modify the task in such a way that it is more aligned with the more
continuous nature of real-life interactions by replacing button-pressing with a
mouse-tracking methodology. In this paradigm participants are asked to execute
responses by moving a computer mouse, which, on the one hand, allows for more
continuous actions and, on the other, for perceiving the actions of the co-actor
(in a condition in which the cursor of the co-actor is made visible on the experi-
mental screen). This way, real-time information about the co-actor’s movements
is available and can allow for perception-action coupling to emerge.
To be fair, the study does not directly pitch a REC explanation for effects
obtained in a variety of JS tasks against a co-representation-based explanation.
However, it serves two purposes. First, a REC-y version of a task taken from the
TCS playing field is aimed at giving REC-ers the possibility to try to provide an
explanation for the effects. This could serve as a springboard for explaining the
less REC-y versions of it in the future. Second, since the majority of real-world
cases of joint action are accomplished by perceiving the other’s movements and
directly responding to them, the study is a question about the ecological relevance
of both the JS task and the co-representation evoked to explain it. Sebanz et al.
(2005) claim that continuous feedback is not important for joint action exhibited
in the JS task because co-representation can be automatically activated by mere
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knowledge of the role division and will remain unaffected by whether the co-actor’s
actions are actually witnessed. We have seen that they are also happy to accept
that joint action can be driven by REC-y processes in some cases, for example
when perceptual information about each other is available. A REC-compatible
version of the task that is supposed to be explainable primarily in terms of co-
representation raises the question whether such a mechanism is also needed here
or if perhaps once perception-action coupling is possible, co-representation is no
longer required.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we undertake an attempt at clarifying what co-representation
could mean in a minimal case by employing the Minimal Cognitive Agents method-
ology. This methodology involves constructing simulated agents, whose brain is
a type of neural network, and then subjecting them to artificial evolution in
the context of a given task. The tasks that are typically used in this method
are those that implement some basic cognitive ability (such as perceptual cat-
egorization) or those that replicate some minimal experimental paradigm from
behavioral research (Beer, 1996). With regard to the latter, the goal is to explore
task constraints and capacities that an agent minimally needs to have in order
to succeed in it (Harvey et al., 2005). In particular, since MCAs are often inter-
preted as representation-less, by evolving them to perform representation-hungry
tasks, one can investigate whether successful behavior can be obtained by such
agents and how, i.e., whether the agents can be usefully analyzed as processing
representations and what kind of representations these would be (Beer, 2003).
The study presented in Chapter 6, applies this methodology to a joint action
task, which requires, according to its authors coordinating one’s own action to
a predicted and complementary action of the co-actor (Knoblich and Jordan,
2003). In this task, two participants control the horizontal movement of a tracker
in order to follow a target that keeps oscillating between the left and right edge
of the experimental computer screen. One of the participants is responsible for
accelerating the tracker to the left while the other to the right and the task
constraints are set up in such a way that close to the border there is a potential
for a conflict between the two types of commands and the most effective tracking.
It is argued that a successful solution is based on the ability to predict each other’s
actions and adjust accordingly through a development of a forward model of the
joint performance.
We implement pairs of MCAs to solve this task and examine resulting be-
havioral and internal dynamics in order to see whether something that can be
usefully called co-representation or a forward model can be found. The goal of
this (continued) work is not to necessarily prove or disprove the existence of co-
representations or their role in joint action. Rather, it is an attempt to clarify
what co-representation could minimally mean and whether (1) it is something
that can be made sense of within a REC framework and (2) even deserves a
name representation or perhaps becomes theoretically empty at closer inspec-
tion. As described in the results of this study, we do find some indication for
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statistically predictive relationship between the brain activity of one agent and
the action of the other agent. However, whether this should be taken as evidence
for co-representation awaits further study.
2.3.3 Comparable explananda: Language
Scaling up to language has long been one of the holy grails of REC as this could
possibly help explain how low-level sensorimotor forms of cognition tied to online
engagement with the world get transformed into high-level forms characterized
by oﬄine decoupling, abstraction and other features traditionally associated with
human thought (Clark, 2005; Hutto and Satne, 2015). Arguably, a theory that
accomplishes this would need to meet several criteria. First, it has to explain
whether it is specifically human language that transforms cognition in required
ways and if so, how it is different from animal communication (the question of
the nature of human language). Second, it should provide an account of how
human language does in fact emerge from evolutionary older forms of commu-
nication (the question of language origin) and how it transforms cognition (the
question of language effects). Third, the theory needs to be compatible with a
REC approach in answers to all the three questions above, i.e., an implied picture
of language cannot itself be disembodied or representation-based, at least not at
its evolutionary roots. Some allow for contentful representations to be a result of
language and socialization, others insist that REC needs to go contentless all the
way (Harvey, 2015).
Since addressing all these questions goes beyond the scope of this thesis that
is focused primarily on joint action, it contains only a humble attempt to begin
to answer one of them: the question of language origins. In particular, it con-
siders language as an outgrowth of sociality, taking inspiration from the roots of
enactivism: autopoietic theory (AT).
As already stated in previous sections, AT and its progeny, autopoietic enac-
tivism, define a cognitive system as a living system that is able to preserve its
organization despite structural changes through the processes of continuous self-
production and interaction with the environment. AT (similarly to general dy-
namical approach to cognition) also considers the system to be state-determined,
which means that its behavior depends only on the current state of the system
and its dynamics, i.e. it cannot be arbitrarily specified from outside. For this
reason representation understood as the environment “telling” the system how
things are and what to do is ruled out as biologically impossible. What the envi-
ronment can do is perturb the system’s dynamics and affect its trajectory but only
if there is an appropriate history of system-environment interaction to support
this. Such a process of an emerging fit between the system and the environment
in which the system persists as an individual and exhibits behaviors adaptive for
the given niche is known as structural coupling: “a historical process leading to
the spatio-temporal coincidence between the changes of state” (Maturana, 1980)
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of the participating entities.
According to AT, structural coupling is fundamental not only to the system’s
identity in its interaction with the physical environment but also to social inter-
action and language. However, there are two further things to note before we
proceed. First, structural coupling in a system equipped with a plastic nervous
system can lead to more complex behavior than when nervous system is absent.
This is because instead of being perturbed by interactions of only chemical or
physical nature, nervous system allows the system to be sensitive to relations:
those between physical stimuli, between sensory and motor surfaces and between
internal states. Moreover, the plasticity of the nervous system allows coupling
to act on shorter timescales (during the organism’s ontogeny) rather than being
confined to slower timescales of genetic mutation and reproduction.
Second, structural coupling is a process that happens both between the system
and its environment and between two cognitive systems. The nature of the process
is not different in the latter case compared to the former, it is just that instead
of one autopoietic system and its environment, we have two autopoietic systems
perturbing each other’s state transitions and changing together through recurrent
interactions. This establishes a so-called consensual domain in which interlocked
chains of social behaviors are possible.
Now, combining these two points, AT states that although consensual do-
main can be established through phylogeny and occur between systems without
the nervous system, this is not a fertile ground for the emergence of language.
When structural coupling happens between nervous system-equipped organisms,
interactions between organisms can be based not on physical or chemical triggers
but on orientation, that is, a process of accomplishing a compatible stance with
respect to some portion of a consensual domain. Furthermore, if this happens
based on co-ontogenic rather than co-phylogenic changes, orientation can obtain
for a great variety of such portions (Maturana, 1978). The orienting behavior is
called linguistic behavior and is a basis for language.
Concrete examples are hard to come by in the AT literature but think of the
following. Quorum sensing in bacteria is a phenomenon in which a bacterium
can “detect” the density of its surrounding population based on certain molecules
secreted by bacteria of that type. When the concentration of these molecules
crosses a threshold, they bind to specific sites in the bacterium DNA and change
the behavior of the population (OpenStax College, 2017, Ch. 9.4). This process
is best viewed as a case of chemical triggering because its unfolding is completely
determined by low-level interactions between bacterium’s DNA and its chemical
milieu. On the other hand, a baby chimpanzee that invites her sibling to play
using a certain gesture is more appropriately taken as an example of orientation.
The gesture requires correct interpretation and its effect will depend not just on
the meaning of the gesture but also the state of the receiver, whether the most
recent play session ended amicably and so on. Furthermore, the emergence of
such a gesture and its meaning is typically acquired through a common history
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of interaction rather than being genetically determined. For this reason, a great
variety of gestures can emerge in species like chimpanzees, depending on the types
of interactions available.
According to AT, the mechanism that brings us from linguistic behavior to
language is recursion within a consensual domain. Let me explain what this
means. Since orienting (linguistic) behavior is itself a behavior, it is instantiated
both in the relation between the organisms and in the nervous systems of those
involved. Therefore, it can itself become a target of structural coupling and a
unit of interaction in its own terms, becoming as it were a “representation” of the
interaction towards which it orients. That is, structural coupling can now play out
in this new linguistic domain leading to a second-order coordination in the form
of languaging.13 Furthermore, once a system can interact with its own linguistic
states as if they were representations of the interactions they connote, we are in
the presence of an observer and with a further recursive step, of self-consciousness
– the details of these transitions need not concern us here.
Just like behavior in a consensual domain also language is primarily a matter of
orientation. The focus on orientation is important in order to avoid the idea that
coordination between cognitive systems is a matter of agents transferring informa-
tion to each other or instilling representations in each other’s minds and thereby
achieving coordination. The possibility of social interaction and communication
does not change the basic fact that each system is strictly state-determined and
therefore the only way for an organism to influence another organism is either
through direct physico-chemical perturbations or through achieving broad con-
gruence in a certain stance toward some aspect of the world and letting the
individual structural changes governed by the rules intrinsic to the orientee lead
to a behavior that matches the stance and behavior of the orienter.
In more linguistic terms, this is to say that (1) the primary function of lan-
guage is connotation, not denotation and that (2) mutual understanding is not
about perfect recovery of meaning and intentions of the speaker but about inter-
pretative and practical attunement. For example, consider a woman sitting in a
restaurant with her husband who says “The elderly gentleman at that table over
there is studying you” versus “The old geezer at that table over there is ogling
you”. The reference to the entity and his action is the same in the two cases but
the woman is likely to be oriented very differently and a rather different reaction
is to be expected, depending on whether she recognizes the referent (perhaps the
gentleman is her long-lost mentor), whether her husband is known for pangs of
jealousy, whether she is bothered by that if yes and so on.
13This is admittedly a very abstract description of the most crucial step in the AT account
of language. Unfortunately, providing an example would amount to no less than proposing a
theory of language and its evolution because it requires an interpretation of the AT framework
and a way to relate it to current developments in cognitive science. This is a topic of ongoing
work and so the reader is encourage to adopt her own understanding of recursion here. See also
discussion below.
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Since language then is not a process of encoding and decoding meanings and
its primary operation is connotation, explaining the origin of language is not a
matter of uncovering the origin of reference and how the different members of
our ancestral population manage to exchange the meanings stored in their heads
correctly. This, according to Maturana, would require a prior consensus on the
set of meanings to be exchanged. Instead on AT view, language has its origin
in something more primitive: ontogenetic structural coupling and coordination
(Maturana, 1980). It is a natural consequence of coordination of behavior and
coordination of those coordinations and the richness of communication depends
only on the richness of the system’s environment, behaviors and joint activities.
Although it is not explicitly stated in AT, its implicit equation of an observer
with human being suggests that while linguistic behaviors appear in many species,
language is a specifically human activity. Unfortunately, AT does not describe
specific biological or cultural mechanisms that underlie communication or lan-
guage nor does it provide a worked out theory of (human) language evolution.
In addition, because of relatively opaque conceptual apparatus and a paucity of
concrete examples it presents considerable difficulty to anyone trying to develop
such a theory. The particular problem is this. It is evident what a theory of
language evolution cannot do if it is to stay within AT-imposed constraints: it
cannot assume that at the root of communication are two systems having symbolic
structures in their minds and trying to figure out a way to convey these symbols
to each other (the information transmission view; Rendall and Owren 2013). It
also cannot assume that the key to unlocking language is some syntax-centered
mutation or a mechanism solely placed within the neuro-physiology, disregarding
the coupling between the communicating systems. However, it is far less clear
what a required theory should propose as a plausible evolutionary scenario beyond
“expanding ambient diversity”.
This problem most likely arises because in analyzing language AT emphasizes
continuity between animal and human linguistic behaviors by insisting that they
need to be understood in terms of the same mechanisms, i.e., as a result of
reciprocal ontogenetic structural coupling and mutual orientation. At the same
time, it suggests that human language is special and gives rise to many uniquely
human capacities like observing or self-consciousness. The proposed key is the
mechanism of recursion but it is not specified what recursion is exactly in such
a way that it characterizes human communication but is not present in other
species.
The examples scattered through the AT-inspired literature are in fact of be-
haviors that can be found in animal communication. For instance, (Verheggen
and Baerveldt, 2010) describe two dogs growling but not attacking each other as
recursive linguistic behavior that connotes a fight and allows the dogs to coordi-
nate without engaging in an actual fight. Raimondi (2014) gives an example of
a game of toy passing between an infant and a parent. At first it is just passive
passing of a toy back and forth. It becomes recursive, according to Raimondi,
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when a request to pass the object emerges. The former example is straight-
forwardly about animals communicating. The latter is similar to gestures that
appear in nonhuman primates such as gestures that request play or hugging. If
these are examples of language-conferring recursion, one would have to conclude
that observing and self-consciousness are not in fact human-specific.
Now, the idea that inspires Chapter 7 (published as Abramova, 2018) is that
in order to propose and AT-compatible (and by extension REC-compatible) lan-
guage evolution scenario, one should start with animal communication and then
attempt to define minimal extensions that go beyond it and towards human lan-
guage. In particular it considers a proto-language in which communicative signals
emerge through ontogenetic ritualization (OR). This is a well-known process re-
sponsible for the development of gestures in non-human primates in which initially
instrumental actions become abbreviated through recurrent interaction leading to
a situation in which a beginning of an act evokes desired compatible behavior of
a conspecific (Call & Tomasello, 2007). For instance, an adult picking up an
infant leads to an arm-raise gesture where just the raising of the infant’s arms in
preparation for the pick-up action is enough to induce such an action. Compared
to what OR delivers in non-human primates I consider how the same process in
a context of appropriate sociocultural circumstances could lead to more complex
signals, which are modestly referential (in the sense of world-involving) and in-
tersubjective (in the sense of going beyond particular coordinations and towards
culturally shared linguistic forms).
As a final note, Chapter 7 is written from a slightly different perspective than
offered here. It is presented as a critique of a TCS-derived theory of language
evolution that invokes a construct that presupposes capacities for symbolization
(using signs that stand for objects or actions) and communicative intentions (the
speaker demonstrating his intention to communicate). The article then proposes
an alternative mechanism for deriving a proto-language that avoids these ca-
pacities: a Triadic Ontogenetic Ritualization. Although it is not argued there
but what I can admit here is that I believe this mechanism is REC-compatible.
Clearly, more needs to be done to develop this proposal – both in how it relates
to other REC theories, to AT and whether and how the evolutionary scenario
could continue.
I have stated openly in Chapter 1 that I believe that REC is the most promis-
ing approach to doing cognitive science. However, I believe that it can only truly
succeed if there are sufficient bridges built to the TCS side of the fence. This
requires that both approaches are understandable to each other and that they
can play on the level field in terms of the phenomena they are able to explain.
The purpose of this thesis is to sketch the outlines of a framework for human
sociality and language that can both serve as a basis for further research on these
topics in a unified REC-y way and acknowledge the TCS audience.

Chapter 3
Mechanistic Explanation for Enactive
Sociality
In this article we analyze the methodological commitments of a radical embodied
cognition (REC) approach to social interaction and social cognition, specifically
with respect to the explanatory framework it adopts. According to many represen-
tatives of REC, such as enactivists and the proponents of dynamical and ecological
psychology, sociality is to be explained by (1) focusing on the social unit rather
than the individuals that comprise it and (2) establishing the regularities that hold
on this level rather than modeling the sub-personal mechanisms that could be said
to underlie social phenomena. We point out that, despite explicit commitment,
such a view implies an implicit rejection of the mechanistic explanation framework
widely adopted in traditional cognitive science (TCS), which, in our view, hinders
comparability between REC and these approaches. We further argue that such a po-
sition is unnecessary and that enactive mechanistic explanation of sociality is both
possible and desirable. We examine three distinct objections from REC against
mechanistic explanation, which we dub the decomposability, causality and extended
cognition worries. In each case we show that these complaints can be alleviated by
either appreciation of the full scope of the mechanistic account or adjustments on
both mechanistic and REC sides of the debate.
3.1 Introduction
The study of social cognition and social interaction is typically aimed at un-
derstanding how people manage to deal with other people; how they perceive,
understand and predict their behavior, coordinate with them, plan and execute
joint actions. In addition to a variety of situations that can be studied and spe-
cific theories that have been proposed to account for social phenomena, there
is also a variety in how such phenomena should be conceived more broadly and
what amounts to a good explanation of any given case. Although theoretical
and methodological diversity is generally positive and desirable in science, when
the differences run so deep as to make competing explanations of a phenomenon
incommensurable, progress can be hindered. This is currently happening in the
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study of social cognition, with proponents of what we will call ‘traditional cogni-
tive science’ (TCS) on the one hand and a radical embodied cognition alternative
(REC) on the other. These approaches adopt wildly different explanatory frame-
works and continually talk past each other. In this paper we aim to illustrate
the differences that lead to this impasse, examine its sources and propose a way
towards a reconciliation.
One way in which competing views within TCS are made comparable is by dis-
tinguishing between what a given cognitive capacity allows an organism to do and
how it allows the organism to do it. This distinction is inspired by Marr’s 1982
proposal on how cognitive systems are to be explained, namely that a complete
cognitive theory should specify the system’s operation on three levels: computa-
tional (what is the system computing? what task is it performing?), algorithmic
(what algorithms and representations are used to perform the task?) and im-
plementational (where are the required computations and representations found
in the physical hardware of the system?). Since the vocabulary of ‘computation’
and ‘representation’ are unnecessarily restrictive, some cognitive scientists have
since proposed that Marr’s distinction is more fruitfully employed if we focus on
the questions that are associated with his levels. For instance, Geurts and Rubio-
Fernández (2015) distinguished between W- and H-level, where ‘W’ stands for
what the system is doing and why and ‘H’ for how it is doing it. While an answer
to a what-question is typically a description of a system’s behavior that is a target
of one’s explanation, an answer to a how-question is a proposal as to what states,
operations, transformations, components etc. are involved in producing such a
behavior.
Although there is a number of ways in which to relate Marr’s scheme to
explanations that are given in terms of mechanisms (e.g., Piccinini and Craver,
2011; Bechtel and Shagrir, 2015; Zednik, 2017), the one we will use here is to
say that the what-level serves as a description of an explanandum phenomenon
while the how-level is a proposed mechanism that is aimed at explaining that
phenomenon. Viewed this way, theoretical development within TCS can be said
to proceed by competing refinements of the descriptions of target phenomena –
for instance, by sketching competing functional analyses of some capacity that
might be exhibited by the organism (Craver, 2006) – or by proposing competing
mechanisms that actually realize these phenomena. A particular TCS account
of, say, memory, vision or social cognition is typically a combination of the two
levels and new evidence is collected and interpreted as supporting one of such
accounts (or rather, as refuting the alternatives). Of course, it might also turn
out that what seems like competing positions are in fact compatible because the
mechanisms that implement them are (or can be) co-instantiated.1
1This strategy of comparing theories of cognition in TCS may but need not presuppose that
all explanations are in principle reducible to mechanistic explanations. It all depends on how we
view the relation between what- and how-level explanations. If the relation is regarded as strict
implementation, then this opens up the way to mechanistic reduction. But when the relation
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We admit that many enactivists might wish to claim that they are not in-
terested in being comparable with TCS, especially if it requires them to adhere
to Marr-inspired levels of analysis. They might say that they want to overhaul
the TCS framework altogether and propose a new standard for what a complete
explanation of a piece of cognition should look like and for how one should con-
nect observed adaptive behaviors with their biological (or artificial) counterparts.
However, we feel that in the interest of general discussion among everybody in-
terested in understanding cognition, we should at least investigate whether there
are principled reasons to resist the possibility of a REC-y how-level that could be
directly compared to TCS alternatives.2
Thus, we claim that it is in the interest of enactive accounts of human sociality
to see whether and to what extent it can incorporate how-level mechanisms. It
is one thing to have a good motivation for wanting REC accounts of sociality to
allow for a mechanistic how-level counterpart, though, but it is quite another to
show that a mechanistic how-level for REC accounts of social cognition is feasible.
This is what we aim to do in this paper (Section 3.4). There are three worries
that motivate enactivists to resist mechanisms. First, mechanisms are conceived
of as being fully decomposable and hence reducible to components whereas enac-
tivists reject such reductionism. Secondly, mechanisms are thought not to allow
for the kind of inter-level causal interaction that plays a crucial part in enac-
tivism. Thirdly, mechanistic explanation is often associated with brain-centered,
non-extended cognition. We shall argue that none of these consideration pro-
vides an insurmountable obstacle to a mechanistic how-level account of enactive
social cognition. But before that, we will first properly introduce REC accounts
of sociality in general (Section 3.2.1) and enactivist accounts more specifically
(Section 3.2.2), as well as the idea of mechanistic explanation (Section 3.3).
3.2 Stage setting
3.2.1 Varieties of Embodied Sociality
In order to introduce the various forms of embodied social cognition, it is useful
to first sketch the (still popular) ‘traditional cognitive science’ (TCS) approach
to social cognition as a contrast class. On the what-level of description, TCS
assumes that humans can interact with others successfully only if they are able
to see them as beings with hidden mental states, which they can infer from
observable behavior. Such inferences either involve a so-called ‘theory of mind’
is viewed in terms of idealization or interpretation (in which the what-level approximates the
how-level; see e.g. Dennett (1987), such reduction is not implied. We shall set the issue of
explanatory reduction aside.
2If nothing else, this paper should be taken as an invitation to the enactivists to provide
explicit arguments against how-level explanations as well as an explicit commitment to what
model of explanation enactivism puts forth as an alternative.
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or simulation routines. The results of these inferences are thought to be plugged
into the planning of the agent’s own actions. There is a stunning variety of TCS
views on social cognition, but they all share a general commitment that cognition
is about processing information – perceived behavior of the other – by the brain.
This coarse-grained what-level characterization of social cognition suggests the
rough outlines of the how-level mechanisms underlying social cognition, according
to TCS. Figure 3.1 schematically depicts the way in which social interaction is
facilitated by the interacting agents’ representation of each other’s motivational
states, broadly conceived (including emotional, intentional and epistemic states).
This figure is still to be interpreted as a what-level – the cogs suggest a first step
in functionally analyzing the phenomenon so as to make it susceptible to how-
level mechanistic explanation – see section 3.3. The non-blurry cogs represent
the motivational states of the agents and the blurry cogs represent their repre-
sentations of the other agent’s motivations. Traditionally, motivational states are
thought of as (folk-psychological) mental states. This is the case in so-called the-
ory theories (see e.g., Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997; Stich and Ravenscroft, 1992)
and most versions of the simulation theory (Goldman, 1989, 2006; Gordon, 1986,
1996 accepts this too but 2008 tends to be sympathetic to resonance-based sim-
ulation theories too – see below). Thus, in Figure 3.1 the cogs represent mental
states and representations of mental states (e.g. beliefs and desires). This means
that the actual neural mechanisms that constitute an agent’s motivations and
the neural mechanisms that constitute the other agent’s representations of these
motivations differ quite considerably (this is conveyed by the blurriness of the
representation cogs). The unfolding of interaction between agents is explained,
by all TCS theories, in terms of the operations of this internal representational
machinery, allowing for the process to even proceed oﬄine, without continuous
access to information about the other person.
Figure 3.1: Traditional cognitive science. Differently colored cogs depict the
states of the agents’ minds/brains. All the states of the agents are located inside
their minds/brains and not their bodies. The clear cogs are the agent’s own states
while blurry cogs are representations of the states of the other agent.
Embodied approaches to cognition (EC) have emerged as an alternative to
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traditional cognitive science in the early 90s and have since been gaining ground
while also diversifying in their particular commitments. In terms of intensity of
their opposition to TCS, one can distinguish two families of EC: call them weak
EC and radical EC. A weak EC view is most generally a plea to acknowledge
that the states of the body and the environment can influence cognition and that
lower sensorimotor knowledge plays a role in higher cognition like language and
reasoning (van Dijk et al., 2008). Such a view emphasizes real-time interaction
with other people and perceptual information available in such settings. However,
in many theories within weak EC, the brain still plays a central role, as shown in
Figure 3.2. That is, the body and the environment of an observed agent matter
only insofar as they are represented by the brain of the observer. Certain varieties
of simulation accounts of mindreading fit into this framework. For example, the
appeal to mirror neurons as mediating social understanding still requires that one
person replicates the state of the other person in their head. These states need
not be mental states, like in Figure 3.1. Some motivational states are mental,
others are motor processes and ensuing bodily movements.
In the figure, bodily movements and motor processes are depicted as one cog
in the body. The cog in the observer representing this bodily cog of the person
observed is less blurry than the cog representing their mental state for two reasons.
On the one hand, bodily movements are easier to access than mental states. On
the other hand, so-called ‘motor-resonance’ (Gallese et al., 2004) or ‘unmediated
resonance theories’ (see Goldman and Sripada, 2005) claim that neural processes
driving the behavior of an observed agent are partly replicated in the observers’
brain (the replication is only partial and it is taken oﬄine, so that it does not
directly cause the observer’s behavior).
Figure 3.2: Weak embodied cognition. One agent has her own bodily state (blue
cog for agent1) and her own mind/brain state (green cog for agent1) but is also
representing the bodily state of the other agent (somewhat blurry red cog in agent1
which corresponds to the red cog in the body of the agent2) and their mind/brain
state (very blurry purple cog in agent1 which corresponds to the purple cog in
the mind/brain of agent2).
A Radical Embodied Cognition (REC) approach is the view that the body
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and the environment are actually part of cognition and as a result there is no
need to have internal representations of the environment, other people or their
perspective on the world in order to coordinate with them successfully (Wilson
and Golonka, 2013). However, this basic claim has been further developed in
two different ways. Some REC-ers focus on exploring the emphasis on real-time
interaction with other people instead of detached theorizing about or simulating
them. This often goes together with a view that social cognition can be realized
through “direct social perception” of other people’s mental states. That is, for
example, perceiving somebody’s emotional expression elicits your own response
directly, without having to simulate or interpret it first (Gallagher, 2008). Since
this view assumes that the body is literally part of the cognitive system, while
the agents have perceptual access to each other’s bodies they thereby access each
other’s minds (note the lack of blurriness in Figure 3.3). There has not been an
explicit commitment on the part of REC-ers of this type as to what explanatory
framework does justice to their views. Given their general focus on perception-
action systems, however, one could surmise that the main questions that guide
research of this type have to do with the perceptual input available to the agent
in a social situation and the way this input directly guides the agent’s response
(expressed in thicker perception-action arrows in the figure).
Figure 3.3: Radical EC, Direct Perception View. Both agents have only their
own states of their bodies and minds/brains and no representations of the states
of the other agent. Perception-action arrows are thick depicting the importance
of this process in the interaction.
Other REC-ers focus on a different point, namely that the particular dynamics
of social interaction as such play a crucial role in explaining social cognition. This
is because “becoming a temporary unit of social action with another person also
involves creation of a new perception-action system with new capabilities” (Marsh
et al., 2009, p. 1219). Therefore, the correct level of analysis in the study of social
cognition is the social unit, rather than individuals that comprise it and their
internal cogs. Instead of examining properties of individual independent cognizers
(be it their brains or bodies), we are to investigate the social interconnectivity
that emerges as a result of the interaction and constrains individual-level behavior
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from the level of a new overarching structure. That is, although it is acknowledged
that there is something to be said about the individual brains and bodies (the
blurry blobs in Figure 3.4), an explanatory search for cognitive mechanisms is
rejected, typically in favor of dynamical analyses of social interaction on a higher
level.
Figure 3.4: Radical EC, Supra-Personal View. The agents have some states in
their minds/brains and bodies. They are not easily identified nor ascribed to
either the brain or the body. There are no representations of each other’s states.
In addition to perception-action links between the agents, there is an overarching
coupling connection (the toothed belt) which gives the whole unity an emerging
perception-action opening to the environment (in gray).
From the survey of these positions on social cognition it is clear that TCS and
REC - especially its second variety - are not just different theories that purport
to explain the same phenomenon. Rather, they adopt a different what-level un-
derstanding of a target phenomenon (cognition in general and more specifically
social cognition or social interaction) and a different view on what it even means
to provide an explanation. We believe this unbridgeable gap is not a necessary
state of affairs and that even the more extreme version of REC is in fact compat-
ible with a mechanistic how-level focus of traditional cognitive science. Before we
move on to this argument, however, a short presentation of the supra-personal
approach and the general issue of explanation in cognitive science is in order.
3.2.2 Enacted Sociality
The supra-personal view on social cognition is advocated by two main sub-groups
within REC: advocates of complex systems approach to cognition and enactivists.
These two strands of REC share many theoretical and methodological commit-
ments. However, enactivism is a strand that is more specifically about cognition3
and therefore we will will focus on enactivist take on sociality in this paper.
3That is to say, complexity science is a field of study dedicated to a variety of physical and
biological phenomena, not just cognition.
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Enactivism stems from the early work in philosophy of biology of Maturana
and Varela (1980) and was popularized as an alternative to traditional cognitive
science by Varela et al. (1991). It shares theoretical commitments with complex
systems theory, phenomenology and the Buddhist tradition in, on the one hand,
grounding cognition on the organizational principles of living systems while at
the same time giving a prominent role to the investigation of human experience.
Three main principles adopted by enactivism are (1) challenging the dichotomy
between internal components of the system and its external conditions, instead
stressing the interaction between the two, (2) emphasizing properties of higher
(emergent) levels of organization while precluding the possibility of reduction from
higher to lower levels and (3) viewing the organism as an active autonomous entity
that is geared towards adaptively maintaining itself in the environment.
Recent years have witnessed a development of a specifically enactivist take on
sociality, in situations in which two autonomous agents interact with each other.
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p. 493) provide the following definition of a social
interaction:
Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two au-
tonomous agents, where the regulation is aimed at aspects of the cou-
pling itself so that it constitutes an emergent autonomous organization
in the domain of relational dynamics, without destroying in the pro-
cess the autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter’s scope
can be augmented or reduced).
“Coupling” in this definition is a technical term drawn from the science of
complexity. It means that the states of one agent are a function of the states of
another agent and vice versa. Although one could say one agent representing the
other is also a function of this type, when used by REC-ers coupling is a more
basic phenomenon that precludes a need for representation. For example, two
oscillating clocks when hanged on the same wall synchronize over time because
they are coupled. Their link is not representation-based, it is more direct. The
same type of coupling is implied in social interaction.
Thus, an enactivist view on cognition tends to give a different what-level de-
scription of social-cognitive phenomena. While one could begin an investigation
at the how-level into what exactly becomes coupled between agents, what en-
activism emphasizes instead is that the coupling can become self-sustaining and
influence the interactants from the higher level. That is, the interaction itself can
be viewed as autonomous. In an oft-cited example, imagine two people trying to
walk past each other in a narrow corridor and getting trapped in mirroring each
other’s movements. In such a scenario both individuals are autonomous and both
have individual intentions to end the interaction and keep walking. However, the
nature of the emerging social dynamics is such that their individual intentions
get over-ridden and interaction continues.
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One of the most distinctive empirical paradigms that exemplifies this idea of
autonomous interaction is what is known as a perceptual crossing (PC) study
(Auvray et al., 2009; Auvray and Rohde, 2012) shown in Figure 3.5. In this
set-up, a pair of blindfolded participants (call them A and B) are each equipped
with a computer mouse and a tactile feedback pad. The mouses correspond, for
each participant, with an avatar on a computer screen that can move along a
horizontal line. There can be objects at various points on that line. Avatars
can ‘interact’ with objects and ‘interact’ with each other when they are at the
exact same location (since the avatars and objects have a certain width, so does
a location). Whenever an avatar interacts with an object or another avatar, the
(blindfolded) participant that operates this avatar will feel this via a vibration in
the tactile feedback pad. Avatars and objects will elicit the same tactile feedback,
but a participant might be able to tell whether she (her avatar) interacts with an
object or another avatar by being sensitive to the different patterns of interaction
induced by objects compared to avatars. That is, since avatars move and objects
remain in a stable location, the latter will elicit consistent vibration as participant
moves along its (1D) “shape”. On the other hand, if participant remains still but
vibration feedback changes, it most likely means that an avatar of the other
participant has been encountered. Metaphorically, we might say that avatars
are ‘alive’ because they move and feel, while objects are ‘dead’ because they do
neither. Now there is a complicating factor: both avatars have ‘shadows’. A
shadow is located a small distance from the avatar and it moves exactly parallel
to it (i.e. the distance between avatar and shadow remains the same). Shadows
move, then, but they do not feel: when an avatar of one participant bumps into
a shadow of another participant, the participant operating the avatar will feel a
vibration on her pad, while the participant operating the shadow will feel nothing.
In that sense shadows are as dead as objects. Thus: avatar-object and avatar-
shadow interactions are felt by the avatar-owner while avatar-avatar interactions
are felt by both avatar-owners. The assignment that both participants get is to
figure out when they interact with an avatar rather than a shadow or an object.
Once they do, they are asked to click a button.
Results show that participants were in some sense successful at this discrimi-
nation. Both participants adopt a scanning strategy, moving back and forth when
feeling an interaction. Using such a strategy, the difference between a static item
(object) and a mobile item (other agent or shadow) can be made. But the distinc-
tion between encountering an avatar and its shadow is much harder: An avatar
that is ‘being scanned’ by another avatar will feel continuous stimulation even
when she does not move herself. But the same sensation can be the result of a
shadow moving back and forth over the avatar due to the fact that, for instance,
the shadow’s-avatar is scanning a static object a bit further away.
What makes the experiment so interesting are the paradoxical results. On the
one hand, in the majority of cases in which participants indicated they were inter-
acting with another avatar, they were in fact correct (i.e., the absolute number of
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Figure 3.5: Perceptual crossing experiment. Each participant in the experiment
has an ability to move and receive tactile sensations. They objects shown here on
the computer screen represent the state of the 1D environment available to them
but cannot be visually perceived by the participants themselves. The objective of
each participant is to click the button when they think they are interacting with
the other participant’s avatar.
clicks was in fact preceded by an interaction with an avatar). On the other hand,
participants were nearly as likely to guess they were interacting with an avatar
when they were indeed interacting with an avatar as when they were interacting
with their shadow (i.e. the number of clicks relative to the proportion of inter-
actions with avatar compared to shadow did not differ). This paradox is easily
explained: avatar-avatar interactions were more frequent than avatar-shadow in-
teractions. The situation of ‘sensing the other’ while ‘being sensed’ turns out to
be more stable than sensing an insensitive shadow. The task is solved globally,
then, even if participants are not conscious of this effect4.
This result is important. A frequent assumption in TCS explanations of social
cognition is that recognizing another as a minded being is accomplished by some
special cognitive capacity, often referred to as ‘mindreading’ or agency detection,
and that it is a precondition for interacting successfully. Applied to the PC
experiment this would be like assuming that the participants have a capacity to
4The divergence in results is often difficult to grasp. To explain this in another way: imagine
a bag of black and white marbles and your task is to take out a marble and guess its color but
the only answer you can give is ‘white’. This is analogous to the fact that participants had
to only respond when they thought they were interacting with the other’s avatar, not guess
differentially what entity they are interacting with. You take out marbles and say ‘white’ and it
turns out you are correct 2/3 of the time. However, it also so happens that 2/3 of the marbles
in the bag are actually white. Thus, you are correct majority of the times but mostly due to
the distribution of your chances to be so.
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infer when the other participant felt their interaction too and when not. People
do not have such telepathic capacities, so from a TCS point of view they should
not be able to tell whether the item their avatar interacts with is another avatar or
a shadow. TCS theorists would therefore most likely emphasize that “the relative
recognition rate, i.e., the ratio of clicks per type of object divided by stimulations
per type of object, does not differ between the mobile object and the interaction
partner” (Auvray and Rohde, 2012, p. 2) and so participants failed at the task.
Enactivists and other REC theorists, by contrast, emphasize that “they clicked
significantly more often when meeting the partner’s avatar” than in other cases
and so “were able to perform this task well” (p. 2). That is, from a supra-
personal perspective the task is solved by the fact that avatar-avatar interactions
are more stable, more self-perpetuating, than avatar-shadow interactions. For
this results in the fact that overall significantly more clicks were correct than
false. From a REC perspective, the social interaction itself and its particular
dynamics constitute a solution to a task of agency detection. Therefore, in the
oft-repeated claim by enactivists, social interaction constitutes social cognition.
The difference between the approaches to this experiment is a difference in
what-level description of social-cognitive tasks. According to TCS, agency de-
tection is a matter of being able to fathom another person’s mind; according to
enactivists, agency detection is a matter of being engaged in self-perpetuating,
stable interactions (in the case of this experiment). On the TCS what-level char-
acterization, a how-level explanation should focus on individual social-cognitive
mechanisms. On the enactivist what-level description, the issue of how-level ex-
planations is much more complex. This is what we will turn to in the following
sections.
3.3 Mechanisms and how-level explanation
What enactivists claim with respect to explanations of sociality is that in many
instances in which TCS invokes mindreading, interaction supra-personal processes
such as the stability of avatar-avatar interactions in the PC experiment will do too.
In fact, the PC experiment shows that this description is to be preferred since it is
better at capturing the pattern of results. Thus, the experiment suggests that we
should at least take seriously the idea that the supra-personal interaction-based
social cognition promoted by enactivists plays a more prominent role than TCS
supposes. And yet, enactivist social cognition does not play a significant role in
mainstream social cognition research. As we will explain in this section, the reason
for this is that when it comes to explanations, enactivists content themselves with
precise, prediction-supporting descriptions of the what-level. TCS explanations,
by contrast, allow for mechanistic how-level explanations. In the absence of a
similar how-level counterpart of enactivist characterizations of social cognition,
mainstream researchers see the REC what-level characterizations as incomplete
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and incomparable to their own. To state this differently, when comparing options,
a what-level account that does allow for a how-level explanation tends to be
preferred over a what-level description that does not come with such a how-level
explanation (and does not even allow for one). Let us elaborate briefly on this.
Phenomena such as the apparent stability of avatar-avatar interactions can be
described and modeled in precise ways. Enactivists employ sophisticated means
such as artificial agent simulations and dynamical systems theory for this. For
instance, Di Paolo et al. (2008) and Froese and Di Paolo (2010) implemented the
PC study in agents controlled by a neural network and trained to perform the
task in an artificial evolution. They confirmed that it can be solved using very
basic resources (the agents are very simple and have no mindreading module) and
that the best explanation lies indeed in the stability of the interaction and not in
the individual perceptuo-motor capacities of the agents. In fact, the latter study
(Froese and Di Paolo, 2010) showed that the influence of the interaction dynamics
is robust even in a situation in which individual capacity cannot contribute to
solving the task (because the agents are wired in such a way as to receive their
co-actor’s perceptual input) and when it goes against individual intentions (the
agents are required to stay with the co-actor’s shadow but still end up trapped
in the mutual interaction).
What is most interesting about these modeling studies, for the purpose of our
paper, is the type of explanation that they put forward. There are three elements
that enactivists emphasize. First, they claim that both the PC experiment itself
and the modeling examples “point to the dynamics of the interaction process as
the explanation of coordinated crossing between subjects and not to an individual
sensitivity to social contingency” (Di Paolo et al., 2008). That is, the what-level
consists in interacting individuals and patterns that emerge between them and
not in their individual behaviors.
Second, the modeling studies emphasize that simulated agents are not to be
thought of as models of human behavior or psychology in the experiment. They
are rather a conceptual tool to explore the constraints of the task and probe its
possible solutions allowing the researcher to challenge the preconceptions about
how the behavior must be generated. In fact, there seems to be no simple way
to relate the structures and processes that generate PC solution in the simulated
agents versus the ones operational in humans.
Third, Froese and Di Paolo (2010) carry out a detailed dynamical analysis of
the agents’ behavior and compare it to assuming that agents are controlled by
a circuit that calculates a discrimination decision based on something like the
length of the simulation from the objects it encounters. This analysis shows that
such a circuit would not be able to explain the results and that instead, it is more
useful to consider the dynamics of the agents’ internal states, their movement in
the environment and responsiveness of the other agent. The explanation is pro-
vided in terms of dynamical landscape, attractors, perturbation and hysteriesis.
Such notions places this account in the species of dynamical explanation that is
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traditionally viewed as opposed to a mechanistic explanation (although it does
not need to be, see e.g. Zednik, 2011) and that raises a typical complaint that
what is being offered is merely a finer-grained description of the what-level and
not a how-level at all.
TCS descriptions of the what-level of social cognition, usually in terms of
some variant of mindreading, do not easily allow for a mathematical modeling
of this type. They do allow for a how-level counterpart, though, when they
are combined with what is known as mechanistic approaches to cognition. In
a mechanistic framework, one does not explain a given phenomenon in terms of
dynamic patterns that generalize over large terrains, but in terms of the structural
nature of (causal) interactions between particular elements that comprise the
phenomenon. This is known as identifying a mechanism, where:
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its
component parts, component operations, and their organization. The
orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or
more phenomena (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 423).
Mechanisms implement the processes that are described at the what-level.
They are the paradigmatic how-level counterparts of the what-level. A mecha-
nistic explanation proceeds by identifying the phenomenon of interest and then
trying to understand how it results from an orchestrated operation of lower-level
components and their temporal and spatial organization (Bechtel and Abraham-
sen, 2005; Bechtel and Richardson, 2010). For example, spatial memory as a cog-
nitive capacity is explained by the structure and functioning of the hippocampus
and its connection to other brain regions, as well as the mechanism of long-term
potentiation (a form of synaptic plasticity) on yet lower level (Craver, 2002).
The mechanistic explanatory strategy has been described by (Bechtel, 2009b)
as the activity of looking down, around and up, i.e., respectively, decomposing a
phenomenon into its working parts and operations, establishing their organization
(understanding how the parts relate to each other) and situating the mechanism
in a larger context. The latter might be a mechanism on a higher level or the
environment.
Enactivists do not employ mechanistic explanations. In part this is because
mechanism is associated with functionalism and reductionism, to which enac-
tivists are fundamentally opposed (Raimondi, 2014). More specifically, there
are three main reasons why enactivists avoid mechanistic how-level explanations.
First they assume that mechanists necessarily claim that cognitive phenomena
can be reduced to a composite of their parts. This would preclude the idea that
e.g. the supra-personal level of description has an autonomous explanatory role
to play. Secondly, enactivists assume that there is inter-level causal influence –
for example, the supra-personal level phenomenon of the stability of avatar-avatar
interactions causes individuals in the PC experiment to behave in certain ways.
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Such inter-level causality is usually denied by mechanists. Thirdly, mechanis-
tic explanations in cognitive science are as yet applied solely at the individual
level, while enactivists assume a prominent role for the supra-personal level in
explaining social cognition.
Avoiding mechanisms altogether, however, puts enactivist positions on social
interaction in second place relative to TCS approaches in the eyes of many, for the
simple reason that TCS approaches can and do readily help themselves to various
models of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the individual information-
based processes they postulate. The (implicit) rejection of mechanism is thus an
obstacle to the wider acceptance and further development of the position. What
we want to suggest here is that mechanistic explanation is not only compatible
with enactivism but also preferable.
Figure 3.6: Enactive mechanistic view.
Our proposed version of mechanistic enactive explanation, depicted in Figure
3.6, combines both versions of REC outlined above. The what-level describes
kinds of social interactions in which individuals participate. The how-level ex-
planation is to be achieved by specifying all the components of the picture that
contribute to the realization of such interactions. The components of the cogni-
tive mechanisms (the cogs) are distributed across the brain and the body of both
agents embracing the version of REC that emphasizes direct perception (Fig-
ure 3.3). They are also dynamically coupled (the toothed belt), respecting the
enactivist rejection of the internal-external dichotomy. In contrast to the pure
enactivist view (Figure 3.4), what the current picture stresses is that individual
brain-body cogs are also part of the picture and are required for a complete ex-
planation. Their contribution, however, is diminished with respect to Figure 3.1
or 3.2, suggesting a need for an alternative account of such internal mechanisms.
The fact that the coupling is a constraint on individual mechanisms rather than
an additional cog, expresses the idea that interaction consists of interacting indi-
viduals yet allowing for emergent effects resulting from the linkage. Furthermore,
the picture includes the possibility that the coupling might be affected by contex-
tual factors (the tension pulley), such as the layout of the environment in which
interaction unfolds, or some socio-cultural circumstances.
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Relating the picture to the PC experiment, the enactivist mechanistic view
would imply that an explanation for the supra-personal what-level effect observed
therein (the superior stability of avatar-avatar interactions relative to avatar-
shadow interactions) is right to focus on the inter-connectivity between the par-
ticipants. However, what it adds is the need for taking into account the particular
environmental constraints present in the task (the one-dimensional environment,
the types of objects that can be encountered) and the particular sensory and
motor capabilities of the participants (moving the mouse, sensing vibrations).
These capabilities are parts of the individuals, of their bodies and brains and an
explanation is not complete without specifying their contribution. The various
components and processes contained in the task description above are tightly in-
terconnected in concrete causal terms. This does not preclude, however, that the
whole set-up, including the two persons and the equipment, can be described as
one mechanism relative to which the various parts play their role. It is impossible
to describe this mechanism in a paper such as this (if indeed at all, since, for one
thing, the relevant brain components may as yet be unknown). But the principles
underlying such a description are captured intuitively in the Figure 3.6 scheme
and are as such, we think, sufficiently distinguishable from established enactivist
approaches.
The acceptance of our enactive mechanistic picture hinges on the possibility
of combining enactivist with mechanistic explanation. Thus, in the remainder of
the paper, we will consider the three main objections raised by REC researchers
against mechanistic explanations and show that they rely on a misunderstanding
of what such an explanation entails.
3.4 Enactivist Worries about Mechanistic Expla-
nation
We will examine the three main worries that have been raised so far that con-
veniently fall into the main categories of questions that guide a mechanist, what
Bechtel has called looking down, around and up. We first discuss the decom-
posability worry that concerns Bechtel’s looking down and around, namely the
possibility of decomposing higher-level phenomena into lower-level components
organized in a certain way, which enactivists consider reductionist. We reply that
such a view relies on a misconception of the mechanistic approach.
The second worry we turn to is related to the effect of higher-level emergent
levels onto lower level constituents (looking up in the sense of situating the compo-
nents inside a larger mechanism). Enactivists fear that a mechanistic approach
precludes such top-down causality which they think essential to the autonomy
(i.e. the non-reducibility) of the social level and the possibility of so-called ‘cir-
cular causation’. Most mechanists do indeed reject inter-level causation. We
argue, however, that a recent proposal to explain how mechanism can allow for
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inter-level causation is convincing and fully compatible with enactivism.
Finally, the extended cognition worry has to do with looking up in situating
the individual in a social and physical context. We contend that the core mecha-
nistic literature does not seem to cover extended and supra-personal mechanisms,
as required by enactivism. However, recent developments in the field show that
there are ways to create such a possibility while staying true to both mechanistic
framework and enactivism.
3.4.1 The Decomposability Worry
The main worry enactivists and other REC-ers seem to have with the mecha-
nistic approach is that it allegedly views cognitive systems as decomposable or
near-decomposable while in reality they are non-decomposable. For example,
Lamb and Chemero (2014) argue that according to the mechanists, producing
an explanation requires (1) “decomposition [that] involves developing a model
of a system’s behavior by identifying discrete component parts and their linear,
or weakly non-linear, interactions” and (2) “localization [that] involves mapping
those discrete components and interactions onto features of a physical system”
(pp. 809-810). What is often added to this charge is that such an explanatory
strategy views cognitive systems as component-dominant, i.e. the behavior of the
whole is a simple additive result of the behavior of its components, whose prop-
erties and functions are rigid and pre-determined (Favela, 2015). Therefore, a
single component can be analyzed in isolation as responsible for some particular
capacity of the system. Applied to the brain, for example, it would mean that
we can identify and localize particular brain modules responsible for particular
cognitive tasks like vision, processing information about other agents, reading
written text and so on. Taking out that part of the brain or disrupting it would
mean that the whole system loses that particular capacity.
In an opposition to this view on the brain and cognition, REC-ers argue
that in fact living cognitive systems are non-decomposable into components and
interaction-dominant. That is, the behavior of the whole is more than a simple
sum of the parts because interactions between parts are mostly non-linear, the
behavior of each part dynamically depends on all other parts of the system and it
is not possible to assign any specific task to any component. Therefore, interac-
tions between components are more important than the components themselves
(Richardson and Chemero, 2014). Viewed through that lens, it is not possible to
analyze the brain and cognition into separable modules. Removing a part of the
brain will obviously lead to some loss of function. However, this is not because the
brain lost a particular component that realizes a particular property but because
the brain is then a different whole operating differently (Maturana, 1980). One
should note that we have not claimed that enactivists or interaction-dominant
explanations deny the existence of components altogether. What they do is deny
that the identification of components and their contribution to the realization
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of the phenomenon is an important part of the explanation of this phenomenon.
Differently put, the contribution of a component to the overall behavior of a sys-
tem is not tractable or identifiable in terms of the taxonomy that is appropriate
to describe the overall behavior of the system (much like this is the case with,
say, the contribution of genes to the complex behavior of animals).
As can be seen from the comparison between a component-dominant and
interaction-dominant view on the cognitive system, they are two extremes of a
continuum of positions that might be held by supporters of REC. Rejecting a
component-based explanation could mean rejecting explanations that (a) take
into account parts only but not their configuration, (b) take into account only
parts that interact linearly or (c) statically but not dynamically, (d) take into
account all sorts of interactions in addition to parts but not the modulating effect
of the environment.5 It is unclear at present which of these options enactivists
subscribe to. However, we can examine where the mechanistic approach places
itself on this continuum.
If neural and cognitive systems are indeed non-decomposable and the mech-
anistic framework can only be applied to decomposable systems, then obviously
enactivists cannot make use of it. However, these arguments betray a misunder-
standing of the mechanistic framework and explicit dismissal of the new develop-
ments in this field.
First of all, mechanists explicitly argue against mere aggregation of compo-
nents and place heavy emphasis on their organization (Wimsatt, 1997). It is
because the way parts are organized in space and time that they together can
exhibit behavior that they cannot exhibit on their own. It is because the parts
are on a lower level than the whole they comprise that they cannot have the same
properties (the properties of the hydrogen and the oxygen atoms are clearly not
the same as the properties of water molecules).
Second, there is no reason to suppose that only linear and sequential modes
of organization are allowed in mechanisms. Especially when dealing with biolog-
ical mechanisms, non-linear and cyclic modes are ever-present. Such a focus on
biology has led mechanists to stress the necessity for dynamic mechanistic expla-
nation because in a system organized non-linearly “the operations performed by
parts of the mechanism vary dynamically, depending on activity elsewhere in the
mechanism” (Bechtel, 2011, p. 551). Therefore, an explanation has to include not
just a static diagram of components and their organization but also a description
of how the functioning of these parts is orchestrated in time.
Finally, Bechtel (1997), in response to REC challenges has argued that cog-
nitive systems are likely to lie on a continuum between the extremes of non-
decomposable and fully-decomposable. They are, instead, integrated systems. In
such systems, it is still possible to identify components. However, their functions
5We thank a reviewer of a previous version of this paper for pointing out this ambiguity and
a range of possibilities that need to be considered.
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are not necessarily predetermined and fixed. Rather, their contribution to the
operation of the whole might dynamically depend on other parts of the system,
the larger context and be variable in time. It does not mean that when study-
ing a mechanism for a particular phenomenon it is impossible to identify these
contributions.
In reply to such arguments, Lamb and Chemero (2014) state that
If a neo-mechanist wishes to discard the condition of decomposabil-
ity, then she does so at the cost of discarding the feature of neo-
mechanistic explanations that makes them distinct from more general
accounts of naturalistic explanation (p. 813).
We believe that this is incorrect. What is distinctive about neo-mechanistic
explanations is not decomposability understood by REC-ers to mean “decompos-
ability into linearly interacting static components”. What is distinctive about
neo-mechanistic explanation is (1) a concern for capturing different levels of the
system and understanding the relations within and between levels and (2) a con-
cern for a particular target phenomenon and the concrete working parts and
operations that underlie it. The latter property makes mechanistic explanation
different from different types of explanation, such as, for instance, dynamic ex-
planation (which seems to be what Lamb and Chemero mean with ‘naturalistic
explanation’) in which generality and an ability to subsume a variety of phe-
nomena under a particular regularity is seen as a virtue. The former property
distinguishes mechanistic explanation from a general REC view on inter-level re-
lations that take us into the discussion of inter-level causality, to which we now
turn.
3.4.2 The Causality Worry
Connected with the decomposability worry is another misgiving of enactivists
about mechanisms, which we will call the ‘causality worry’. An important part
of the enactivist framework is the so-called ‘circular causality’ that is allegedly
operative in many enactive systems. The idea here is that the elements or com-
ponents that make up a system ‘cause’ the emergence of properties at a higher
level of aggregation that cannot be reduced to the component parts and their
interactions. These emergent properties, in turn ‘cause’ specific effects at the
component level, by ‘enslaving’ components and their properties, as it is called.
The PC experiment is a case in point: the overall dynamics of the experimental
set-up, including participants, involves the more frequent occurrence of avatar-
avatar interactions. This is caused by the actions of individuals, but the overall
dynamics of the whole system causes individuals to move their mouses such as to
contribute to this effect. Although mechanistic explanations are keen on levels as
well as on causation, causation between levels has not traditionally been part of
the mechanistic picture (Bechtel, 2008; Craver, 2007; Craver and Bechtel, 2007).
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Mechanists typically think of causation as an intra-level phenomenon. Inter-
level relations are relations of constitution, according to them, and it would be
wrong to put these on a par with causal relations. The problem is that on a
mechanistic account higher-level phenomena – system S’s Ψ-ing, say – are con-
stituted by the causal interactions of components of a given mechanism – such
as component C’s Φ-ing. This means that C is a part of S and that C’s Φ-ing is
part of S’s Ψ-ing. Thus, top-down causation in a mechanistic framework would
seem to involve causal interactions between a whole and its parts. This is prob-
lematic because according to many, if C and S are related as part and whole, they
cannot be related as cause and effect. Causes and effects are thought to be (i)
wholly distinct, (ii) temporally asymmetric (causes precede effects) and (iii) uni-
directionally dependent (effects depend on causes, but not vice versa). However,
wholes and parts are (i) not wholly distinct, (ii) temporally coincidental, and (iii)
dependent in a direction (wholes are constituted by parts, not vice versa), that is
incompatible with causal dependency in top-down causation (where parts should
depend on wholes). For reasons such as these, mechanists reject the idea that the
constituent relations between levels leave room for causal relations.
The notion of constitution at play here is synchronic. Or better: it is a notion
in which the diachronic nature of processes – whether at the component level
or the system level – does not play an explicit role. It is for this reason that
Kirchhoff (2015) has argued that the notion of constitution as employed by REC
is radically different from the way analytic philosophers, including mechanists,
use that notion. Constitution on REC accounts is essentially and fundamentally
diachronic; it is the dynamic unfolding of interconnected lower-level processes
that constitutes events at a higher level. The notion of constitution that Kirchhoff
uses as a contrast class for this dynamic, diachronic constitution, though, is taken
from the kind of analytical metaphysics that is not concerned with cognition or
processes in the first place: Gibbard’s 1975 example of a piece of marble that
constituted Michelangelo’s David is used as the main model. Though this model
has been used to argue that persons are constituted by bodies (Rudder-Baker,
2000), it should be clear that a constitution relation that is as static as the relation
between a piece of marble and a statue cannot used as be a model for the way
in which lower-level processes constitute higher-level cognition. Kirchhoff is right
when he claims that diachronicity has been disregarded by mechanists. This is
not because they think interconnected components of mechanisms are as static
as pieces of marble. It is because they have failed to be explicit about the fact
that these components are processes too.
This is exactly what Krickel 2017 has done in a recent paper. By doing so
she has killed two birds with one stone: not only is her diachronic notion of
constitution a plausible diachronic extension of the standard mechanistic picture
drawn by e.g. Bechtel and Craver. More importantly for our discussion, she shows
how a diachronic notion of mechanistic constitution, in which interconnected
lower-level processes together constitute a higher-level process, makes room for
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inter-level causation. In order to see how, we first need to distinguish between
two ways in which a system-level process can be subdivided in parts. Temporal
parts of such a process are parts of the overall system-level process – they are
time-slices of such a process. If the process is the process of a person dying –
to use a sinister but simple example – a temporal part of it may be the moment
in which a person looks shocked and brings his hands to his chest. Spatial parts
are at the component-level; but like temporal parts they can occur during only
a part of the overall system-level process. In the example of a dying person, the
event of a heart that stops beating would be a case in point. Inter-level causation
becomes possible, according to Krickel, because spatial parts of an overall process
and temporal parts of such a process are not related as parts and wholes. Suppose
that the event of diving in ice cold water and the event of ceasing to move are
temporal parts of the process of some person’s dying, and that the event of a heart
that stops beating is a spatial part of that overall process. The heart that stops
beating is not related as a part to either the process of diving into the water or
the process of stopping to move. If spatial and temporal parts of a single overall
process are not related as parts and wholes, then they can be related as causes and
effects: they are distinct and temporally related and they can have asymmetrical
dependence relations. In our example it would mean that we can say that the
diving in ice-cold water caused the heart to stop beating, which in turn caused
the person to stop moving. And these causal relations are all constitutive of the
overall process of dying.
Krickel’s mechanistic notion of inter-level causation fits our model of mecha-
nistic enactivism (where the tooth-belt of global processes causes movements in
the component cogs and vice versa). It also fits the enactivist diachronic/process
view of constitution. In fact, prominent enactivists cite Krickel’s position with
approval (Gallagher, ress; Gallagher stops short of explicitly accepting diachronic
mechanism but he certainly does not reject it).
3.4.3 The Extended Cognition Worry
The third major worry enactivists could have about mechanisms is that they
prevent cognition from being understood as extended, i.e. done not by the brain
alone but rather by a brain-body-environment system. In the case of social cogni-
tion, it is rather an extended brain-body-environment-body-brain system (Froese
et al., 2013).
That the worry is justified is illustrated by the following critique by Herschbach
(2012). In his article on social cognition sub-titled “A mechanistic alternative to
enactivism” (emphasis added), he very acutely points out that enactivists have
not been very clear on what they mean by constitution in their claim that social
interaction constitutes social cognition. Constitution is a part-whole relationship
and if the claim is that supra-personal interaction constitutes individual cogni-
tion, then it is somehow a category mistake and a confusion of levels of organi-
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zation.6 On the other hand, if constitution is aimed at emphasizing the causal
links between agents engaged in the interaction, then enactivists are committing
a well-known coupling-constitution fallacy (Adams and Aizawa, 2010). In this
fallacy, frequently ascribed to proponents of extended cognition in general, one
points out extensive causal coupling between a cognitive agent and some exter-
nal factors and then concludes that therefore these factors are part of cognition.
Such a conclusion is thought to be unwarranted because coupling and constitutive
relations are in general not equivalent.
Herschbach proposes that adopting a mechanistic framework can capture ev-
erything that enactivists want to say about social interaction without committing
the fallacy. He states that the perceptual crossing example would be described
by mechanists as
an autonomous social network composed of two interacting agents
[with some emergent properties to be explained by] (a) decompos-
ing the system into its parts – the agents and potentially other en-
vironmental objects – and determining how each part behaves, (b)
examining how those parts are organized spatially and temporally to
constitute the entire social network, and (c) determining how that
network interacts with anything external to it (p. 482).
Enactivists probably would not find this description troubling. However, Her-
schbach moves on to claim that a mechanist would focus on the lower level of
the individual agents and how their internal mechanisms are responsible for the
scanning behavior observed in the experiment. This behavior is responsive to
the kind of sensory input received by the agent (from another avatar vs their
shadow). The main point of difference between enactivists and mechanists, ac-
cording to Herschbach, is that while the former would like to say that such envi-
ronmental input constitutes social cognition, the latter would say that only the
agent-internal mechanism constitutes the phenomenon of interest (the scanning
behavior) while the environmental input is merely an external influence on that
mechanism. The mechanism succeeds only when situated in the appropriate so-
cial context of having contact with another agent. In conclusion, rather than
talking of the constitutive role of the interaction, Herschbach suggests that the
emerging pattern is to be explained by internal capacities and dynamics of the
agents (this is the constitutive part) that are situated in the appropriate social
environment that causally interacts with it.
Why would Herschbach say this? Are mechanists necessarily internalists with
respect to cognition? They are not. While most mechanists say little about the
6‘Levels of organization’, such as a level of an organism, organs and cells, is a different
distinction than ‘levels of explanation’ and we should be careful not to confuse the two. In
general, one can provide a what- and how-level explanation for any particular level of organiza-
tion although sometimes it certainly does seem that in explanations of cognition the what-level
behavior of full persons is coupled to how-level mechanisms of person parts.
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issue of extended cognition, Zednik (2011), for one, has argued for a possibility
of truly extended mechanisms. He argues that dynamical explanations “are well
suited for describing extended mechanisms whose components are distributed
across brain, body, and the environment” (p. 239). That is, body and its brain on
the one hand and the environment on the other can be said to be the two working
parts of the mechanism (see also Beer, 2003). Following this idea, Rucińska (2016)
adds that the said parts can be conceived in a non-representational manner to
fit wider enactivist commitments, by focusing on the ‘know-how’ in the animal’s
body and affordances as constituents of the environmental side of the equation.
The link between mechanism and internalism that Herschbach assumes is not
inherent in mechanism but rests on a further assumption, not about the nature of
explanation, but about the nature of cognition. Herschbach thinks that only parts
that participate in a self-organized autonomous individual can be truly said to
constitute cognition. He follows Bechtel 2009a in this claim, who in turn argued
that it is the autonomous living system that is the proper “locus of control”,
differentiated from the environment, because it is the living system that needs to
maintain itself as a unity in constantly changing external conditions. Thus, even
if we were to regard the whole PC set-up as a large mechanistic system, it would
simply not be a cognitive system, according to Herschbach.
The obvious thing to note here is that Herschbach replaces the enactive ex-
planandum – the enactivist what-level description – with his own by switch-
ing from the phenomenon of interest being social interaction as a whole to the
scanning behavior of the individual – which is the standard TCS what-level de-
scription. Like Bechtel, enactivists think that organisms are loci of autonomous
control. However, they are autonomous in being operationally closed. This, how-
ever, applies not just to the bio-chemical processes of self-maintenance, but also
to the closure of the sensorimotor loop of the organism. This loop is closed not
to the environment but through the environment, which is merely an additional
step in the loop, not an input or output external to the system (see Villalobos
and Ward, 2015, for a more detailed argument). The point here is that if the
enactivist notion of autonomy did not allow for the role of the environment in the
cognitive process, they could not coherently advance extended cognition type of
claims.
Herschbach may reject this enactivist notion of environment-involving auton-
omy. But he cannot do this on the grounds that it precludes a mechanistic expla-
nation. The fight between Herschbach and the enactivists is not at the how-level
where mechanism is at home, but at the what-level.
3.5 Conclusion
Radical enactivist explanations of social cognition have tended to reject a pos-
sibility of how-level explanations. This pushes radical enactivists in a passive
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defense position relative to classical cognitivist explanations of social cognition,
since the latter can avail themselves of a more detailed mechanistic type of ex-
planation. In this paper we have argued that this situation is unnecessary, as
mechanistic radically enactive explanations of social cognition are possible too.
This, we claim, can put enactivist and cognitivist explanations on equal footing,
which would make a more balanced comparison possible. It can allow radical en-
activism to become more integrated with the rest of cognitive science. And it can
allow radical enactivists to focus on the role of individual cognition in processes
of social interaction without giving up on the extended nature of social cognition
and the possibility of supra-personal explanation.
For this we have discussed the three main alleged objections from radical
enactivists against mechanistic explanation, which we have labeled the decom-
posability worry, the causality worry and the extended cognition worry. With
respect to the decomposability worry we have argued that allowing for mecha-
nisms to be decomposable in components need not turn mechanisms into mere
aggregates of linearly interconnected components. On the contrary, it can allow
for complex, dynamic, non-sequential interactions that result in emergent system-
level properties. With respect to the causality worry, we have argued that while
such emergent properties are constituted by the interconnected components of
a given mechanism, they can, in turn, be said to exert influence on these com-
ponents. We have argued that these mutual relations of influence should not
be conceived as causal relations to fit the mechanistic framework and need not
be conceived as causal relations to capture the enactivist commitments. Finally,
with respect to the extended cognition worry, we have argued that, contrary to
what is assumed by many cognitivists, mechanistic explanation does not stand in
the way of extended cognition.
We believe enactive mechanistic explanation is definitely possible. All it re-
quires is an appreciation of the full scope of the mechanistic framework and its
adjustment to fit wider enactivist commitments. A mechanistic reorientation of
radical enactivism can be advantageous to enactivism as such, and can put enac-
tivism in a better position in comparison to traditional cognitivist approaches in
cognitive science.

Chapter 4
Social Cognition in Simple Action
Coordination
In this paper we sketch the outlines of an account of the kind of social cogni-
tion involved in simple action coordination that is based on direct social perception
(DSP) rather than recursive mindreading. While we recognize the viability of a
mindreading-based account such as e.g. Michael Tomasello’s, we present an alter-
native DSP account that (i) explains simple action coordination in a less cognitively
demanding manner, (ii) is better able to explain flexibility and strategy-switching
in coordination and crucially (iii) allows for formal modeling. This account of
action coordination is based on the notion of an agent’s field of affordances. Coor-
dination ensues, we argue, when, given a shared intention, the actions of and/or
affordances for one agent shape the field of affordances for another agent. This is a
form of social perception since in particular perceiving affordances for another per-
son involves seeing that person as an agent. It is a form of social perception since
it involves perceiving affordances for another person and registering how another
person’s actions influence one’s own perceived field of affordances.
4.1 Introduction
Up until a decade ago there was a scholarly near-consensus over the idea that
understanding others is an inferential process, called ‘mindreading’, that can be
broken down in two parts. First, understanding the behavior of others is held to
involve the attribution of mental states – propositional attitudes, usually – that
cause observed behavior. Secondly, mental states are held to be not directly ob-
servable. There is a lot of disagreement over the nature of mental states and there
are different readings of ‘unobservability’, to be sure (Craver and Bechtel, 2007).
But accepting a version of both points of departure is accepting that understand-
ing others is inescapably inferential: to understand the actions of others we need
to go beyond what is perceivable and make inferences about their hidden mental
causes. For a long time, the debate on social cognition concentrated on the na-
ture of these inferences; this is what is at stake in the ongoing discussion between
theory-theorists and simulationists. Recently, however, some philosophers have
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challenged this inferential nature of at least some social cognitive processes. On
the one hand, phenomenologists question the unobservability of mental states and
insist that we can directly perceive e.g. the other’s emotions or basic intentions
in facial expressions, voice intonations, gestures and bodily postures
DSP is usually associated with the idea that understanding others and success-
fully interacting with them in daily life are inextricably intertwined (Gallagher,
2001). More traditional (cognitivist) approaches would agree only partially. They
would agree that understanding others is a necessary precondition for successful
social interaction but deny that successful interaction necessarily equals proper
understanding of the other. In this paper we focus on situations in which un-
derstanding others serves the purpose of coordinating actions in simple tasks
that require two people to collaborate. Such situations are usually described by
philosophers in terms of shared intentions. We shall not concentrate on the na-
ture of shared intentions (see Bratman, 1993, 2014; Gilbert, 1992, 2003; Searle,
1995; Tuomela, 1992, 2007). Rather, we shall focus on the kind of understanding
of others that guides joint action coordination: who will do what in order to
achieve the shared goal? In order to negotiate the roles played in the pursuit of
a common goal, one needs to grasp the intentions in the actions of others so as
to determine one’s own actions, either to complement or to influence the other’s
actions. This is an extremely common form of social cognition. It is the day-to-
day understanding of others involved in jointly tidying up a room, jointly fixing a
bike, maneuvering a couch through the house together, or in cooking with a part-
ner. In such activities, settling the ‘who does what’ question is usually driven
by a non-verbal understanding of what the other is up to in conjunction with
some grasp of how a single task can be executed jointly. The question we are
concerned with in this paper is whether such understanding involves inferential
‘mindreading’ or whether it can be conceived of as a form of direct social percep-
tion. We shall argue that both options are theoretically feasible but make a case
specifically for direct perception.
In his defense of DSP, Gallagher (2008) insists that social perception is smart
perception, i.e. perception that is informed by previous experience, emotions and
relevant situational context. Clearly, the combination of such different sources
of information in perceiving people is a complex process, but Gallagher insists
this is not mindreading. All that is required is perceiving the other person in a
situation in which one is also engaged and having a vast store of experience of
social interaction. Given these conditions, intentions and emotions of the other
are directly perceived. While highly informative, such accounts of social percep-
tion have not been sufficiently fleshed out yet when it comes to the perceptual
mechanisms involved in perceiving others in their world-context. Nor do they
show how social perception figures in interacting with others in action coordina-
tion tasks. We will argue that the notion of affordances is helpful in filling this
gap. More specifically, we shall propose that successful coordination of actions in
simple cases of joint agency need not be understood in terms of the ascription of
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mental states that must be inferred from perceived behavior. Instead, it can be
understood in terms of perceiving the actions of one’s cooperation partner and/or
her positioning in a shared environment as directly determining one’s own “field
of affordances” – the array of action opportunities that one is responsive to. This
can be understood as perceiving intentions in (rather than ‘behind’) the actions
of others or in their being poised for action. But ‘perception’ is understood in
enactivist terms here. Thus, perceiving intentions in the actions and postures
of others means perceiving them as co-determining the perceiver’s own possible
action-array so as to collaborate efficiently. This is a kind of social cognition
in the sense that this involves seeing the other person as an intentional being
(rather than a mere physical object). Yet it does not involve the ascription of
mental states as hidden causes of action – all intentionality is ‘out in the open’.
To further clarify our account we will augment it with a preliminary version of a
computational model cast within the framework of Dynamic Field Theory (Erl-
hagen and Schöner, 2002; Spencer et al., 2009). We modify the DFT approach
so as to (1) incorporate the notion of a field of affordances and (2) make room
for embodied cognitive mechanisms spanning multiple agents. This is important
since one of the weaknesses of many DSP proposals is that while criticizing an
account of social cognition that can be modeled in meta-representational terms,
no alternative style of modeling is proposed.
The paper is set up as follows. In Section 1 we briefly present the notion
of simple action coordination and the widely accepted idea, well expressed by
Michael Tomasello, that such coordination requires recursive mindreading. In
order to facilitate our argument for a DSP account of action coordination we will
distinguish two types of coordination in Section 2: distributive and contributive
action coordination. Roughly, the former is the kind of coordination that involves
roles that can be carried out relatively independently of each other, whereas the
latter requires e.g. acting on the same object together as in the cases discussed
by Tomasello. Distributive action coordination will figure as a stepping stone in
our argument. In Section 3 we will claim that the phenomenon of distributive
action coordination can be described in terms of one agent’s ‘field of affordances’
being determined by the other agent’s actions. In Section 4 we shall describe
how DFT modeling can capture this type of coordination process, using an al-
ready implemented example from robotics. Up till then we will not have made a
case for a DSP alternative for Tomasello’s recursive mindreading, which concerns
contributive action coordination. In Section 5, however, we will argue that the
action-coordination processes described in Section 4 can be scaled up to cover
cases of contributive action coordination. Contributive action coordination, we
shall argue, can be understood in terms of one agent’s field of affordances being
determined by the perceived affordances for the other agent. We give reasons
to be hopeful that future DFT modeling will be able to implement this type of
process.
68 Chapter 4. Social Cognition in Simple Action Coordination
4.2 Action Coordination and Mindreading
The idea that coordinated joint action requires mindreading on the part of the
collaborators is widely shared. It is intuitive to attribute a three-stage structure
to coordinated joint action. First, collaborators must share an intention; if there
are two collaborators, they both intend to do x together. As mentioned in the
introduction, there are various ways to conceive of this first stage. This is the
shared intention stage. We will concentrate on the other two steps, however, that
constitute the action-coordination stages. Secondly, there has to be something
like a shared action plan. This is crucial for our discussion. Tomasello et al.
express this notion as follows:
(. . . ) both collaborators must choose their own action plan in the
activity in light of (and coordinated with) the other’s action plan: my
role is to hold the box steady while you cut it open. This requires that
each participant cognitively represent both roles of the collaboration
in a single representational format – holistically, from a “bird’s-eye
view,” as it were – thus enabling role reversal and mutual helping
(Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 681).
One complicating factor here is that there may be more than one set of roles
that are jointly sufficient to carry out the shared intention. We shall ignore
this complication for now. The main point is that, intuitively, it seems that both
collaborators need to be aware of a (the same) set of roles that are jointly sufficient
to attain a shared goal. Given this shared action plan, a third step required for
coordinated joint action would be to assign roles: who is going to do what? This
step will be our main concern at first (though we will argue that there is a need
to reassess step two later on).
In order to assign roles, we need to take into account the various skills of the
collaborators, their positions in the shared physical environment, their access to
e.g. tools, etc. But apart from such practical considerations collaborators need
to assess, mutually, each other’s preferences and inclinations to adopt a certain
role. How? Tomasello, writing about “(. . . ) multiple individuals pursuing a
joint goal – and all knowing together that they are doing so – with inter-related,
complementary roles” answers this question as follows:
This kind of collaboration requires (. . . ) skills and motivations for
shared intentionality, including as the basic social-cognitive pre-requisite,
recursive mindreading (Tomasello, 2008, p. 173).
The idea here is that collaboration and role distribution requires knowing
what others are up to, and knowing that necessarily involves accessing their incli-
nations, preferences and intentions – i.e. their minds. Though Tomasello is not
always clear on this, it is not uncommon within this line of thinking, to suggest (as
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e.g. Bratman, 1993 does) that collaboration requires mutual knowledge. Thus,
collaboration does not only require that I know what you’re up to, but also that
I know that you know that I know what you’re up to, that you know that I know
that you know what I’m up to, etc. All this clearly requires both of us to access
each other minds. Hence mindreading is deemed to be a “basic social-cognitive
prerequisite” (Tomasello, 2008, p. 173) for collaborative joint agency. This min-
dreading is recursive because I am assessing your inclinations to act thus or so
while you are assessing mine. Tomasello:
(. . . ) any time we create a joint goal, this must involve a kind of
negotiation that inherently involves such mental coordination because
I only want to engage in the collaborative activity if you do also (and
you feel the same about me), and so we must both assess the other’s
propensities, which depend on their assessment of our propensities,
and so on (Tomasello, 2008, p. 188).
Elsewhere, Tomasello speaks of ‘intention reading’: “The key cognitive sub-
strate required for skillful collaboration is the ability to read intentions.” (Tomasello
et al., 2005, p. 687; italics ours). Intention reading crucially goes beyond ap-
praising situated actions. The latter may be sufficient for competitive behavior,
Tomasello argues, but not for collaboration.
Intention reading involves a “means-end analysis of the observed behavior”
(Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 687). The ‘ends’ cannot be perceived or observed; they
rather need to be inferred. Starting from observed situated behavior, inferential
cognitive processes produce hypotheses about the intentions and inclinations of
others, which in turn imply some understanding of and predictions about the
behavior of others required to adjust one’s own behavior for the purpose of col-
laboration. While this may involve the application of ‘theory of mind’ abilities,
according to some, this is not necessarily implied by the suggestion that intention
reading is an analytical, inferential affair. Tomasello states that his proposal is a
close kin of the ‘theory of mind’ option (2005, p. 690), yet according to him the
ability to simulate others suffices (see also e.g., Bekkering et al., 2009; Eskenazy
et al., 2012; Sebanz et al., 2006). But here again, such simulation is explicitly
meant to go beyond mere bodily simulation as Tomasello and colleagues write in
connection with this that “infants begin to understand particular intentional and
mental states in others only after they have experienced them first in their own
activity and then used their own experience to simulate that of others” (Tomasello
et al., 2005, p. 688). We need to be aware of our own mental states and their
relation to our own behavior before we can read the intentions of others through
simulation. In Searle’s terminology (Searle, 1983) Tomasello’s simulation is not
only aimed at acquiring knowledge of the intentions-in-action of other people,
but also of their prior intentions – intentions that are hidden rather than in plain
view. Tomasello’s proposal here is completely in line with simulationists such
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as Goldman (2006). On Goldman’s view, ascribing intentions (and other mental
states) involves an ‘inference from me to you’ (as Gordon puts it; Gordon, 1995.
Simulation in this sense is just as much inferential as the use of ‘theory of mind’
abilities.
To be sure, the inferences at play here are not suggested to consist of conscious
reasoning processes. Just like our wielding a ‘theory of mind’, the application of
simulation routines aimed at understanding others is usually depicted as a sub-
personal cognitive process that should not be confused with the personal-level
phenomenology of interacting with others(Herschbach, 2008; Spaulding, 2010).
The claim that the kind of understanding of others that is involved in collabo-
rative action coordination is inferential is a claim about (sub-personal) cognitive
processing only. Likewise, the concomitant idea that the intentions of others are
said to be ‘hidden’ behind observed behavior on views such as Tomasello’s and
Goldman’s needs to be taken only as a claim about the inferential rather than
perceptual nature of the social-cognitive processes involved, not as a claim about
the phenomenology of collaboration or the nature of the ascribed states (Bohl
and Gangopadhyay, 2014).
4.3 Two Kinds of Action Coordination
Not everyone is convinced that the social cognitive processes underlying simple
action coordination are inferential. Some conceive of the simulation involved in
terms of ‘common coding’ of perception and action without implying an inference
from me to you (Bekkering et al., 2009; Eskenazy et al., 2012; Sebanz et al.,
2006). Others stress that the high-level mindreading involved in sharing intentions
should be complemented by an ‘alignment system’ consisting of all kinds of low-
level embodied cognitive processes that facilitate interaction and collaboration
(Tollefsen and Dale, 2012). We wish to take this line of thinking one step further
and investigate whether it is possible to conceive of the social cognitive processes
involved in simple action coordination in perceptual rather than inferential terms.
In order to present our case as clearly as possible it is useful to make a distinction
between two kinds of simple action coordination.
Much of the literature on simple coordinated joint action involves cases in
which dyads are required to act simultaneously on the same physical object.
In Tomasello’s example discussed above, two people act on a box; one holds it
steady while the other cuts it open. Other such examples include carrying pieces
of furniture together McCabe et al. (2001) or jointly lifting planks while each
participant touches only one side of the plank (Isenhower et al., 2005). In such
cases coordinated joint action is usually required to start simultaneously. The
actions of the individuals involved contribute to one kind of handling of a physical
object. Thus, participants need to track the actions of the other participant in
order to execute her own part. We can refer to this kind of action coordination
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as contributive action coordination.
There are also cases of simple coordinated joint action in which participants
are not required to act on the same object. Think, for instance, of jointly cleaning
up a room. Here one person may start vacuum cleaning. The next person chooses
a different chore and so on until all roles required to reach the joint goal of
cleaning up the classroom are taken. Or think of two waste collectors stepping
off a garbage truck and walking toward a stack of bin bags. As one walks toward
the left-hand side of the stack, the other will facilitate coordinated action by
approaching the right-hand side. In such cases it is usually not necessary to start
acting simultaneously. This is because the overall joint task can be broken down
into a set of actions that can be executed by individuals without requiring the help
of others and often without constantly keeping track of the other’s actions. We
shall refer to this kind of action coordination as distributive action coordination.
A prototypical instance of simple distributive action coordination is the fol-
lowing. Two people, one of whom is an accomplice to an experimental set-up, are
given the task of sorting a bunch of marbles by color. There are 15 blue and 15
white marbles, mixed, in one bowl. The accomplice will start sorting by taking
an empty bowl from a stack of bowls and consecutively taking 3 blue marbles
and putting them in the empty bowl. She will then ask the other participant to
help her sort the marbles. In an informal pilot study with 40 trials of this sce-
nario we found that all of the non-accomplice participants would start by putting
white marbles in another empty bowl. They opted for the most straightforward
complementary action instinctively. During the trials, some participants changed
strategy. Sometimes participants took blue marbles out, which was always due
to a temporary inability to easily access white marbles in the mixed-color bowl.
Sometimes participants started taking a bunch of mixed-color marbles in one
hand, using the other hand to distribute them to the single-colored bowls.2 This
is a case of distributive action coordination; actors act on different physical ob-
jects and one actor starts with a single course of action to which the other actor
can adapt (in different ways).
The distinction between contributive and distributive action coordination is
not meant to be black-and-white. In fact, Tomasello’s jointly opening a box exam-
ple may be considered an in-between case. For on the one hand it involves jointly
acting on the same object which requires keeping track of each others actions at
least in the first stages of the operation. On the other hand, there is a sequence
to the roles (first one has to pick up the box, then the other can start cutting)
which means that the participants need not start simultaneously and which also
limits the extent to which they need to keep track of each others actions. The
distinction between contributive and distributive action coordination can best be
conceived of as a gradual one. It will be useful for our discussion, though. For
the case for a non-inferential account of the kind of social cognition involved in
unambiguous distributive action coordination can be made relatively easily. This
is what we shall start out with. The model we shall develop for distributive action
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coordination can then be amended, making it somewhat more complex, so as to
be applicable to contributive action coordination.
4.4 Distributive Action Coordination
One can describe the cognitive processes behind the simple distributive action
coordination in terms of ‘intention reading’ and inference. Take the marble ex-
ample. On an elaborate reading, the non-accomplice cooperation partner ascribes
an intended overall action plan in Tomasello’s sense to the accomplice in which
different roles are distinguished (one picks the blue marbles, the other picks the
white ones) and distributed (she takes care of the blue ones, so I’ll do the whites).
But it is also possible to let the action plan emerge on the fly, so to speak. In
that case, the reasoning pattern may be something like this: “it is reasonable to
assume that the accomplice has the intention to go on picking out blue marbles”,
“the chance of actors interfering with each other’s activity will be minimized when
I start picking white ones (or when I take my own bunch in one hand instead of
picking from the mixed bowl)”, so “I’ll start picking white marbles (or take my
own mixed bunch).”
Arguably, however, ascribing intentions as hidden causes of behavior is super-
fluous in this case. For instance, the assumption that the accomplice will continue
picking blue marbles may be described as a mere inductive inference rather than
an inference based on intention reading (see Andrews, 2012 for elaborate argu-
mentation to this effect). But even then, the fact that a process can be described
as an inductive (or, for that matter, as an intention-reading) inference at the per-
sonal level, does not imply that the sub-personal cognitive processes that underly
it do in fact instantiate something like an inference. Compare: the distribution of
sunflower seeds, at the ‘macro’ level, can be described in terms of the Fibonacci
sequence. But this does not mean that this sequence or some mathematical pro-
cess that produces this sequence is in fact instantiated in the micro-biological
processes that determine the distribution of sunflower seeds. So the idea here is
simply that action coordination that can be described as being ‘driven’ by inten-
tion reading-based inferences may in fact be driven by sub-personal processes that
do not resemble intention ascription and intentional inference. The personal-level
ways in which processes are described are not fixed by the sub-personal cogni-
tive processing (see Slors, 2012). This does not mean that a process that can be
described at the personal level in a specific way can in fact be underpinned by
any type of sub-personal process (compare a computer program such as ‘Word’
that runs on a Mac and a PC; this fact does not imply that any computer can
run Word). The fact that two or more different kinds of sub-personal process
can produce similar or even identical behavior at the personal level means only
that observation of that behavior does not tell us, yet, which of a limited set of
possible sub-personal processes is at play. By describing processes in one way or
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another, at the personal level, however, we do influence our conception of the sub-
personal processing at play.3 In order to argue for a DSP alternative to ascribing
intentions as hidden causes of action as a characterization of the sub-personal
processing, then, we will argue for a different personal-level description of the ex-
planandum. We should emphasize here that we are merely offering a description
of the explanandum. We will turn to explanatory models in the next section.
For our redescription we shall make use of the notion of ‘affordances’. The
term ‘affordance’ was coined by Gibson (1986, p. 127):
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what
it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb is found in the
dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean
by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal
in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity
of the animal and the environment.
Briefly put, affordances are action possibilities offered by the environment to a
particular organism. These possibilities are determined both by (physical, social,
cultural) features of the environment and by the bodily and psychological features
of the organism (Chemero, 2003) as well as features that are determined by the
‘form of life’ or culture an organism is immersed in. The bodily features here do
not just involve body size and shape, but also skills and abilities. Thus, young
adults perceive different stair-climbing affordances than equal sized seniors (Cesari
et al., 2003). Note that we will use the notion of ‘affordances’ in a descriptive
way only; we make no claims about their ontological status or causal explanatory
role.
Any environment of any organism can be said to contain a plethora of different
affordances. But only a very tiny fragment of those can actually be said to be
involved in the actions an organism engages in. It is thus useful to distinguish
between what Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) call the ‘landscape of affordances’
and the ‘field of affordances’. Whereas the former refers to all action possibilities
available to a form of life, the latter refers to action possibilities that an organism
– a person, say – is potentially responsive to in a given situation, depending on
e.g. psychological factors such as (shared) goals or needs. Thus, the field is a
situation-specific, individual subset of the landscape of affordances. An important
part of the notion of the field of affordances is that it can dynamically change,
corresponding to changes in the situation or internal state:
If a rabbit eats the only carrot available in a certain place, it changes
the layout of the (locally present) landscape of affordances. However,
as the landscape of affordances changes and the individual’s interest
in eating diminishes, new possibilities for action show up. Once the
carrot has been eaten, the rabbit hole might solicit sleeping, or a place
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a bit further away might solicit exploring (Bruineberg and Rietveld,
2014, p. 3).
That is, the content of the field can change, i.e. which objects are present
in one’s environment and their arrangement, but so can its soliciting “profile”
(the saliency of the objects present). The primary reason for talking about a
field rather than particular object affordances, as is frequently done in cognitive
neuroscience or psychology (when e.g. investigating an activation of brain areas
related to actions that can be performed with a given object induced by perceiv-
ing that object), is that in order to behave adaptively, an organism has to be
able to switch between action possibilities available in a given situation, allowing
different elements of that situation to solicit actions. This theoretical perspective
is consistent with a neurophysiological account of Cisek (2007) that views action
as affordance competition, i.e. a continuous interplay between action selection
and action specification in any given situation.
The idea we would like to put forward, as an alternative to an inferential de-
scription of the cognitive processes underlying distributive action coordination,
is that such coordination can also be described in terms of the actions of our
cooperation partner co-determining both the selection of our field of affordances
from the landscape of affordances and the changes within the field of affordances
as coordination proceeds. Briefly put: perception of the other’s actions medi-
ates the perceived array of possible relevant actions directed at our environment.
What I see my partner doing directly and non-inferentially determines the action
possibilities that are salient to me. At a personal-level of description this can be
interpreted – at least in very many instances – as perceiving the intentions-in-
action (Searle, 1983) of others, as long as we conceive of perception in enactivist
terms. Let us break this proposal down in its two components.
First, intentions-in-action are here intended to be of a kind with what Dan
Hutto (2008a) calls ‘intentional attitudes’ (see footnote 1). They consist of the
perceivable goal-directedness of people’s movements or bodily postures. In line
with other DSP proposals (Gallagher, 2004, 2008; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008;
Zahavi, 2005), the idea here is that we actually see intentions without having
to infer them. It is important to stress that the notion of perceiving intentional
attitudes is pitched at the personal level of description. Thus we do not reject
various proposals for understanding the sub-personal mechanisms underlying the
direct pick up of other people’s basic intentions. In particular we are not op-
posed to the many proposals according to which mirror neurons play a major role
in such pick up (e.g. Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Gallese,
2007). We do, however, think that it is misleading to describe such sub-personal
processes in terms that are borrowed from higher-level inferentially characterized
cognitive processing. In particular we think it is misleading to think of mirror
neuron activity as a form of mental simulation. Rather than as simulation, mirror
neuron activity can more neutrally be described as ‘neural resonance’ (Gallagher,
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2007; see however also Slors, 2010) so that the sub-personal processes underly-
ing our picking up on another person’s intentional attitudes are not depicted as
hypothesizing about another person’s inner realm.
Secondly and importantly, perception enactively conceived does not mean
adequate representation of the perceived information. Rather, it means usage
of the perceived information in driving adequate actions of the perceiver. Thus,
perception of another person’s intentions-in-action, enactively understood, means
picking up on the intentional directedness of the other on a shared environment
so as to co-determine the way in which this environment solicits actions by the
perceiver. This is, in effect, the idea that the actions and postures of other
people can co-determine the selection of our field of affordances from the complete
landscape of affordances. The fact that this alternative conception of action
coordination can also be described as enactive perception of intentions in action
is important. For it underscores the idea that, even though no ascription of hidden
mental states is involved, this is still a form of direct social perception. Others
are relevant in determining one’s own field of affordances and hence one’s actions
as intentional agents, not merely as physical objects.
The cases of cleaning a room together or collecting bin bags can easily be de-
scribed in terms of others co-determining the selection of our field of affordances
from the landscape of affordances and the changes within the field of affordances
as coordination proceeds. But we shall concentrate on the marble sorting scenario
since this is a little bit more complex. The idea is that the initial actions of the
accomplice (consecutively taking out 3 blue marbles and putting them in a sepa-
rate bowl) mediates the array of action possibilities perceived by the cooperation
partner. Initially this leads, apparently, to the affordances of the white marbles
(being picked out of the mixed bowl and put in a separate empty one) becoming
salient for the cooperation partner. Before discussing the possibility of a change
of strategy, it is crucial to stress that on our redescription all we need to fix the
field of affordances for the cooperation partner (apart from the physical features
of the scenario) is the actions of the accomplice. There is no need to postulate
unobservable intentions behind these actions. Indeed, as argued above, it isn’t
even necessary to assume inductive inferences. All we need is the expectation that
the accomplice will go on doing what she is doing. Here it may be argued that
such an expectation boils down to a prediction and that such a prediction would
require some form of mindreading or the ascription of intentions as hidden causes
of action. We disagree. At least at a personal level of description it is alright
to translate an expectation into a prediction. But to understand the prediction
as being based on or grounded in the ascription of a hypothetical (inferred but
not observed) intention is entirely superfluous. For what would be the reason to
postulate that intention, other than the expectation that the accomplice will con-
tinue doing what she does. As Ryle (1949) showed in great detail, we are often so
captivated by a causal (para-mechanical) intentional picture of human behavior
that we tend to lose sight of the fact that the ascription of most mental states
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is not just based on observed behavior, but that it is often a characterization
of observed behavior. To expect others to continue doing what they do in the
absence of a reason to change one’s behavior may quite simply be a psychological
fact (as is e.g. postulated by the current ‘predictive coding’ paradigm; Hohwy,
2013); we may well form this expectation, even if there is no underlying inferential
justification. For psychology should not be mistaken for epistemology.
Equally important is the fact that on our affordance-based redescription of
the explanandum, there is no need for a discrete consideration about being in
each other’s way. Seeing the accomplice pick blue marbles and expecting her to
continue doing so will simply eliminate the blue marbles from the collaborator’s
field of affordances on the description we propose. To say that this elimination
is grounded in an inference based on a preference not to be in each others way
is to confuse the logical justification of an action for the sub-personal cognitive
mechanisms at play.
The description of the explanandum we would like to put forward suggests a
simpler and less demanding cognitive process (if it is that at all) than Tomasello’s
shared action plans. This is perhaps best illustrated by considering the questions
why and how people change strategy in the marble sorting scenario. The most
common change we observed was the change from a “complementary color strat-
egy” (one in which one person picks out e.g. white marbles while the collaborator
picks out blue ones) to a “take your own batch strategy” (taking a batch of mixed
marbled in one’s own hand and sorting them into bowls before taking a new hand).
Typically this change is initiated when turn-taking is not going smoothly and the
participants hands are in each others way in the bowl. When consistently taking
a batch of mixed marbles from the bowl by one participant and taking away one
color only by the accomplice results in an overrepresentation of one color (blue if
the accomplice picks white) this prompts some participants to return to the one-
color-only, one-marble-at-a-time strategy. These are just examples of changes of
strategy and what prompts them. What we propose is that these changes of strat-
egy are direct responses, unmediated by inference, to changes in the perceived
field of affordances. When turn-taking is not going well and hands are in each
others way, the bowl with marbles will no longer be perceived as easily affording
taking out one blue marble at a time; instead it will be perceived as more easily
affording taking out a batch of mixed colored marbles. The change of strategy
is an immediate response to this change in the participant’s perceived field of
affordances.
Of course we can also describe the change of strategy in terms of a change
of overall action plan, based on inference and ascription of intentions. The par-
ticipants hands being in each others way may be conceived of as providing good
reasons to opt for an alternative overall action plan that may be deemed more effi-
cient or easier to carry out. We have no knock-down argument against this option.
But we do wish to point out that this option involves the cognitive processing
or representing of two elements that are not involved in the affordance-based
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reconstruction of what is going on in this type of action coordination.
Firstly, and most conspicuously, an overall action plan involves the actions of
the other agent – the accomplice – as well as the actions of the participant. Thus,
if a change of strategy involves a change of overall action plan, this means that
the anticipated actions of the accomplice are also represented in the new overall
action plan. In the marble example, the actions of the accomplice remain the same
throughout the whole experiment. That is, when a participant changes strategy
and switches from picking blue marbles, one at a time, to taking a whole handful
of mixed-colored marbles, the accomplice will continue to pick blue marbles, one
at a time. The accomplice’s continued actions will fit an overall action plan in
which the participant takes a handful of mixed marbles just as well as an overall
action plan in which the participant picks one color only, one marble at a time.
Is it necessary for the participant to represent the anticipated actions of the
other? On an action-plan account of coordination it is. It is at least necessary to
take into account the anticipated future actions of the accomplice as one part of
an overall action plan that promotes the shared goal and does so while not inter-
fering with the participant’s intended future actions (in cases of distributed action
coordination, non-inference is the most crucial constraint on a collaborator’s an-
ticipated actions; in the cases of contributive action coordination, the constraints
are much more elaborate – see below). On an affordance-based account of action
coordination explicitly representing anticipated future actions of one’s collabora-
tion partner is not necessary. For on this account, action coordination is driven
by ‘on-line’, direct adaptation to changes in the agent’s environment. If the ac-
complice changes her actions, this will be a prompt to re-attune the actions of
the participant. But when there is no change, the actions of the accomplice are
‘merely’ a part of the participant’s environment, to which she is directly respon-
sive, not a part of the participant’s mental representation thereof.
Secondly, an action-plan based account of changing strategies involves the
weighing of options. One action plan is abandoned in favor of another. This
change is not just prompted, there is a reason for it. Obviously, this reason
need not be considered consciously; it is clear that participants do not need to
deliberate explicitly about their strategies. But on an action-plan based model of
changing strategies, one plan must be deemed better, at some level of cognitive
processing, than another. And for this, both must be represented and compared,
at least during some brief period prior to the time of switching. Again, such
double representing and comparing is not required by an account of strategy
changes that is based on online adaptation, such as the affordance-based account
we put forward. On this account, changes in the environment may simply tip
some perception–action balance in the participant.
So, the example of strategy changes demonstrates at least two ways in which
a Tomasello-like action-plan account of action coordination is cognitively more
demanding than the affordance-based account we proposed. This, we submit, is
a good reason to see whether an affordance based, direct perception account of
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action coordination can be developed further.
4.5 Modeling Distributive Action Coordination
Distributive action coordination can be modeled in meta-representational terms
when it is described in terms of intention ascription, shared action plans and
inferences. What we would like to show is that the affordance-based redescription
of the coordination process – the field of affordances of one collaboration partner
being determined by the actions of the other collaborator – can be modeled equally
well in ways that can e.g. allow robots to collaborate. We start by describing the
modeling framework that we adopt for our purposes, namely the Dynamic Field
Theory (DFT). We choose this framework for its compatibility with our basic
claims as well as its high metaphorical and visual value in elucidating the view
on action coordination that we propose.
DFT is a particular instantiation of a dynamical systems approach to cogni-
tion in which emphasis is put on (1) the temporal unfolding of cognitive processes
and (2) the emergence of stable behavior from a multiplicity of lower-level com-
ponent processes each governed by their own dynamics. The basic currency of the
DFT framework are dynamic neural fields (DNF). These are formalizations of the
distribution of activation in populations of neurons relative to continuous metric
dimensions in the organism’s environment. The dimensions can be anything that
is of interest to the modeler but typically the focus is on spatial locations and
movement directions. Each site in a neural field corresponds to a particular value
of the dimension, for example a direction in which an agent can move their hand
(see Fig. 1). Activation is “the certainty with which some bit of information is
currently known to the nervous system” (Spencer et al., 2009, p. 91). In the case
of a movement field, a high activation value of a particular site in the field would
mean that a movement in the direction corresponding to the site is likely.
The fields are dynamic because activation levels change with time according to
intrinsic dynamics as well as inputs from other parts of the system (e.g. senses)
which are themselves represented as fields. The resulting patterns of change
are partly governed by interconnections between different neurons and lead to
behaviorally relevant phenomena, for example an ability to self-sustain activation
in the absence of external input (which corresponds to working memory).
A paradigmatic example of the use of the DFT modeling approach is an ac-
count of infant perseverative reaching, advanced by (Thelen et al., 2001). In the
task, an infant is asked to retrieve an object from one of two containers after she
observed the experimenter hide it in one of them. In the first couple of trials,
the object is consistently hidden in container A and the infant (from around 7
months of age) is able to retrieve it. Curiously, if at this point the toy is hidden
in the second container, B, the infant (up to around 12 months) will still reach
for the first container, exhibiting the so-called A-not-B error.
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A DFT formalization was proposed to account for the error itself, its depen-
dence on a variety of factors, and the developmental change that allows older
infants to perform correctly. It was meant as an alternative to the standard ex-
planation that the error occurs due to some lack of (or lack of access to) relevant
knowledge structures about hidden objects. Instead, the DFT explanation focuses
on how the infant’s behavior emerges from a coupling between different neural,
bodily and environmental resources. All of these resources are represented in the
DFT model as fields: (1) input fields that represent the task environment with
two containers and the actions of the experimenter, (2) the memory field that
contains a trace of previous actions (3) the output field that represents where
the infant will reach (the movement planning field). The age effect is explained
by a model parameter that expresses cooperativity between field sites and the
resulting ability to form self-sustaining peaks of activation. Put simply, younger
infants have lower cooperativity of the movement planning field and therefore
their memory of the experimenter’s cue to the B-container decays during a time
between the cue and response and the movement is primarily driven by strong
memory of previous reaches.
Since the early focus on modeling simple behaviors such as saccadic move-
ments (Kopecz and Schöner, 1995) and reaching (Bastian et al., 1998), the DFT
framework has expanded to incorporate models of working memory (Johnson
et al., 2009), sequence generation (Sandamirskaya and Schoner, 2008b), and even
preliminary attempts at capturing turn-taking in communication and spatial lan-
guage (Sandamirskaya and Schoner, 2008a). What is of primary interest to us
here is the use of dynamic fields in simulating action coordination between two
agents. It is easy to see that in order to capture such interaction, what needs to
be added to individual fields of each of the agents involved, is a coupling between
their fields. One might ask, however, if such a coupling amounts to shaping each
other’s field of affordances as our theory would expect. The answer, obviously,
depends on whether we can find affordances in the dynamic fields employed by
DFT.
It is noteworthy that already in the commentary to the BBS target article
on the DFT account of the A-not-B error (Thelen et al., 2001) a suggestion ap-
peared that the movement-planning field postulated by the authors can be viewed
as an affordance field, in which the dimension would be based not on mere spa-
tial metric dimension but rather on types of actions that can be performed on
objects (Glenberg et al., 2001). The details of the commentators’ argument are
not relevant to the present discussion but we would like to note several things.
First, Thelen and colleagues define their task input field as “the features of the
world which constitute the behavioral alternatives within the intentions of the
actor” (p. 18), which is directly compatible with Rietveld’s notion of the field of
affordances. Second, the authors in response to the commentary also note that
while in the A-not-B experiment the task field is assumed to be neutral and novel
to all infants, in reality it is of course landscaped through experience, which then
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acts as a pre-shape for the movement field a feature that would correspond to
the relational structure of affordances (their dependence on the agent’s action
possibilities). Third, due to the interaction of memory and task input, the move-
ment planning field can contain a number of sub-threshold solutions which can
become active if the situation is changed – a feature corresponding to the flexible
switching between action possibilities within a field. And finally, in simple tasks
such as sorting marbles, there is no need to go beyond a spatial notion of affor-
dances because locations of particular marbles and the target bowls are the only
relevant dimensions of the task input. However, more complex affordances could
in principle be represented with multi-dimensional fields if the performance of the
task would so require (e.g. if one agent had to perform a power grip while another
a precision grip). To sum up, there is no need to represent a separate “dynamic
neural field of affordances” in order to capture the philosophical notion of the
“field of affordances”. Rather, the properties that are definitional of the latter
can be found in different properties of different dynamic neural fields relevant to
action and the way they interact with each other.
We suggest that it is possible to model distributive action coordination in cases
like the marble task in terms of dynamic fields. We are currently constructing
an experimental paradigm that will enable us to test our predictions in a more
controlled fashion. However, a similar model for distributive joint action already
exists. Bicho et al. (2006) use a DFT model in two robots that jointly search
for objects in a cluttered environment and transport them to one site in the
most efficient way possible. The robots do not communicate explicitly but joint
action is accomplished by a combination of memory and prediction abilities of the
robots. Each of the robots possesses the following dynamic fields: (1) an STS-like
field – i.e. a field that represents the kind of information normally processed by
the superior temporal sulcus in the brain – that represents the robot’s perception
of the motion of his partner, (2) a working memory field that keeps a memory
trace of objects in the environment, (3) a goal field that implements the guidance
of upcoming action sequence and (4) a “premotor cortex” field that guides the
action.
In an illustrative example, one robot, R1, can perceive two target objects, T1
and T2, chooses the closer one (T2) and starts moving toward it. Because of its
working memory, R1 is able to remember the location of T1 even when it gets
occluded by an obstacle (recall that the robots are moving in a cluttered envi-
ronment). The STS field of R1 takes in the information about the movement of
the second robot, R2 and “predicts” that it is moving toward T2. Crucially, this
prediction does not involve a ‘means-end’ analysis (as in Tomasello’s intention-
reading). This prediction inhibits R1’s decision to move to T2 and it instead
switches to moving toward T1 (based on the remaining memory trace) and both
robots end up accomplishing the task efficiently. This is distributive action coor-
dination (see the source for detailed figures of the model).
The dynamics of all the fields above and the way they lead to behavior can be
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described in terms of inferences, i.e. R1 inferring that R2 intends to go for T2,
combining it with some encoded information that the task is to collect objects
efficiently and therefore deciding to go for T1. We would like to argue here,
however, that a description in terms of fields of affordances being affected by the
other’s actions is more accurate and much more in line with the actual features
of the model. In particular, the model contains no discrete elements that would
constitute a means-end analysis either with respect to the other robot’s action or
with respect to its own actions. By contrast, R1’s action field at the beginning of
the discussed scenario can very naturally be described in terms of two affordances
moving toward T1 or T2. Due to the inhibitory connection between the perceived
target of the R2’s action, the tendency to move to T2 decreases and instead T1
becomes more salient. In other words – as we proposed in the previous section –
R1’s field of affordances is mediated by R2’s actions.5
4.6 Contributive Action Coordination
So far it can be argued that we have not really been discussing the domain of
coordinated action that requires real social cognition. That is, if it is possible
to accomplish an overall task without constantly tracking the other agent, then
maybe simple social perception is enough. It may be argued, though, that once
we really need to act together with the other, that is when inferences make a
comeback. This is where we turn to contributive action coordination (see Sec-
tion 2), in which agents need to act on the same object. We will first extend
our affordance-based view on distributive action coordination to such cases and
describe what kind of social perception is involved. Then we shall make some
suggestions for future research purporting to demonstrate that this kind of social
cognition can be also captured by a DFT model.
In Sections 3 and 4 we argued that distributive action coordination may be
subserved by the fact that one agent’s field of affordances is altered by the ac-
tions of another agent. That is, the actions of another make some affordances in
my own field vanish or decrease in salience. In some cases of contributive action
coordination a similar mechanism may be at play. For instance, if one person
already starts lifting one end of a table she thereby makes the other end afford
table lifting in a joint action for another person. But in many cases of contribu-
tive action coordination people are required to start acting simultaneously. In
a paradigmatic experiment by Isenhower et al. (2005), for instance, people were
requested to lift planks appearing on a conveyor belt. They were only allowed
to touch the end grain sides of the planks. Some planks were small enough to
be lifted by one person, others could only be lifted when two persons would each
touch a different side of the plank. Lifting a plank together in this way is cer-
tainly a case of coordinated action. But the coordination cannot be due to one
person’s actions influencing another’s field of affordances. For the lifting has to
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commence simultaneously. It can also not be described in terms of limiting the
actor’s affordances as the presence of another person provides me with a possibil-
ity of lifting the plank that I did not have on my own. How, then, can such cases
of contributive action coordination be fitted into the affordance based scheme we
would like to propose?
What we would like to suggest is that in such cases of contributive action
coordination it is not the actions of others that affect another person’s field of
affordances, but the perceived affordances for the other (crudely put; see below
for a more nuanced picture). Furthermore, the influence of perceiving affordances
for another person is not limiting but augmenting in nature. Thus, in the plank-
lifting case, the field of affordances of a person standing at one end of a plank is
changed when she sees another person at the other end of the plank. The plank
becomes ‘jointly liftable’ for her because she recognizes the availability of exactly
the same affordance for the other person as well. In such a case the slightest
motion of one of the people involved might trigger the joint action of lifting the
plank (depending of course on whether there is a shared intention to do so –
remember that we are only talking about the action coordination phase). Or
consider Tomasello’s box-opening scenario. In that scenario it is apparently the
case that (for some reason not disclosed to us by Tomasello) the box can only be
cut open when someone holds it. Thus, even though Thomas has a knife, the box
by itself does not afford opening to him. But now imagine that Thomas sees Ellen
standing behind the box. Thomas’ ability to recognize that the box affords lifting
to Ellen changes his field of affordances: now the box is perceived by Thomas as
affording being cut open in a joint action.
This proposal builds on the idea that we can perceive affordances for others,
but in a crucial sense it goes beyond that idea as well.6 Let us first discuss
the possibility to perceive affordances for others, a possibility that was already
recognized by Gibson at the inception of the concept of affordances:
The child begins, no doubt, by perceiving the affordances of things for
her, (. . . ). But she must learn to perceive the affordances of things
for other observers as well as herself (Gibson, 1986, p. 141).
Since this suggestion, there has been a growing body of literature showing
that people are able to judge affordances for others almost as accurately as af-
fordances for oneself. The concern in this strand of ecological psychology has
been with investigating what information is available in movements, bodies or
positions of others in the environment such that it can provide a perceptual basis
for social judgments (McArthur and Baron, 1983; Runeson and Frykholm, 1983).
For example, people are able to judge whether observed people are able to sit on
a chair based on perceived relationship between the actor’s leg length and the
seat height (Stoffregen et al., 1999). From a perspective of ecological psychol-
ogy, information about action possibilities for others is directly perceived by the
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pick up of invariants in the perceptual array. More recent accounts invoke an
‘affordance-mirroring mechanism’ to account for the same ability (Costantini and
Sinigaglia, 2011). Which of the accounts is closer to reality is an open empirical
issue but we would argue that both are compatible with our view as long as they
are conceived of as primarily perceptual processes.
The notion of perceiving affordances for others can be used to extend our
distributive action coordination account: one’s field of affordances can be shaped
not merely by perceiving actions of others but also by perceiving affordances for
others. For example, perceiving that one of the parents in the classroom-cleaning
example is standing right next to the vacuum cleaner will bias my decision to
wipe the desks instead. This would be the case of (distributive) action coordi-
nation in which affordances of the other (not their actions) limit my own action
possibilities. Now, let us conceive of the next step in our spectrum of action
coordination complexity. Imagine the simple case in which affordances for the
other person augment the array of actions available to me without my needing to
worry about the other’s willingness to cooperate, i.e. without the need to assess
their intentions. Perhaps an analogy with new arguments that have been made
for viewing communication as a type of tool-use may help to convey this idea
(Borghi et al., 2013).
Recent evidence (Costantini et al., 2011) suggests that sensitivity to affor-
dances of the environment is modulated by whether the objects whose affordances
are in question are in one’s peripersonal space, i.e. whether they are within the
space that can be acted upon (this is more than spatial proximity as an object can
be spatially close but behind a glass shield which will not count as peripersonal
space). Borghi et al. (2013) review related evidence (e.g. Iriki et al., 1996) that
the experience of using tools induces an extension of peripersonal space. That
is, a distant object can become reachable provided that I have a rake to pull it
closer. They then suggest that words can similarly act as tools, i.e. an object can
also become reachable if I can ask another person to give it to me. The suggestion
is backed up by empirical evidence (Scorolli et al., 2011) that peripersonal space
is indeed extended in the experiment in which people retrieve objects with the
help of a tool, a button and an object word label uttered to the observer and the
effect is not affected by the type of a tool used. In a similarly fashion, we suggest
that we could perceive the plank as liftable-with-the-other. In such a case, the
other and her perceivable action capabilities is part of the environment that offers
action possibilities to me. We call this case “simple” because the cognitive process
we envision here does not even involve perceiving the other as an agent with men-
tal states – he is simply a physical tool that can augment my interaction with the
environment. My perceiving him as a useful tool depends on the long history of
observing people’s bodies interacting with the environment and my own history
of using physical tools and people to extend my action possibilities.
Now, clearly, for a more complex case of contributive action coordination
something else is required. In the plank lifting experiment, it is not exactly right
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to say that one plank-lifter’s field of affordances is augmented by the affordances
for the person standing at the other end of the plank in a simple tool-use manner.
For the affordance to lift a plank for that person also depends on the cooperation
of the plank-lifter. Now we might think that there is a recursive process in which
one person sees the affordance for another to touch one end of the plank. This
augments her own field of affordances. For now her touching the other end of
the plank would allow her to start lifting it. She can then acknowledge that
this, in turn, will augment the affordances for the other person as the plank
now affords lifting to her as well. Thus, we can imagine a recursive process of
perceiving affordances-for-others that bootstraps a dyad into contributive action
coordination, in which the actions of the two agents are mutually dependent.
There are two considerations that count against this option. For one thing,
this way of conceiving affordance-based action coordination closely resembles the
recursive mindreading approach advocated by Tomasello. Thus it becomes less
than obvious that this kind of affordance-based contributive action coordination
is a real alternative to Tomasello’s proposal. For another, the recursion process
is entirely conditional. The perceived affordances for one person hinge not just
on this person perceiving affordances for someone else, but also in assuming that
this other person will act on these affordances. I can see that if someone else
touches a plank on one side, my touching the other side allows both of us to lift
the plank. But if the other person does not act, there will not be a change in my
field of affordances. Thus the bootstrapping process will only be initiated under
the assumption that the other person will act on the simple affordance to touch
a side of a plank. But why should she do this if the benefit of that action will
become apparent only after the bootstrapping process is completed?
Perhaps it is possible to construe this seemingly recursive process in a way that
avoids the problems above. For example, by building in the assumption of the
other’s cooperation into the shared intention of performing the action together.
However, we also wish to consider another, more radical alternative by recognizing
the possibility of perceiving affordances for dyads (or, for that matter, for groups).
Consider that in their interpretation of the plank lifting experiment, Sebanz
and colleagues note that the finding that people switch from lifting planks alone
to joint lifting “as a function of a pair’s mean arm span” (Sebanz et al., 2006,
p. 73; emphasis ours) suggests that “the way members of a group perceive the
environment might be a function of the resources and action capabilities that are
inherent to the group” (p. 76). Thus, the plank is perceived as being liftable by us
making the affordance a triadic relation between the plank and two specifically
located people. Accordingly, in addition to speaking of affordances for oneself
and perceived affordances for another, there may be good reason to speak about
the fields of affordances for dyads or groups. This is, we recognize, a somewhat
radical proposal. But, as the quote shows, it is already recognized by others, and
radical does not mean implausible.
It is clear that the best way to conceptualize the role of affordances in joint
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action scenarios requires further theoretical work but work that needs to be sup-
ported with empirical and formal tools. Accordingly, in Section 4 we argued that
our affordance-based account of the mechanisms behind distributive action co-
ordination can be modeled in terms of dynamic field theory. We identified an
already realized dyad of cooperating robots as an illustrative case in point. Such
an example is not yet available for contributive action coordination. However,
we see no obstacles in principle for a DFT model in which action coordination
is based on one agent’s field of affordances being augmented by perceived affor-
dances for another agent.
We conclude with a preliminary modeling suggestion for formalizing our affordance-
based view on contributive action coordination. In Section 4 we also discussed
the application of the DFT framework to perseverative reaching in infants that
leads to the famous A-not-B error. It should be noted, however, that the model
has changed since its first presentation by Thelen et al. (2001): upon an attempt
to replicate the task effects by implementing the model on a simple robot, it
has been discovered that instead of moving reliably to either the A or the B lo-
cation, the robot directions were fluctuating at every time step (Dineva et al.,
2007; Spencer et al., 2009). The details of the reason for this problem are not
essential for the present discussion, but it is important that the solution to it
involved raising the resting level of the motor planning field in the phase in which
response was required, i.e. when the containers were moved toward the infant
into her peripersonal space. As a consequence, small and unstable bumps of
activation could more easily rise above threshold and generate stable reaching
decision (Schöner and Dineva, 2007). Given our previous discussion, it should be
apparent that a similar process could be taking place whereby the resting level
of the movement planning field is affected not just by objects coming into one’s
own peripersonal space, but also when it is perceived that objects can be acted
upon with the other.
Importantly, such a model would capture the recursive-looking bootstrapping
of joint affordances. Whether it can be extended to mechanisms spanning multiple
individuals and how to best capture such mechanisms with formal tools remains
an open question.
4.7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to sketch the outlines of an account of the kind of social
cognition involved in simple action coordination that is based on direct social
perception (DSP) rather than recursive mindreading. We have not argued directly
against a recursive mindreading account. In fact we started out by outlining one
mindreading-based account – Michael Tomasello’s – as a live option. However,
by presenting a DSP account that explains simple action coordination in a less
cognitively demanding manner and by arguing that this account allows for formal
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modeling, part of which has already been accomplished, we have tentatively made
an indirect case in favor of DSP in simple action coordination.
Our account of action coordination is based on the notion of an agent’s field
of affordances. On this account, coordination ensues when, given a shared inten-
tion, the actions of and/or affordances for one agent shape the field of affordances
for another agent. This a form of social perception since in particular perceiving
affordances for another person involves seeing that person as an agent. While
this does involve attributing some basic kind of intentional relation between a
person and her environment, it does not involve attributing propositional atti-
tudes. Affordances were introduced as key ingredients of an ecological theory
of perception. Thus, being able to perceive affordances for another person and
being able to perceive how another person’s actions influence one’s own field of
affordances counts as a form of social perception.
One advantage of our proposal for a DSP account of simple action coordination
over other DSP accounts is that it allows for modeling in terms of dynamic fields
theory (DFT). We have discussed one existing DFT model that successfully drives
and describes action coordination in two robots in a way that neatly fits our
proposed DSP account. This example concerns distributive action coordination
only. Although a DFT model for contributive action coordination does not yet
exist, we argued that there do not seem to be principled obstacles for such a
model and made some suggestions for devising one.
Chapter 5
Joint Simon Effect in Movement
Trajectories
In joint action literature it is often assumed that acting together is driven by perva-
sive and automatic process of co-representation, that is, representing the co-actor’s
part of the task in addition to one’s own. Much of this research employs joint
stimulus-response compatibility tasks varying the stimuli employed or the physi-
cal and social relations between participants. In this study we test the robustness
of co-representation effects by focusing instead on variation in response modal-
ity. Specifically, we implement a mouse-tracking version of a Joint Simon Task in
which participants respond by producing continuous movements with a computer
mouse rather than pushing discrete buttons. We have three key findings. First,
in a replication of an earlier study we show that in a classical individual Simon
Task movement trajectories show greater curvature on incongruent trials, paral-
leling longer response times. Second, this effect largely disappears in a Go-NoGo
Simon Task, in which participants respond to only one of the cues and refrain
from responding to the other. Third, contrary to previous studies that use but-
ton pressing responses, we observe no overall effect in the joint variants of the
task. However, we also detect a notable diversity in movement strategies adopted
by the participants with some participants showing the effect on the individual
level. Our study casts doubt on the pervasiveness of co-representation, highlights
the usefulness of mouse-tracking methodology and emphasizes the need for looking
at individual variation in task performance.
5.1 Introduction
Research on social cognition has advanced by moving beyond scenarios of passive
observation of other’s actions or instructed imitation tasks to situations of joint
action. Based on one of the most popular tasks in this research, the so-called Joint
Simon Task (JST), it has been argued that humans co-represent each other’s tasks
during joint action (Sebanz et al., 2003). This proposal, which we will refer to
as the social account, has not gone unchallenged. Some cognitive scientists have
proposed that the effects observed in the JST need not be seen as evidence of
a specifically social cognitive mechanism of ‘co-representation’, but instead can
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be explained by an appeal to domain-general cognitive processes (the domain-
general account; Dolk et al., 2013). So far, this debate has been limited to trying
to come up with competing mechanisms that could underlie the effect obtained
in variations of the same basic experimental paradigm. A question that has not
been addressed, however, is if this phenomenon, if it indeed occurs, is as pervasive
and automatic as has been assumed in the social account. In this paper we set
out to contribute to the running debate by targeting this latter question.
The JST is an extension of the standard Simon Task. In a standard, non-
joint Simon task (SST) participants carry out spatially defined responses (e.g.,
push a left or a right button) to stimuli defined by a task-relevant non-spatial
dimension (e.g., shape or color) while ignoring their spatial dimension (e.g. stimuli
themselves appearing on the left or right side of the screen). What is typically
found in such an experiment is that incompatible trials (pushing the left button
in response to the stimulus appearing on the right) lead to worse performance,
that is, an increased number of errors and slower reaction time compared to
compatible trials (pushing the left button in response to the stimulus on the left).
This is commonly explained as a result of conflict in the response selection stage
produced by an automatic encoding of stimulus spatiality which interacts with
an active representation of two response alternatives. Accordingly, it has been
found (Hommel, 1996) that the Simon effect disappears if the participant is asked
to perform a Go-NoGo version of the task in which they have to respond to only
one type of stimulus with one type of a response. Arguably, this is due to the
fact that if only one kind of response is required, it can be represented in a non-
spatial way, for example as needing to push a button, not a left or right button
and therefore no conflict with the spatiality of the stimulus can arise.
The JST has been designed by Sebanz et al. (2003) to investigate how one’s
own action planning is affected by the intentions, actions or tasks of another
person. Sebanz and colleagues reasoned that if two people are assigned com-
plementary halves of the task and they are not affected by each other’s roles,
there will be no Simon effect, just as in the individual Go-NoGo version of the
task. However, the experiment showed that the Simon effect does occur in such
a joint version, leading Sebanz and colleagues to conclude that “the action at the
other’s disposal was represented and subject to automatic response activation by
the irrelevant stimulus dimension” (p. 15), just as in the individual Simon task.
Interestingly, what also emerged from the experiment is that blocking any au-
ditory or visual information about the other’s responses did not alter the effect,
suggesting that representing the other’s part of the task is a relatively high-level,
“oﬄine” process, i.e. it can be activated by mere knowledge of the task and the
co-actor’s contribution to it, and unaffected by whether or not one witnesses the
other’s actions (see also Tsai et al., 2008; Vlainic et al., 2010 for corroborating
but Welsh et al., 2007 for contrasting evidence).
The mechanism proposed to underlie the joint Simon effect (JSE) has since
been dubbed co-representation and it became an ingredient of a broader social
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account of joint action, that also includes processes of action simulation and
prediction, joint attention, perspective-taking, and mind-reading (e.g., Vesper
et al., 2010; Loehr et al., 2013; Sebanz et al., 2006). According to this account, solo
and joint actions are functionally equivalent in that they rely on representations
of task constraints and required actions, except that in the joint case, the task is
represented as distributed among the participants, allowing one’s own actions to
be coordinated with that of the co-actor. The resulting account is ‘social’ because
it relies on specifically social representations whose content is something about
the internal state of another intentional agent (her goals, intentions and actions
specified by the task) and social mechanisms operating only in social contexts
and influenced by social factors. Furthermore, it has also been suggested that
the formation of co-representations is pervasive across situations and automatic,
that is, “even if that leads to a decline in one’s own performance ... people cannot
help representing what other people do” (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006, p. 101).
Of the three features of co-representation, i.e. its social, oﬄine, and automatic
nature, the most heated debate centered on the first one. The proponents of the
social nature of co-representation have provided evidence that the JSE is more
likely when the co-actor is an intentional agent (Müller et al., 2011, 2015; Tsai and
Brass, 2007; Stenzel et al., 2012) and that it is affected by a host of social factors
(Hommel et al., 2009; McClung et al., 2013; Ford and Aberdein, 2015; Ruys and
Aarts, 2010). However, a different group of researchers have demonstrated that
JSE can be found with a passive and even a variety of non-human co-actors
(Dolk et al., 2011, 2013; Stenzel and Liepelt, 2016) and that the co-actor does
not seem to share all aspects of the task (e.g. the proportion of compatible
and incompatible trials; Yamaguchi et al., 2018). The former casts doubt on
the social nature of co-representation while the latter puts a limit on the extent
of the overlap with the co-actor. In order to explain these results a competing
domain-general theory has been proposed, according to which the JSE is due to
the presence of salient events that induce spatial coding of the perceived task
environment and required actions (Dolk et al., 2014). A more general idea is that
people navigate social situations not due to some specifically social mechanisms
but by simply perceiving task environment differently than when they are on
their own and therefore the notion of task-sharing should be replaced by a more
neutral term like task-shaping of the participants by an enriched context (see for
example Dolk et al., 2016).
While the debate on the mechanisms underlying the JSE and joint action
more broadly is undoubtedly important, we believe it risks losing sight of the big
picture that inspires this research in the first place. What research on joint action
ideally should explain is how real people in a variety of real-life situations manage
to act together employing a range of possible strategies. If an account of joint
action postulates a mechanism to explain an observed phenomenon, we should
make sure that the phenomenon actually occurs in real-world interactions and
it is not limited to, or worse, an artifact of an experimental paradigm. In other
90 Chapter 5. Joint Simon Effect in Movement Trajectories
words, we should ask ourselves the question to what extent the phenomenon has
ecological relevance.
Such reflection is especially important in light of recent evidence that JSE
itself might not be as robust as previously thought. A meta-analysis conducted
on 39 distinct studies that employed JST (Karlinsky et al., 2017) found that (1)
there is reason to believe there is a publication bias skewed towards studies that
found a JSE, (2) restricting the analysis to studies with large samples removes the
bias but reduces the overall effect size to d = 0.17. These two findings together
indicate that the effect may not be reliably present and even when it is, its
size is small. Karlinsky and colleagues caution that this may indicate a “limited
‘practical’ significance of this effect". Here we would argue that it may also limit
its “theoretical" significance: the unreliability of the JSE suggests that—leaving
statistical bias aside—the evidence for the pervasiveness and automaticity of co-
representation is weak at best.
In this study, we add to the discussion of pervasiveness of the JSE by taking
a preliminary step towards exploring whether it is robust under variation of the
experimental paradigm that incorporates some of the aspects of more naturalistic
settings of embodied joint action. Specifically, we developed a paradigm in which
participants can move continuously and have more real-time (“online”) informa-
tion about the co-actor’s movements. This is motivated by the fact that in real
life, joint action is typically done by people present in the same location and able
to observe each other’s movements. Given the assumption that the JSE is driven
by oﬄine, automatic processes of co-representation, the JSE should remain ro-
bust under such variants. If it does not, then this would cast more doubt on
the ecological relevance of the effect and the mechanisms postulated to explain
it, for embodied joint action.1 To emphasize this in other words: our study does
not aim at pitching the different accounts of mechanisms that underlie JSE—co-
representation versus domain-general—against each other. Instead, we probe the
ecological plausibility of the co-representation account by modifying an existing
prominent paradigm in a slightly more naturalistic version to to test if indeed
this postulated mechanism is as pervasive as seems to be implied by its presumed
automaticity.
In our experimental paradigm, we employ a dynamic mouse-tracking method-
ology (Freeman, 2018; Freeman et al., 2011). In this methodology participant is
carrying out a choice task by selecting responses via moving a computer mouse
cursor to one of the specified locations on the screen. The mouse movement is
recorded at high sampling frequency and the resulting trajectories analyzed in
1Note that this moves in opposite direction compared to previous research that attempted
to answer whether JSE is affected by the presence of the co-actor. There a typical comparison
was between a situation of people executing button presses while seated next to each other
and the situations of decreasing access to information about the co-actor (Vlainic et al., 2010;
Guagnano et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2013; Tsai et al., 2008; Ruys and Aarts, 2010; Welsh et al.,
2007; Sellaro et al., 2013).
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various ways. This allows for a more fine-grained insight into the evolution of
decision over time than, for instance, simply measuring reaction times. What
is typically found in studies that employ mouse-tracking is that in certain con-
ditions trajectories reveal a deviation toward an unselected response, indicating
its covert activation. This approach has been used in a variety of settings, such
as social perception (Freeman et al., 2008), language processing (Spivey et al.,
2005), Implicit Association Test measure (Yu et al., 2012) and even theory of
mind (van der Wel et al., 2013).
Adapting the mouse-tracking methodology to the Simon task means that in-
stead of clicking right or left buttons in response to the Simon task stimuli, partic-
ipants execute responses by moving the cursor from a starting position to one of
the response boxes presented on a screen (see Figure 5.1). Previously it has been
demonstrated by Scherbaum et al. (2010) that by using such a trajectory-based
response modality the standard (individual) Simon effect can be replicated. Their
results showed that in addition to slower RT in incompatible trials, the mouse
trajectory is also affected by exhibiting greater curvature towards the wrong re-
sponse box, indicating an implicit attraction towards the unselected competing
response, as explained above (Freeman et al., 2011). If this effect were to be repli-
cated in a JST version of the mouse-tracking paradigm it would be the continuous
(mouse-tracking) analog of the classical (key press) JSE.
To our knowledge there has been only one study that was partially imple-
mented to investigate mouse trajectories in a JST (Croker et al., 2015). However,
in this study both participants performed a full version of the standard Simon
task, not a complementary Go-NoGo task, which prevents any interpretation as
to whether the effects observed are due to the individual spatial compatibility
effect or due to anything that has to do with joint action. Additionally, the
study setup involved participants responding in two different modalities, one ex-
ecuting responses with the mouse, while their co-actor was still pressing buttons.
First, it is unclear how such a setup could be integrated into one potential co-
representation. Second, it allows one to investigate only the effect of executing
continuous actions, not observing the actions of the co-actor.
In an attempt to improve the interpretability of the joint mouse-tracking task,
we made the following modifications, implementing four different mouse-tracking
variants of the (Joint) Simon task in three successive experiments with different
participants.
Our Experiment 1 was designed to test if we could replicate the mouse-tracking
Simon effect observed by Scherbaum et al. (2010). Experiment 2 tested whether in
an individual Go-NoGo mouse-tracking task, in which each participant responded
to only one cue, the effect is indeed absent as has been observed in the key press
version of the task (Sebanz et al., 2003). Experiment 3 was the main target of our
study. It employed a traditional JST design, performed by pairs of participants, in
which one participant responded to one cue and the other to the complementary
cue. In our study both participants performed a mouse-tracking implementation
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of the task. We tested two versions of this task: an online version in which
participants had online information about the others’ actions: each participant
saw both their own and their partner’s cursor on the screen; and an oﬄine version
in which participants only saw their own cursor. With Experiment 3 we wanted
to test whether or not a mouse-tracking JSE occurs under these conditions.
If we find a mouse-tracking JSE, it would increase the likelihood that the effect
is robust and generalizes to a paradigm with more continuous response format,
which seems a minimal condition for it to apply also in life-like situations of joint
action. Furthermore, it would give researchers an additional tool to investigate
the mechanisms underlying the JSE, such as the ability to observe an unfolding
of action over time, including a decision to inhibit the response. If, however,
we find no effect in our Experiment 3, this puts into question the robustness
and generalizability of the effect. Such a result would bear on the nature of the
mechanisms that are postulated to underlie the effect, specifically the presumed
pervasive, automatic, social and oﬄine nature of co-representation.
The aim of the first experiment was to replicate a previous study by Scherbaum
and colleagues (Scherbaum et al., 2010) in order to ensure that the re-created
setup delivers comparable results for the individual Simon condition. We have
followed the description of their experimental conditions with the exception of
employing different type of stimuli: colored squares instead of white arrows. As
such, our Experiment 1 serves as a generalization test for the individual Simon
effect in mouse trajectories. We predicted that participants in incongruent trials
will exhibit longer reaction times and movement trajectories curved towards the
incorrect response.
5.1.1 Methods
Participants
Twenty participants from the Radboud University participants pool (14 women;
ages between 19 and 30 years, mean age 23.9) were recruited for the first experi-
ment. The number of participants was based on the previous study by (Scherbaum
et al., 2010) and is justified by a large number of trials that each participant
performs (640). All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were not aware of the purpose of the experiment. They were
paid 10 euros for their participation. The study was approved by the institution’s
local ethics committee (ECSW2015-1105-309) and written informed consent was
obtained from each participant.
Apparatus and stimuli
All participants were seated about 60 cm in front of a 24 inch computer screen
(a resolution of 1920x1080 pixels, 120 Hz refresh frequency) and performed the
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task on their own. We used Psychophysics Toolbox 3 as presentation software
running in Matlab 2016a on Windows 7. Target stimuli were red and blue square
boxes presented in turn on a black background. They had a size of 3.82◦ and
an eccentricity of 7.16◦ at 60 cm distance. The top left and right of the screen
contained gray response boxes of width 9.55◦. There was a small gray rectangle
(3.82◦ width) displayed at the bottom center of the screen that played the role
of a “start button”. Responses were executed by moving a standard computer
mouse (Logitech G500S). Mouse positions were sampled with a frequency of 92
Hz and recorded in each trial from the presentation of the start rectangle until
response.2
Task and procedure
Participants were asked to respond to the color of a presented square by clicking
on the assigned response box. The association between the color of the square
(blue or red) and the response box (left or right) was counter-balanced across
participants.
Each trial consisted of three stages (see Figure 5.1). In the first stage par-
ticipants were asked to click on the small gray box at the bottom of the screen
in order to start the trial within a deadline of 1.5s. After the start click, two
gray response boxes appeared on the screen and participants had to start moving
upward within a deadline of 1.5s. If they started moving as requested and crossed
a specific y-threshold (unknown to the participants), a color square appeared on
the left or right side of the screen. Participants were asked to click on the re-
sponse box corresponding to the color of the cue and irrespective of the cue’s
location within a deadline of 2s. If participants missed any of the deadlines, the
trial ended, the screen turned black briefly and a new trial began.
Figure 5.1: Trial time course
Each experimental run started with a presentation of instructions on the screen
and a practice block of 40 trials. The first 10 practice trials involved no deadlines
2Upon publication the full code for the experiment including experimental instructions will
be found on GitHub.
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and ended with feedback as to the time and correctness of the response. The
next 10 practice trials involved deadlines and feedback. The last 20 practice trials
involved deadlines and no feedback. The experiment consisted of 2 blocks and
320 test trials per block. The color and location of the cue was balanced within
each block by pseudo-randomization. A complete procedure with debriefing took
45 minutes.
Data preprocessing
Following recommendations by Freeman and Ambady (2010) we pre-processed
the mouse trajectories by aligning them for common starting position (horizontal
middle position of the screen, 540 pixels), flipping them to the same direction and
normalizing to 100 equal time slices 3.
5.1.2 Results
Trials were coded as Congruent when the cue appeared on the same side of the
screen as the response box to which the cue color was assigned and Incongruent
when the cue appeared on the opposite side. One participant was found to have
misunderstood the instructions (they responded correctly on only 2% of the trials)
and her/his data was removed from further analysis. Of the remaining data, trials
were removed if any of the deadlines was missed, an incorrect response was given,
a sampling interval (the time between recording of the coordinates) was 3SD
above the sample mean or a total reaction time was 3SD above the sample mean.
Altogether this led to the elimination of around 7.8% of the data.
Reaction times
Reaction time was measured as the time that elapsed between the moment par-
ticipants clicked on the start button (indicating readiness to respond) and the
moment they clicked on the response box. Participants took less time to com-
plete Congruent (M = 747.15, SD = 78.95) than Incongruent (M = 810.98,
SD = 71.03) trials. A paired, one-tailed t-test showed that this difference was
significant t(18) = −11.47, p < .001 and represented a large effect r = .94.
Movement curves
The most widely used measure of trajectory attraction towards an unselected
response is Area Under Curve, i.e., the size of the area between each trajectory
and a straight line between the trajectory beginning and end point (Freeman and
Ambady, 2010). This measure can be obtained for all participant trajectories
3A full code for data analysis reported in this paper will be found on GitHub upon publica-
tion.
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Figure 5.2: Results of Experiment 1 (A and B) and 2 (C and D). Reaction times
with 95% confidence intervals are shown in figures A and C. Figures B and D
show normalized movement trajectories averaged across participants with shaded
areas corresponding to a 95% confidence interval on each coordinate.
and then averaged across all trials to obtain a single value for each trial type
in question. Figure 5.2 shows the shape of the average observed trajectories
in the two conditions. We again performed a paired one-tailed t-test on such
aggregated AUC values and found that the curvature was significantly greater
in Incongruent (M = .42, SD = .05) than in Congruent (M = .35, SD = .07)
trials, t(18) = −6.7, p < .001, r = .85. Thus, this result mirrored the reaction
time results.
5.1.3 Discussion
Our Experiment 1 demonstrated a standard individual mouse-tracking Simon ef-
fect as higher RTs and a greater movement curvature in Incongruent compared to
Congruent trials. It therefore replicated part of the findings of the previous study
by (Scherbaum et al., 2010) for a different type of stimulus. Most importantly,
the fact that we found the effect in both RTs and mouse trajectories and that it
was large, gave us strong evidence that the particular mouse-tracking setup we
implemented was successful. That is, the setup we used can lead to a Simon effect
in the individual condition and therefore can be used to investigate whether an
effect can be observed also in the joint condition in which the task is split be-
tween two participants (Experiment 3). Before proceeding to this test, however,
we needed to investigate the individual Go-NoGo condition.
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5.2 Experiment 2
Having found the Simon effect in reaction times and trajectory curvature in the
individual Simon condition, we set out to find out whether we find an effect
if participants are requested to respond only to one of the cues. According to
previous studies, no effect of trial congruency should be found in Experiment 2.
An additional question concerned the behavior of participants in ‘passive’
trials, i.e. the trials in which the cue indicated that they were required to abstain
from response rather than click on either of the response boxes. The advantage of
mouse-tracking methodology here is that we can observe how a decision to inhibit
the response guides the movement, which is not possible with a simple reaction
time measure.
5.2.1 Methods
Participants
Given the large effect sizes in Experiment 1, we kept the same number of partici-
pants. Thus, twenty participants from the Radboud University participants pool
(18 women; ages between 20 and 51 years, mean age 26.5) were recruited for the
second experiment. All were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and were not aware of the purpose of the experiment. None of the partici-
pants participated in the previous experiment. They were paid 10 euros for their
participation. The study was approved by the institution’s local ethics commit-
tee (ECSW2015-1105-309) and written informed consent was obtained from each
participant.
Apparatus, stimuli, task and procedure
The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were as in Experiment 1. The task differed
from the one employed in Experiment 1 as follows. Each participant was told
to respond to only one of the color squares and refrain from responding to the
other (“do nothing”). A click on a response box in such a trial was counted as
an error. A trial ended upon a click or after the deadline (on successful NoGo
trials). The remaining features of the task (time course of each trial, practice
blocks, counter-balancing) were as in Experiment 1. Although participants were
aware that the two gray squares in the upper corners of the screen were both
response boxes and that a cue could be of two colors, they were not given any
explicit indication of a complementary stimulus-response pairing.
Data preprocessing
The data was pre-processed as in Experiment 1.
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5.2.2 Results
As in Experiment 1, responses were coded as Congruent and Incongruent depend-
ing on the relationship between the location of the cue and the location of its as-
signed response box. However, given that participants were required to respond
only to one of the cues, another variable was encoded that indicated whether a
given trial was ‘active’ (required response) or ‘passive’ (required refraining from
responding). Given that it is likely that different cognitive processes operated in
active and passive trials, we have analyzed the corresponding data separately.
We removed a participant who gave a number of correct responses that was
3SD lower than the mean number of correct responses in the sample. Of the
remaining data we removed trials that missed deadlines, included an incorrect
response, overly long (3SD above the mean) sampling intervals or total reaction
time. This eliminated around 6.3% of the data.
Reaction times
Within active trial data, participants took comparable amount of time to complete
Incongruent (M = 744.26, SD = 230.87) and Congruent trials (M = 736.4,
SD = 214.95). According to a paired one-tailed t-test the difference was not
significant t(18) = −1.3, p = .104 albeit it represented a medium effect r = .29.
Thus, as predicted from the literature, we found no effect of trial congruency on
reaction times in the individual Go-NoGo condition.
Since passive trials required no clicking response from the participant, they all
took maximum amount of time (2s) and hence no explicit reaction time measure
could be defined. We did, however, attempt to define an implicit reaction time
measure as time that elapsed until the maximum y-coordinate was reached and
started decreasing. The rationale behind this measure is that at the end of every
trial participant had to return to the starting position in order to be ready for
the next trial. When the cue required inhibiting the response, it would have been
most efficient to simply return to the starting point. Greater conflict in either
type of trials could cause a delay in response inhibition leading the turning point
(the reversal from the highest reached y-coordinate) to occur later in the trial.
We found no effect of this type in passive trials, in which the time until the
reversal from highest y-coordinate was similar for Congruent (M = 960.62, SD =
574.17) and Incongruent (M = 962.2, SD = 597.67) trials and the difference was
not significant according to a two-tailed paired t-test t(18) = −0.103, p = .919.
The effect could of course be masked by the huge variance in this data, which in
turn could be explained by the large variety of motion trajectories exhibited by
the participants, to which we turn next.
98 Chapter 5. Joint Simon Effect in Movement Trajectories
A B C
Trial type congruent incongruent
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
X coordinate
Y
 c
o
o
rd
in
a
te
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
X coordinate
Y
 c
o
o
rd
in
a
te
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
X coordinate
Y
 c
o
o
rd
in
a
te
Figure 5.3: Example passive trajectories of 3 different participants in Experiment
2. Shown in black are average trajectories from the whole experiment duration.
Shown in gray are particular trajectories from the last 40 trials. One can note
that participants differ in how they go towards the response box – in a slightly
curved manner (A) or in a straight line (B and C). They also differ in how they
choose to return to the starting position – curved but staying in the same half
of the screen (A), in a straight line (B) or making a circle through the opposite
part of the screen (C).
Movement curves
The AUC calculated for participant trajectories in active trials was similar in
Incongruent (M = .08, SD = .117) and Congruent (M = .07, SD = .1) trials.
A paired one-tailed t-test showed that it was not significant, t(18) = −1.002,
p = .165, r = .23. Interestingly, movement trajectories differed qualitatively
from the patterns observed in Experiment 1. While in Experiment 1 participants
tended to move straight up first and only then turn towards the selected response,
in Experiment 2 the movement would start directly towards the assigned response
box (see also Supplementary Material for plots of individual average trajectories
and Section 5.4 below for further discussion). Since the only difference in instruc-
tions in the two experiments regarded whether participants need to respond to
both cues or only one, we can surmise that the movement strategy was freely
adopted by the participants. Given that in Experiment 2 they had to click on
only one of the response boxes (located on one side of the screen), they have
chosen to always start moving towards that side.
We have also explored the movement patterns in passive trials. It became
quickly apparent that trajectory curvature measures, such as AUC, would not be
applicable because participants adopted very different strategies for dealing with
the time they had when they were required to not click on the response box (see
Figure 5.3). Given that passive data was not our primary concern and we found
no effect in passive RTs, we decided not to investigate it further.
5.2.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 confirmed an absence of the Simon effect in an individual Go-NoGo
version of the paradigm. We have also made a new observation, namely that
5.3. Experiment 3 99
people in this paradigm seem to adopt a qualitatively different movement strategy
compared to the standard individual Simon task. That is, while in Experiment
1 participants moved straight up and then turned to a response box in a curved
manner, in Experiment 2 participants tended to move to a response box in a
straight line. This strategy intuitively makes sense, given that in the latter case
they have only one response location throughout the whole experiment, while in
Experiment 1 they have to continuously switch between two response locations.
As we will show, this observation is relevant for interpreting the results of our
last experiment.
5.3 Experiment 3
Experiment 1 confirmed the presence of a Simon effect when participants respond
to both cues and Experiment 2 its absence when they perform only half of the
task. We took this pattern of results to validate our experimental setup and
proceeded to conduct Experiment 3 that employed a joint version of the task.
In this version two participants share a task in such a way that each of them
performs half of it, i.e. responds to one of the cues. According to the joint action
literature, such a setup induces people to covertly co-represent the co-actor’s task
and therefore we should expect a reappearance of a full-blown Simon effect. That
is, in Experiment 3 participants should take longer to respond in incongruent
trials and exhibit movement trajectories curved towards the incorrect response as
in Experiment 1. Given the qualitative differences between movement patterns
in the two previous experiments, we might add that should a full-blown mouse-
tracking version of a JSE occur, we would expect trajectories to be more like in
Experiment 1, i.e. directed upward and curved, rather than straight.
We were additionally interested in a possible modulating effect of perceiving
the co-actor’s movements and therefore we implemented two conditions in Ex-
periment 3, that we call Online and Oﬄine condition. In the former, participants
were able to observe the co-actor’s cursor moving on the screen in addition to
their own throughout the experiment. In the latter, only one’s own cursor was
visible. We made no specific predictions with respect to the difference between
the Online and Oﬄine conditions. On the one hand, given the relatively ‘of-
fline’ nature of co-representation (should the effect occur), one could expect no
difference between actually perceiving the co-actor’s movements versus merely
knowing about their involvement in the task. On the other hand, perception of
the co-actor might affect one’s own movements in two ways, either augmenting
the feeling of ‘jointness’ of the action and therefore increasing the interference
observable as a JSE, or instead making the division of labor more clear thereby
decreasing the interference.
100 Chapter 5. Joint Simon Effect in Movement Trajectories
5.3.1 Methods
Participants
Sixty participants from the Radboud University participants pool (48 women;
ages between 18 and 54 years, mean age 24.4) were recruited for the third experi-
ment. All were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were
not aware of the purpose of the experiment. None of the participants participated
in the previous experiments. They were paid 10 euros for their participation. The
study was approved by the institution’s local ethics committee (ECSW2015-1105-
309) and written informed consent was obtained from each participant. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to the Online and Oﬄine versions of the task. They
were also randomly allocated into pairs, not constraining the couple composition
by gender or age. None of the participants indicated previous familiarity with
each other.
Apparatus and stimuli
The apparatus and stimuli were similar to those employed in Experiments 1 and
2. In both conditions participants were sitting in the same room facing towards
each other (see Figure 5.4) with a partition placed between their desks. Each
participant in the pair was seated in front of their own computer. The two
computers were connected using a serial port that enabled two displays to be
synchronized with each other in real time. The participants entered the room
together, were aware of each other’s position and received instructions that made
their respective cue-response pairings explicit.
Figure 5.4: The physical setup of Experiment 3.
Task and procedure
The task and procedure were as in Experiment 1 with the following differences.
The task was divided between the participants in each pair with one required
to respond to blue and another to the red color of the cue. Regarding the time
course of each trial, both participants had to click on the “start button” box and
start moving upwards before the deadline in order for the trial not to be aborted.
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Since participants could respond at different speeds, the criterion for the deadlines
was effectively based on the participant that responded last. Not responding or
clicking on the incorrect response box was considered an error.
The only difference between the two joint conditions was the visibility of the
mouse cursor of the co-actor (visible in the Online and not visible in the Oﬄine
condition). Own cursor was drawn in white while the cursor of the co-actor
appeared in grey in order to facilitate discrimination between the two.
Data preprocessing
The data was pre-processed as in Experiments 1 and 2. It must be noted that each
trial required both participants to click on the start button within a deadline but
they did not necessarily click at exactly the same time. We have chosen to align
each participant’s trajectory to their own starting point and not to the starting
point of the trial.
5.3.2 Results
As in Experiment 2, responses were coded for congruency and whether a partici-
pant’s role was ‘active’ or ‘passive’ in a given trial. Given the task division this
means that in each trial the roles of the pair members were complementary.
While cleaning the data we took care that trials were removed jointly in most
cases. That is, if one of the participants committed an error in a given trial, the
data for both participants within that pair for that trial was removed. Similarly to
previous experiments, we removed participants with a large number of incorrect
responses and trials with missed deadlines, errors, exceedingly long sampling
intervals or total reaction time. This resulted in the removal of 10.5% of the data
from the Online and 24.2% from the Oﬄine condition.
Reaction times
We performed a 2 x 2 ANOVA with a between-subject variable Condition (Online
vs. Oﬄine) and a within-subject variable Trial type (Congruent vs. Incongruent).
It showed that there were no significant differences between conditions or trial
types, all Fs(1, 51) < 2.65, all p > .1, all η2p < .05. Summary statistics are
presented in Table 5.1.
Movement curves
Paralleling the results of the RT data also the trajectory deviations measured
as AUC did not exhibit significant differences between different conditions, all
Fs(1, 51) < 3.58, all p > .05, all η2p < .05.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics in Experiment 3
RT (ms) AUC
Condition Mean SD Mean SD
Online-congruent 764 121 0.029 0.112
Online-incongruent 773 131 0.032 0.123
Oﬄine-congruent 724 129 0.018 0.119
Oﬄine-incongruent 726 122 0.021 0.122
Visual inspection of trajectories averaged across participants indicates that
they behaved as in Experiment 2, moving straight for their assigned target re-
sponse box (Figure 5.5A and B) and not exhibiting any attraction toward the
incorrect side.
Figure 5.5: Results of Experiment 3: Average trajectories depending on trial type
in Online (A) and Oﬄine (B) conditions, shown with 95% confidence intervals.
5.3.3 Discussion
In Experiment 3 we found no mouse-tracking JSE. This absence of a JSE held
regardless of the visibility of the co-actor’s movements, and is contrary to the pre-
diction based on the presumed pervasiveness of co-representation. Also, given the
strong Simon Effect observed in trajectories in Experiment 1 we were surprised
to find no effect in Experiment 3, not even in the online condition. Notably, the
overall shapes of the average trajectories were quite different from those observed
in Experiment 1 and more similar to those in Experiment 2 (i.e., ‘straight’ trajec-
tories moving in a straight line directly to the response box rather than ‘curved’
trajectories that moved up first before curving towards the response box).
Inspection of individual trajectories did reveal that participants moved their
mouse in qualitatively different ways, some in fact displaying ‘curved’ rather
than ‘straight’ trajectories, suggesting that they may have been using different
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strategies for performing the task. To probe to what extent the individuals that
displayed curved trajectories may show a JSE at the individual level (which may
have been masked in the group-level analysis by the majority of ‘straight’ tra-
jectories), we decided to perform individual analyses to better characterize indi-
vidual strategies and test for JSE at the level of individuals. The results of this
additional analysis are reported next.
5.4 Individual-level analysis
In order to survey the potential individual differences in movement patterns ex-
hibited by the participants of our Experiment 3, we plotted trajectories averaged
per participant instead of averaging across them. We noticed that in fact several
participants (3 persons in Online and 2 in Oﬄine) seemed to adopt a movement
pattern more similar to those observed in Experiment 1, i.e. moving first straight
up and then curving towards the response box. The examples of ‘curved’ and
‘straight’ average trajectories of Experiment 3 are shown in Figure 5.7A-C. Plots
of all individual trajectories from Experiments 1-3 are available as Supplementary
Material.
We proceeded to investigate whether people with a majority of curved trajec-
tories show a JSE on the individual level. To that end, we first applied a clustering
technique to automatically determine which participants exhibited mostly curved
and which mostly straight trajectories. We have used a function provided by an
R mousetrap package (Kieslich et al., 2017) that calculates geometric distance
(Euclidean distance by default) between each trajectory and a number of prede-
fined prototype trajectories (depicted in Figure 5.6) and then assigns a label that
represents the closest prototype to that trajectory. We then collapsed three of
the default prototypes (‘curved’, ‘cCoM’ and ‘dCoM’) that have a curved shape
to a single ‘curved’ category, removed trials that were assigned a very infrequent
prototype (‘dCoM2’ occurred in 0.1% of the cases) and calculated for each par-
ticipant how many straight and curved trajectories they produced. Finally, each
participant was assigned to a Straight or Curved category based on a simple
majority of their trajectory types. The automatic classification confirmed our
intuitive observations.
After classifying our participants, we went on to run a series of independent
one-tailed t-tests on the trial data from all the participants to see whether an
effect could be detected at the individual level. We were specifically interested
if a possible effect was differentially present for curved and absent for straight
participants. We adopted a significance level of 0.05/2 = 0.025 as our cut-off,
correcting for a double comparison conducted on each individual (one for the
group test, one for the individual level).
The tests revealed that 2 curved-strategy participants from a single pair in
the Online condition exhibited a significant JSE in their trajectory curvature and
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Figure 5.6: Trajectory prototypes: straight, mildly curved, continuous change-of-
mind, discrete change-of-mind, and double discrete change-of-mind.
one of them additionally in RTs. From the 48 straight-strategy participants only
one showed a significant difference in AUC measure depending on the trial type.
However, the effect was based on a negative area under curve meaning that the
deviation of that participant’s average trajectories in incongruent trials was away
from the alternative response.
Having found an individual-level significant JSE in Experiment 3 (albeit in
only one pair), we felt it were appropriate to repeat this procedure also for the
data from Experiment 2, where we had concluded an absence of an effect based
on a group-level analysis. We therefore plotted individual average trajectories of
participants from Experiment 2 (see examples in Figure 5.7D-F), mapped them
to curved vs straight prototypes and run a series of t-tests. The procedure es-
tablished that indeed 5 of 19 participants were assigned to the Curved category
and 3 out of these 5 exhibited a Simon effect in their RTs and AUC. None of the
straight-strategy participants showed such an effect.
5.5 General discussion
In our series of three experiments we have found a strong Simon Effect in both
reaction times and mouse trajectory curvatures in the Standard individual Simon
Task (Experiment 1), no effect in the individual Go-NoGo task (Experiment 2)
and no effect in the Joint Simon Task – the latter regardless of the visibility of
the co-actor’s movements (Experiment 3). Additionally, we found evidence for
individual variation in movement strategies adopted by participants in conditions
in which response to only one of the two stimuli was required (Experiment 2 and
3).
The pattern of results in all three experiments suggests that the Joint Si-
mon Effect does not seem to readily generalize to a more continuous response
modality, and hence co-representation may not be as pervasive and automatic as
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Figure 5.7: Example average individual movement trajectories in active trials
in Experiment 3 (A-C) and 2 (D-F). Plots A and D show curved participants
with a detectable Simon effect. Plots B and E show curved participants without
a detectable Simon effect. Plots C and F show straight participants without a
detectable Simon effect.
previously thought. As always, however, a null result needs to be treated with
care and therefore we consider several limitations of our study and its possible
interpretations.
First of all, one could object that our lack of the JSE could be due to a
failure of the experimental paradigm. For example, some studies have found the
effect only when participants sat next to each other, rather than away from each
other (Guagnano et al., 2010), or only under conditions of a compatible spatial
reference frame of the co-actor (Holländer et al., 2011). One may argue that this
could potentially provide an explanation for the lack of the JSE from a domain-
general perspective since what matters there is that the co-actor provides a salient
spatially defined distractor but in our study the co-actor’s body is not salient in
the left-right spatial dimension (since they are sitting in front of the participant)
and the co-actor’s response is actually to the same side of the room from the
bird’s eye view. However, in our joint condition (especially in its Online version)
there was a salient event of the co-actor’s cursor moving towards the response box
on the side of the screen opposite to the participant’s own response box. In the
absence of a way to determine a priori which events are crucial to elicit a JSE from
the domain-general perspective – the co-actor’s physical presence, their imagined
physical actions or their action effects on the screen – it remains unclear why
merely a screen-based salience is insufficient. Especially given the recent finding
that merely an experimenter’s presence in the room might produce a Simon effect
type of modulation (Michel et al., 2018) Furthermore, while these factors could
be cited by the proponents of the domain-general account, we think there is no
basis in the social account for rejecting our experimental setup. Co-representation
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is supposed to arise due to the knowledge of the task. The participants in our
study were explicitly informed that they are doing the task together and their
respective parts of the task were made clear. Thus, we see no reason from the
social perspective to expect a lack of the effect in the setting we employed.4 This
is especially true in light of the fact that the JSE has been found in the past with
participants sitting in separate rooms (Tsai et al., 2008; Ruys and Aarts, 2010).
That being said, future studies could look at the influence of physical factors on
the mouse-tracking JSE.
We further believe that other elements independently support the validity of
our paradigm. Most importantly, we do find an effect in the individual Simon task
(Experiment 1). If co-representation is a process that mirrors executing the task
on one’s own, it should also emerge in exactly the same setting in which it is split
across participants. In addition, it appears that several people in Experiment 3
(specifically those who adopt curved movement strategy) do show an effect at
the individual level, suggesting that the paradigm is sensitive enough to detect a
JSE if it occurs. For example, if most of the participants had adopted the strat-
egy that generates curved trajectories (presumably based on co-representation,
on the social account), we would arguably have found a full-blown JSE at the
group-level. One could now argue that perhaps participants needed to be forced
to move upwards (for example by placing a target in the middle of the screen
that they need to pass through before moving to their response box). However,
we see no theoretical reason why co-representation should hinge on forcing a par-
ticular movement strategy on the participants, as the theoretical link typically
goes the other way – from knowledge of the task constraints to co-representation
to particular response patterns.
With the above considerations out of the way, we need to emphasize that
even if our conclusion of non-pervasiveness of co-representation holds, it does
not imply that the phenomenon of co-representation does not exist in general.
It might occur in a variety of settings, and in fact on the basis of our findings
we cannot argue against inferences towards co-representation based on JSEs ob-
tained in the past in other paradigms. One should note that the features of
co-representation that we discussed in the Introduction (its social and oﬄine na-
ture, as well as pervasiveness) are logically not a package deal. JSEs could be a
result of a co-representation-based mechanism and such co-representation could
be a real phenomenon that plays an important role in joint action without it be-
ing automatic or pervasive. The tendency in the social account has been to argue
that (1) it is an ‘oﬄine’ mechanism, inducible by mere knowledge of the task
and its division and (2) that it is automatic, activated even in contexts in which
it is not beneficial to the overall behavior. From these two points, it has been
4Unless the proponents of the social account were to postulate that co-representation is based
on simulation, in which case compatibility of a reference frame would be a relevant factor. We
know of no explicit argument to this effect.
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assumed that the pervasiveness claim follows: co-representation occurs in many
situations, for example, including those that are more ‘online’, in which not only
is there a knowledge of the task but also perceptual information about the co-
actor. One could claim, however, that co-representation is social and important
but restricted to certain type of situations.
Viewed in this light, our study contributes to testing the boundaries of co-
representation. Had we found that JSE occurs in Experiment’s 3 Oﬄine but not
Online condition, we could have concluded that perhaps co-representation is re-
stricted to cases in which there is knowledge of the joint task but no perceptual
information about the co-actor’s movements. Since we found no JSE in either of
the Experiment 3 versions, we need to conclude that it is rather something about
the continuous response modality that weakens the tendency to co-represent. A
tentative explanation for this that we would like to propose is something like
‘oﬄoading’ of cognitive processes onto the resources of the body and the environ-
ment (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994). That is, given that participants in Experiment 2
and 3 only need to respond to one side of the screen throughout the experiment,
they are able to stabilize the movement towards that side by adopting a straight
strategy from the very beginning of each trial. Once the strategy is settled, the
option to move to the opposite side is removed and therefore the incongruent
location of the cue no longer influences the execution of the responses. At this
point this explanation is speculative but we think it warrants further probing in
future studies.
We think the most interesting result of this study is a discovery of qualitative
individual differences in how people approach the task. First, we think it points
to an interesting methodological point. Namely, the individual differences are
readily apparent from a plot of individual average trajectories while at the same
time not being always discernible from the RT data of the same participants. This
raises the possibility that also in past studies there is less uniformity than pre-
viously assumed that remains hidden by using a coarser response modality. We
hope future research will complement traditional methods with designs that can
detect individual differences and incorporate considerations of variation into dis-
cussion of potential mechanisms behind the effects. Mouse-tracking methodology
in particular has a big advantage for addressing this type of questions.
Second, the fact that we also find curved trajectories and individual-level ef-
fects in Experiment 2 poses an interpretative difficulty. It seems that even in the
absence of the social context some people are affected by the complementary task
rule. The reason for this is unknown in the present study. It could be that those
participants spontaneously decide to imagine responding to the alternative cue
(which has been shown to produce the Simon effect in the individual Go-NoGo
condition; Sellaro et al., 2013). It could be that some participants’ attention is
drawn toward the stimulus location influencing the resulting movement despite it
being irrelevant (see Figure 5.7D). Regardless of the precise mechanisms respon-
sible for these effects in Experiment 2, it certainly suggests that similar effects
108 Chapter 5. Joint Simon Effect in Movement Trajectories
in Experiment 3 (i.e. individual-level JSE and curved movement patterns) could
be driven by the same processes and therefore not be ‘social’ in nature. Alterna-
tively, different mechanisms could be responsible for similar looking patterns in
Go-NoGo and Joint versions of the paradigm. Perhaps despite superficial simi-
larity there are other differences between them not captured by the RT and AUC
measures (e.g. differences in velocity profiles, in trajectory angles, in behavior on
passive trials). Future studies should more rigorously compare these conditions.
Finally, if it were to be established in the future that the effects in Experiment
3 (namely, the lack of a JSE) are genuinely social, we think it could raise another
interesting possibility: that joint action can be accomplished using a variety of
strategies. The participants could have adopted their straight trajectories because
it facilitated a division of labor coordination by dividing the space assigned to
each member of the pair. That is, one could still be in the presence of a joint
action rather than participants merely performing individual halves of the task
in parallel, even if no JSE is found. This of course would lead to the question
what differentiates between no JSE because participants are simply ignoring the
co-actor and no JSE because they are adopting a division of labor strategy (and
therefore are still in a way acting jointly). Perhaps also here other types of
measures could capture the difference between these two situations, such as those
that look at coupling between participants (Malone et al., 2014). That is, behavior
in a social situation could produce the same type of movement trajectories as
behavior in an individual task (as captured by trajectory deviation) but, for
instance, a correlation between participant trajectories within a pair could be
higher than between a member of one pair and a member of another pair. This
would mean that individual movement is affected on a very subtle level by the
co-actor even if it does not show up as a curvature difference between congruent
and incongruent trials.
To conclude, our results cast doubt on the arguments for pervasive and auto-
matic co-representation in joint action. Instead, they raise a number of questions
for further research and prompt further refinement of joint action theories. On
the one hand, they suggest that co-representation could be restricted to certain
kinds of settings, like those that do not involve continuous movements, limiting
its presumed pervasiveness and relevance for everyday action coordination. On
the other hand, they raise the possibility that joint action can be accomplished by
different strategies such as division of labor when afforded by the task conditions.
Chapter 6
Embodied Embedded Modeling of
Minimal Joint Action
In this paper we present a Minimal Cognitive Agent model of a joint action task.
Pairs of agents realized as Continuous Time Neural Networks are submitted to
artificial evolution in the context of a task taken from psychological literature. In
this task the agents are required to coordinate their complementary actions in order
to jointly control the movement of a tracker and successfully follow a continuously
moving target. It has been suggested that such a task requires a more complex type
of cognitive mechanism than the types of processes postulated by the proponents of
Embodied Embedded Cognition approach. Specifically, it might possibly require that
the agents “co-represent” each other’s contributions to the common behavior. Our
results show that simple agents with no such built-in co-representation mechanism
are able to evolve a solution to the task. However, we also find emergent neu-
ral activity patterns that are consistent with it. Whether such patterns are truly
representational is further discussed.
6.1 Introduction
The Embodied Embedded approach to cognition (EEC) proposes that rather than
being an activity of computation over representations, cognition is primarily a
matter of the adaptive behavior of an agent that emerges from its concrete bodily
abilities, embeddedness in a particular environment, particular organismic needs
and a history of agent-environment interaction. As a consequence, the meth-
ods typically employed by EEC are those that take the brain-body-environment
system whose internal states are no longer interpreted as representations to be
the proper unit of analysis and those that provide a handle on the unfolding of
behavior over time (Beer, 2000). Such methods typically come from ecological
psychology, which allows one to categorize and quantify environmental and bodily
resources that are employed in task-specific behavior and from dynamical systems
theory, which delivers a toolkit for sophisticated analysis of evolving behavioral
and neural trajectories.
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In this paper we focus on a different powerful tool that is increasingly used
in EEC: the construction of minimal cognitive agents (MCAs) realized through
a combination of Continuous Time Recurrent Neural Networks (CTRNN) as the
agent’s brains and Evolutionary Algorithms as a way to evolve a particular be-
havior of interest (Beer, 1996). Such MCAs are often used at the very core of
the debate between EEC and a more traditional approach to cognition, namely
in relation to the explanatory need for the concept of representation. Specifically,
MCAs can be developed to perform tasks that seemingly require representations
– the so-called representation-hungry problems (Clark and Toribio, 1994) – and
then analyzed as to how successful behavior is actually produced in them and
whether that process relies on anything that can usefully qualify as representa-
tions (Beer, 2003). That is to say, the question is not whether the agents’ “brains”
and their internal states contribute to the task solution – as they undoubtedly
do – but rather, whether conferring to such states a status of representation is
explanatorily useful in the context of a combination of the agent’s resources that
can be invoked as part of an explanation.
In this paper we make preliminary steps in applying this strategy to represen-
tations posited in accounts of social behavior, more specifically, social behavior
in situations of joint action, defined as a form of social interaction “whereby two
or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a
change in the environment” (Sebanz et al., 2006). In the remainder of the Intro-
duction we first describe the MCA methodology (Sec. 6.1.1). Next, we provide a
brief overview of the current research on sociality and motivate the need for con-
sidering more representation-hungry social tasks (Sec. 6.1.2). Finally, we present
a minimal joint action task that we subject to MCA modeling (Sec. 6.1.3).
The results of our study show that (1) very minimal agents are able to ac-
complish coordination that requires acting jointly on a common object in the
shared environment, (2) overall behavior is a result of an orchestrated activity
of the brain-body-environment system, (3) there is evidence for a predictive sta-
tistical relationship between the network activity of one agent and the behavior
of another. We devote our Discussion to considering whether (3) can be taken
as a demonstration of representational processing in our agents and what other
steps could be undertaken to investigate this further. Our preliminary conclu-
sion is that our evolved MCAs might be said to possess simple representations.
However, such representations most likely do not possess sufficiently complex
properties that would justify treating them as “representations” and do not re-
flect the complexity associated with their role in joint action. Whether more
complex representations can be evolved and detected in MCAs remains a topic
for future study.
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6.1.1 Minimal cognitive agents
The construction of MCAs is a popular modeling approach within EEC aimed
at the study of the general principles of brain-body-environment systems as they
perform an increasing variety of cognitively interesting behaviors. The agents
are minimal because the complexity of their architecture is kept low enough
to allow for efficient artificial evolution (i.e., a solution can emerge in a non-
prohibitive amount of time) and analysis (i.e., individual nodes and connections
can be probed in principle). They are cognitive in a wide sense because they model
adaptive behaviors of the agent in the environment. Successful demonstrations
of MCAs include locomotion (Beer and Gallagher, 1992), affordance perception
and selective attention (Slocum et al., 2000), categorical perception (Beer, 2003),
learning (Yamauchi and Beer, 1994), action switching (Agmon and Beer, 2014),
social interaction (Di Paolo et al., 2008) and communication (Quinn, 2001).1 Let
us review the basic steps of the MCA methodology.
First, an agent architecture – their brains and bodies – is defined. MCAs in
this strand of research are usually implemented using CTRNNs, which are a class
of Recurrent Neural Networks well adapted to capturing the dynamic nature
of cognition on multiple timescales and yet not enslaved by immediate stimuli
from the environment. Because they are capable of maintaining their internal
states, they can respond differently to the same stimuli and respond similarly to
different stimuli, depending on the internal dynamics (Beer and Gallagher, 1992;
Beer, 2003), i.e. they are not simply reactive in a protocol-like way. In fact, they
have been shown to perform well when acting based on a memory trace (Mirolli,
2012) or in anticipation of future events. CTRNNs are also said to have a degree
of biological plausibility (Beer, 1995).
Next, once the agent architecture is defined, MCAs are submitted to artificial
evolution using evolutionary algorithms (EAs) in the context of a particular task.
Their fitness is defined by some performance measure relevant to the task and
only the best performing individuals are allowed to survive to the next generation
or procreate (Beer and Gallagher, 1992). The choice of such an evolutionary ap-
proach by EEC modelers is motivated by its holistic character. That is, the goal is
to “stabilize coordinated patterns of adaptive behavior” (Beer, 2003, p. 210) using
whatever means necessary, i.e. environmental, neural and bodily structure and
functional organization without rewarding any particular cognitive mechanism.
As a result of this approach, the agents typically develop strategies that rely on
the dynamic nature of their bodies and the world, that are difficult to predict a
priori.
Finally, the evolved MCAs are in the end analyzed in multiple ways. Most
frequently this includes dynamical systems theory methods applied to behavioral
and neural trajectories. However, psychophysical experiments are also performed
1These functions are naturally not complete analogues of human-level functions but this
applies also to other, non-MCA models as simplification is always part of modeling.
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and, more recently, information theory tools started to be used to capture de-
pendencies between external and internal states and information flows within the
system (Williams and Beer, 2010a) – information understood statistically (Shan-
non and Weaver, 1949), not semantically.
MCAs were originally proposed to model generally defined capacities, rather
than features of particular organisms, let alone humans (Beer, 1996, 2008). How-
ever, recently also tasks drawn from actual cognitive science experiments have
been simulated. The goal of such work is not to model realistic cognitive opera-
tions of human participants but to explore task constraints and thereby question
the dominant interpretation of its requirements. That is, if an evolved agent is
able to perform a task, it tells us something about which capacities are minimally
sufficient to succeed in it and which strategies can possibly be adopted, thereby
encouraging a fresh look at such tasks. This could help counteract researcher pre-
conceptions about how the tasks need to be solved (Froese, 2009; Harvey et al.,
2005), for instance, how they necessarily require representations with a particular
content.
6.1.2 Minimal social agents and joint action
Despite an increase in the number and diversity of minimal models of individ-
ual cognition, there have been comparatively fewer models of social interaction
(e.g., Williams et al., 2008; Di Paolo et al., 2008; Froese and Di Paolo, 2008;
Ikegami and Iizuka, 2007; Di Paolo, 2000). Recent years have witnessed several
new examples inspired by theoretical developments in EEC approach to sociality
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Marsh et al., 2009). Their role, however, was
not to explore the mechanisms and representations necessary for different types
of social interaction. Rather, the aim has been to show that social interaction
is best understood as an emergent phenomenon, not reducible to the individuals
that partake in it.
These recent models (Di Paolo et al., 2008; Froese and Di Paolo, 2008, 2010)
are primarily based on psychological experiments that target a capacity to recog-
nize when one is interacting with a live, responsive partner, versus a prerecorded
interaction or an interaction with an inanimate object (Murray and Trevarthen,
1985; Auvray et al., 2009). A common traditional explanation for such a capac-
ity is a type of “social contingency detection module” which is able to somehow
categorize the stimuli into contingent and non-contingent upon one’s own ac-
tion and thereby infer a presence of agency (e.g., Gergely and Watson, 1999).
The point of EEC alternatives has been to argue that recognition can lie in in-
teraction dynamics instead of individual mechanisms, i.e. the fact that some
types of interaction are more stable than others, more self-reinforcing. This was
done conceptually, using behavioral experiments and also MCA modeling. For
example, Froese and Di Paolo (2010) showed that agency recognition is not dis-
turbed by such modifications like exchanging inputs to receptor fields between
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the two agents or rewarding one of the agents for interacting with an inanimate
(though mobile) object. The conclusion drawn from this research was that no
social contingency detection module could be found and the solution depended
on dynamical properties of mutual coupling.
We believe these studies are interesting and important. However, if their point
is to provide a genuine challenge to the dominant paradigm in cognitive science –
which assumes that cognition is first and foremost about representing the world
and other agents – they are lacking for two reasons. First, to show that evolved
agents are not in fact trading representations of (social) stimuli, a solid attempt
at investigating the representational status of their internal states is required
and this has not been done yet with respect to the minimal social agents studies
described above. This task is, of course, by no means straightforward, given the
slippery nature of the concept of representation. Nevertheless, a sustained effort
to develop such methods would allow sharpening the EEC position by getting
increasingly clear on how the possible ways to define this concept apply or not to
minimal brains2.
Second, we think the tasks that have been used so far are not sufficiently
representation-hungry to convince a staunch proponent of a representation-based
approach. This is because in the joint action literature it is generally acknowl-
edged that a certain portion of social interactions can be explained in dynamical
non-representational terms, referred to as entrainment or emergent coordination
(Knoblich et al., 2011a). For example, people sitting in rocking chairs next to
each other will typically synchronize their movement and this effect is commonly
explained via self-organized dynamics of coupled oscillators (Richardson et al.,
2007b), a phenomenon that is widespread in the physical world and arguably
non-representational.
The joint action researchers on the traditional side of the debate take this type
of accounts on board but with a big caveat. According to them, entrainment is
fine in accounting for online synchronization of continuous movement. However,
in cases that require actions that are discrete, complementary or object-directed,
situations in which no online information is available, in which prediction is re-
quired etc., all entrainment can do is make coordination more smooth and timely.
It cannot, however, provide a full explanation for people’s success in such scenar-
ios (Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009a).
What kind of mechanisms are then additionally required? The consensus
seems to be that there is a continuum of cognitive processes and representations
from less to more complex (Knoblich et al., 2011a; Vesper et al., 2010) with
entrainment occupying the lower end of this continuum. All the higher levels of
this continuum are representation-hungry phenomena that require representing
the co-actor’s task, their perceptual point of view or knowledge states, predicting
their actions (e.g., using forward models) and so on.
2See, for instance, Mirolli, 2012 for an example of such an attempt.
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In light of such views, in order to be able to apply the MCA strategy convinc-
ingly, a particular task needs to be minimal but it also needs to be one, in which
mere non-representational entrainment, is believed to be insufficient. The tasks
currently used by the EEC practitioners are dyadic and continuous and therefore
do not meet this requirement. In fact, the particular study that is cited in sup-
port of the emergent coordination on interaction level (Auvray et al., 2009) that
has been modeled is likely to not even be taken as a case of successful cognitive
performance. Our proposal then is to meet the challenge head-on and move to an
experimental paradigm that is representation-hungry according to the traditional
cognitive scientists themselves.
6.1.3 Minimal joint action task
The task we employ is from a study by Knoblich and Jordan (2003), henceforth
KJ. They repeat the general claim that entrainment type of mechanisms are
insufficient to exhibit sophisticated joint action and focus on two limitations.
First, entrainment only works in situations in which the type of action is known
in advance and the only requirement is to coordinate with the co-actor in time.
What KJ want to investigate instead is planning own actions in relation to both
timing and the type of action of the co-actor. Second, entrainment is limited to
what they call reactionary or compensatory coordination strategy, in which own
action is planned in response to perceived action of the other. They argue that
sometimes it is essential to exhibit a more complex anticipatory strategy, in which
action is planned in response to predicted action of the other.
Accordingly, to investigate the mechanisms of more complex joint action, KJ
set up a task in which successful performance depends on overcoming these two
limitations of entrainment. It is thus representation-hungry in two ways: (1) it
requires representing action alternatives of oneself and the co-actor and (2) it
requires prediction, i.e. representing future events. Note that we are using here
an intuitive notion of representation. We will discuss it in more depth in Section
6.4.
The task environment is a simple field in which movement is possible in only
one horizontal dimension and which contains two objects that can overlap: target
and tracker (see Figure 6.1). On any trial, one of the objects, the target, starts
from the center of the screen and moves first to one of the screen’s borders (left
or right), then reverses its direction, moves to the other border and does so again,
completing 3 turns altogether. The second object, the tracker, is controlled by
the participant and their goal is to keep it on top of the target for as much time
as possible. The control is executed by two buttons: pressing the left button
accelerates the tracker to the left, pressing the right button – to the right. The
task can be performed by one person, who controls acceleration in both directions,
or by two participants acting jointly, in which case one of them is responsible for
accelerating the tracker to the right and the other one to the left.
6.1. Introduction 115
Figure 6.1: The tracking task environment (figure based on KJ and Sebanz et al.
(2006)).
The difficulty in this task is that once some amount of acceleration has been
added to the tracker in one direction by pressing one of the buttons, the same
amount of complementary button presses is required in order to first decelerate
the tracker and then accelerate it in the opposite direction. This means that two
strategies are possible in the region close to the screen border (the border region).
Acting merely reactively would mean starting to decelerate the tracker only once
the target has reached the border and reversed its direction, which would result in
adequate tracking before that moment but subsequent rapid accumulation of error
(because the target moves at constant speed). A more sophisticated anticipatory
strategy would mean starting to decelerate and accruing a small amount of error
before the target reaches the border in order to minimize future error. In a joint
setting this requires being able to coordinate with predicted actions of the co-actor
controlling the complementary action alternative.
KJ tested four conditions of this experiment: individual and joint version of
the task crossed with auditory feedback and no-feedback versions. In the individ-
ual condition, one person was in control of both buttons. In the joint condition
two participants sat in front of two separate computer monitors, wore headphones
and were divided by a partition so they could not hear or see each other. When
no auditory feedback was included in the condition, the only perceivable effect of
button pressing was how it affected the movement of the tracker. With auditory
feedback each button press was accompanied by a tone, different for each of the
buttons. This way, in the individual setting participants had additional informa-
tion about their own action while in the joint setting – about the co-actor’s.3
The results of the experiment showed that auditory feedback made no dif-
ference in the individual condition but was essential to good performance in the
3With no auditory cue they could in principle infer the co-actor’s action from the tracker
movement and one’s own action.
116 Chapter 6. Embodied Embedded Modeling of Minimal Joint Action
joint condition. Overall, the best performance was achieved by individuals and
the worst by pairs with no feedback. The pairs with feedback were struggling
in the beginning but learned to perform well at the end of the experiment. In
addition, good performance was clearly related to the use of anticipatory strategy.
This pattern of results was interpreted by KJ and others (Knoblich and Se-
banz, 2006; Eskenazi et al., 2012) as giving support to the idea that successful
performance of the task is based on learning forward models,4 which is a type
of representation. According to this idea, participants learned to relate currently
perceived events, anticipated events and representation of action alternatives. In
the individual condition, given the internal access to the latter, external feedback
about the actions performed was not needed. Participants in the joint condition,
however, used an external cue regarding the state of the partner’s action alter-
native to acquire a model of each other’s task behavior. That is, each member
learned to predict the timing of the other’s complementary action and the joint
effects of combined responses and use these predictions to coordinate one’s own
action.
6.1.4 Modeling goals
In this paper we set aside the question of whether the interpretation of task
behavior presented above is plausible and we postpone the discussion of possible
representational claims that underlie it to the last section. Our goals are more
modest.
First, we investigate whether MCAs can at all evolve to perform a version of
the KJ tracking task. In particular, if the agents fail at this task (especially in
its joint condition), it would mean it is indeed highly representation-hungry and
beyond the current capabilities of a simple MCA model. If the agents succeed at
this task, however, it could mean two things. One is that the task is actually not
as representation-hungry as assumed in joint action literature, i.e., good perfor-
mance in the task can be achieved with no representations (assuming that MCAs
do not represent). Alternatively, it could be that the task does indeed require rep-
resentations and success indicates that MCAs are capable of representation-based
activity. Future work could then focus on developing methods for identifying the
4“One possible means of accounting for the shift from selecting actions on the basis of imme-
diate events to selecting them on the basis of more temporally distal consequences is to assume
that predictions are generated for all action alternatives that can be applied to a certain task.
A selection mechanism would then be responsible for selecting the action whose predicted con-
sequences most closely match the goal. The most prominent general theory postulating such
processes is the forward model account” (Knoblich and Jordan, 2003, p. 1015). “[Learning to
coordinate] involves the acquisition of new predictive models during joint practice. A study by
Knoblich and Jordan (2003) provides evidence that, through training, it is possible to integrate
predictions about one’s own actions and the actions of others” (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006,
p. 236). “Feedback led partners to develop a model of each other, allowing them to anticipate
each other’s action timing” (Eskenazi et al., 2012, p. 102).
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features of such representations, their role in joint action and their compatibility
with EEC perspective.
Second, should successful performance emerge, we analyze what kind of strat-
egy is adopted by the agents. It could be that despite a potential for non-reactive
behavior, MCAs solve the task exclusively using the reactive strategy (i.e., track-
ing the target all the way to the border and reversing there), which would again
cast doubt on the potential use of this model to investigate representations in
joint action. Alternatively, they could adopt a more complex anticipatory strat-
egy, beginning to slow down before the border. Using this strategy in the joint
condition could indicate an ability to predict the action of the co-actor (if we
accept the original experiment interpretation).
Third, in case we do find interesting joint anticipatory behavior, the ability to
examine the brains of the evolved agents allows us to undertake some exploratory
steps in answering the question whether the agents represent anything about
their co-actor. Following terminology in the joint action literature we will call
this putative process co-representation. This term is typically used in a restricted
sense to mean one person representing the task of the co-actor, i.e., “the rule
that states the stimulus conditions under which a co-actor [and the participant
herself] should perform a certain action” (Sebanz et al., 2005, p. 1235). However,
considerable ambiguity remains as to whether it also applies to representing whose
turn it is to act in the task, representing the other’s action particulars or their
personality features, whether representing is done from a bird’s eye point of view
or from the co-actor’s perspective and so on (Dolk et al., 2016).
Again, we bracket such discussion and adopt the term co-representation be-
cause it highlights the fact that the representation in question includes something
about the other agent, focusing on the predictive function of such a construct.
Therefore, for the purpose of this study we define minimal co-representation as
an internal state of one agent that correlates with future action of the other agent
and is functional in generation of coordinated joint performance. We examine
whether such a state can be detected in the evolved agents’ brain activity.
6.2 Methods
6.2.1 The task environment
The joint action paradigm created by Knoblich and Jordan (2003) was imple-
mented in a simulated model in four versions, replicating the 2 × 2 design of
Individual vs Joint Condition crossed with Sound vs No-Sound Condition.
The experimental environment consisted in a 1D line 40 units wide, sur-
rounded by borders (at coordinates −20 and 20). It contained a target and a
tracker that could move horizontally between the borders in the increments de-
termined by their speed and the time step granularity set to 0.01. The agents
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Figure 6.2: Agent environment.
were located “inside” this environment, as if on top of the tracker and both in the
exact same position in the Joint Condition (see Sec. 6.2.2 and Fig. 6.2).
Each individual agent or agent pair in a single simulated generation was sub-
jected to six trials that were a result of crossing three levels of target velocity and
two initial target directions (left, right). Each trial started with both the target
and the tracker in the middle. After an initial starting period (of T = 100 time
steps) in which both the target and tracker remained stationary, the target would
start moving away from the center at constant velocity. Upon reaching one of the
borders, it changed direction. Each trial consisted of three target turns, ending
again in the middle of the environment. In the Individual Condition, the tracker
movement in both directions was controlled by a single agent, while in the Joint
Condition it was controlled by a pair of agents, where one member of the pair
was responsible for the left and another for the right tracker velocity.
6.2.2 The agent architecture
Each agent received perceptual input and was producing motor output. The
agents had four “eyes” directed towards left and right that received information
about the absolute distance to the two borders and the target (see Fig. 6.2). That
is, border-receptive eyes were constantly receiving input (since the agents were al-
ways in between the two borders) while target-receptive eyes were receiving input
only if the target was located on the side for which a given eye was responsible
(left or right). The distance was scaled linearly in such a way that the maximum
visual input was 10, when the distance was 0 and minimum was 0, when the
distance was maximal, i.e. 40. For the target-receptive eyes the input was also 0
when the target was on the opposite side to a given eye and it was maximal to
both eyes when the tracker was directly on top of the target.
The motor output of the agents controlled the movement of the tracker. We
have experimented with two modes of control: discrete button-based and direct
velocity control. In both control modes each agent had two motors (effectors),
left and right, where the left motor velocity could only be negative and the right
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motor velocity could only be positive. Also in both cases, in the Individual
Condition each agent was using both effectors while in the Joint Condition each
agent had effective control over only one of the effectors. In the button-based
control the effectors activated left or right virtual button that added acceleration
to the tracker in discrete increments of 1. Whenever activation of one of the
motor neurons exceeded a threshold of 0.5, the button was “pressed”, remained
switched on for 50 time steps and could not be pressed again during that time.
If both motor neurons were active above the threshold, the button to press was
chosen in proportion to relative activation. In the direct velocity control, the
tracker velocity was a simple sum of motor activation of the two motors.
In the Sound Condition the agents received auditory input. Each sensor (“ear”)
was activated by just one of the sounds produced by the motors: left or right.
In the button-based control the sound accompanied a button press and was of
a constant value. In the direct velocity control it was produced continuously by
the motor activation and was directly proportional to its magnitude.
The agents in the present study were controlled by a network of 8 neurons
as depicted in Figure 6.3. The 8 neurons were fully inter-connected and self-
connected. There were additional visual and auditory weights (range [−100, 100])
from perceptual input to the neurons, as well as motor weights (range [0, 10])
from motor neurons to left and right motors. No symmetry was imposed on the
network.
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Figure 6.3: Agent morphology. Neurons 1− 4 are visual sensors, neurons 5, 6 are
auditory sensors, neurons 7, 8 are motor controllers.
CTRNN update rule for each neuron was standardly defined by the following
formula:
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y˙i =
1
τi
(−yi +
N∑
j=1
wjiσ(yj + θj) + Ii), i = 1, 2, ..., N
where y is the state of each neuron, τ is its time constant (range [1, 100]),
wji is the connection strength (the weight) from the jth to the ith neuron (range
[−15, 15]), θ is a bias term (range [−15, 15]), σ is the standard logistic activation
function and Ii represents an external (perceptual) input to the neuron. We
applied the Euler integration method with a time step set to h = 0.01 to obtain
the time evolution of the simulation.
6.2.3 Evolutionary algorithm
The behavior of the agents was evolved using a real-valued mixed genetic al-
gorithm (GA) applied to their neural network parameters. The genomes were
composed of all parameters (time constants, bias terms, weights of inter-neurons,
visual sensors, auditory sensors and effectors) for the total of 90 positions sepa-
rated into 6 indivisible modules.
The population size was N = 100 in all conditions. In the Joint Condition it
was split in 2 populations of size 50 for agents controlling left and right effectors.
The population of agents was initialized with random parameters drawn from
their full range. After each trial, agent fitness scores were calculated according
to this formula:
F = 1−
T∑
i=1
di
D · (T + S) − P
P =
1
T
|{ vi | vi = 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., T}|
where di is the absolute distance between target and tracker at a given simula-
tion step, T is the simulation length (T ∈ [3000, 4000, 6000], depending on target
velocity), D is the maximum possible distance between target and tracker (equal
to 40 for all simulations), S is the starting period length (equal to 100 for all
simulations), P is the penalty function, which is defined as the average number
of times the tracker velocity was 0 in a given trial. We added this penalty func-
tion to the fitness calculation to encourage movement of the agents. If penalty
decreased the fitness score below 0, it was clipped to 0. The overall fitness score
for every agent was calculated as harmonic mean over scores in all trials.
A new generation was created by copying the best agents without modifica-
tion (5% of the new population), applying fitness proportionate selection to the
whole population (80%), with rank-based, stochastic universal sampling selection,
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mutation variance set to 10 and probability of crossover to 0.8 (applied at genetic
module boundaries). The remaining 15% of the population was filled up with
new randomly initialized agents. The evolution was stopped after 2000 genera-
tions or after 500 generations passed without improvements of the best agents’
performance.
In the Joint Condition the same fitness score was assigned to each member of
the pair that controlled the tracker. Evolution operations were applied separately
to left and right sub-populations of agents.
All our parameters and decisions about agent architecture and task environ-
ment were optimized on Individual Condition experiments and were then applied
to the Joint Condition. We have experimented with two ways of constructing a
joint population: as seeded from the best Individual Condition agents or as ini-
tialized randomly from scratch. It appeared that while the former leads to more
frequent emergence of interesting collaborative solutions, this is mostly due to a
greater homogeneity of the agent genome within successful pairs. Therefore, to
make for a more informative analysis, we restrict it to the randomly generated
population.
6.3 Results
Given the exploratory nature of this study in this paper we focus on presenting
the results for the Joint Sound Condition. Future research will address the com-
parison with the Individual Condition and the No-Sound Condition in order to
provide a more complete comparison with the original study.
6.3.1 Pilot study
As is typical in this type of research, our piloting for the final experimental set-up
the results of which are presented here was an arduous process that took a consid-
erable number of attempts. However, while choosing particular neural parameters
or a type of evolutionary operations might not carry theoretical significance, other
issues that arise seem more relevant and we mention them here.
First, we have tested two basic ways of providing agents with visual input:
as absolute target and tracker position and as relative distance. That is, in the
first case the agents were “outside” the environment, looking at it as if presented
on a screen, while in the second they were “inside”, as if moving on top of the
tracker. We have observed that the second architecture led to faster and more
reliable solutions, indicating perhaps that MCAs evolve more easily when the
task is setup in a more embodied way.
Second, we have noted a large improvement (in the speed of evolution and
quality of emerging solutions) once we implemented the following tweak to the
experimental environment. In the first instance, attempting to follow the original
122 Chapter 6. Embodied Embedded Modeling of Minimal Joint Action
experiment setup the tracker had a velocity that depended only on the agent
(button presses or motor output). This means that when the tracker reached the
border, its velocity was non-zero, despite it not moving. We then modified our
setup in such a way that when the tracker reached the border, its velocity was set
to zero – even though the agents could still have non-zero output of their motor
neurons. In this way, while “real-world” tracker velocity is zero at the border,
its “virtual” non-zero velocity that forces the agents to decelerate one direction
before accelerating in the other is instantiated in our model in the motor outputs.
Finally, regarding two modes of velocity control, we have noted that while
a single agent can evolve effective target tracking with button-based control, it
does not happen reliably (out of 10 seeds 5 fail miserably and only 1 achieves
near-perfect performance) and even when it does happen, the agent struggles to
generalize to new types of trials. In a Joint Condition, no satisfactory solution
emerged. Direct velocity control, on the other hand, leads to good performance
in 6 out of 14 seeds and the agents readily generalize to unseen trials. The
reasons for the button-based control failure are unclear. It might be that with
further adjustments5 it would have been possible to succeed even in this condition
(which would have been much closer to the psychological experiment). It could,
however, indicate that MCAs have an inherent difficulty in generating discrete
actions. Given the preliminary nature of our study we decided to focus our
analysis on the direct velocity control case but one should bear in mind that
this limits potential generalizability from our results to the original psychological
experiment.
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5Needless to say, a question of how exactly to convert a simple continuous motor output of
two nodes into discrete button presses is nontrivial neither theoretically nor practically.
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6.3.2 Behavioral strategies
In analyzing trial behavior of successful agents we have observed two main strate-
gies. The most prevalent task solution that evolved can be called an “independent
strategy” in which one agent provides a continuous motor output of a given mag-
nitude and the other agent varies its output in an oscillatory manner (see Fig. 6.4).
This allows the pair to produce overall velocity that oscillates around 0 leading
the tracker to continually switch directions staying close to the target. A second
strategy involves both agents producing oscillating output and its combination
allowing the tracker to follow the target (Fig. 6.4). This strategy is more common
and pronounced in the Individual Condition and emerges less frequently in the
Joint Condition. Given, however, that it is a more interesting case of collabo-
ration and a more comparable case to the human study6, in further analysis we
focus on a particular population that evolved such a strategy.
Figure 6.5 shows fitness scores over a number of generations. We can see
that while average fitness of the population stays at a stable level, the best pair
fitness rises sharply at around generation 1350. The lack of average population
progress is unusual but likely to be caused by a tough clipping penalty in the
fitness function. In what follows we specifically examine the best pair of the last
generation from that population which achieved a fitness score of F = 0.966 (F
ranged between 0 and 1 for the best performance).
Figure 6.4 presents behavior in one of the trials of this best pair. The plots
of the remaining trials are available in Appendix B.2. Overall, the patterns look
similar in all trials but are not completely symmetric between those in which
the target starts by moving to the right and those in which it first moves to the
left. Furthermore, motor oscillations (and the resulting velocity and movement
oscillations) show a lower frequency in faster trials.
6In the original KJ study both participants had to act differentially at different time points.
In that sense, one agent merely providing a constant output throughout the whole trial is not
comparable.
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The plot above suggests that rather than adopting a division of labor in which
one agent controls movement to the left and the other to the right, the division
is more along the lines of the left agent (call it L) producing fast oscillations
around the target position and the right agent (R) producing slow oscillations
as the target moves in between the two borders. Examining the velocity profiles
for the left and right motors as well as the overall tracker velocity we can see
that successful tracking is accomplished as follows. The tracker travels to the left
border (while staying close to the target) whenever it is producing longer bursts
of leftward displacement and shorter bursts of rightward displacement. It travels
to the right border when longer rightward bursts are alternated with shorter
leftward bursts. The length of leftward vs rightward displacement depends on
the amount of time that the overall tracker velocity stays negative or positive,
respectively. The predominantly negative velocity is produced by slow oscillation
of the left motor whose output is higher than that of the right with either both
highly active or both only slightly active motors. The predominantly positive
velocity is a result of fast left motor oscillations combined with constant high
output of the right motor which pulls the overall tracker velocity above 0 with
only short negative drops. The faster the trial, the more the agents are able to
track the target by producing only the longer period displacements, with less
oscillation around the target. This is accomplished by slowing down of left motor
oscillations. It can also be noted that the right motor is active in a nearly exact
same way across the different speed trials and the only difference between trials
in which target initially moves left or right is in a phase shift of its activity.
To go beyond this introductory description, as a first step we check the abil-
ity of the best pair to generalize by testing its performance in four new trial
types: target starting position from a set or random points within [−3, 3] co-
ordinates, new target speeds, borders increased to [−30, 30] and the number of
turns increased to 5. We find that the agents perform reasonably well in all these
conditions, with an average score of F = 0.955. It is interesting to note that
while increasing the number of turns or varying target starting position does not
change overall movement patterns, varying target speed or environment width
does. As shown in Figure 6.6a, faster target causes the tracker to follow behind
it at a continuous delay, suggesting that the agents are struggling to adopt a
sufficiently fast oscillation pattern. Slower target, on the other hand, makes the
agents reverse the tracker before reaching the right border (Fig. 6.6b) but not the
left. Figure 6.6c provides further evidence for the asymmetry in behavior close to
the two borders: moving all the way to the left border but reversing at a slight
distance before the right.
Next, we made sure that contribution of both agents is in fact required to
accomplish the task and run the trials with just left or right agent acting alone.
When only the left agent was controlling the tracker first its right and then its left
motor would become maximally active and the tracker quickly drifted to the right
border and stayed there. When only the right agent was controlling the tracker
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its motors would start slow oscillations that resulted in the tracker moving to the
right border and moving back and forth there without concern for the target.
Our final behavioral probing involved running the trials with a set of lesions
on the agents’ brains in order to understand whether and what perceptual input
plays a role in producing the solution. From such lesion studies we can observe
that auditory perception does not seem to be critical to the performance in this
task (Fig. 6.6d). A lack of possibility to hear the co-actor’s motor activation leads
to less precise tracking but it is still sufficient throughout the trial.
Visual perception, on the other hand, does seem critical. If either perception
of the border or the target is removed from the beginning of the trial, performance
is severely disrupted (Fig. 6.6e-f). If border input is removed around the middle
of the trial, from the time of the lesion the agents manage to complete faster
trials but struggle on the slower ones. Such delayed loss of target information is
slightly more detrimental – soon after the input is removed the left agent stops
its oscillations leading the tracker off course. Interestingly, also here in the fastest
trial adequate behavior seems to be maintained.
6.3.3 Behavioral and neural dynamics
Having established that the agents’ behavior is robust to experimental variations
and that both agents’ activity is indeed required, we proceeded to examine the
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factors that underlie successful task performance.
In order to better understand the way the agents accomplish the task, we can
take a closer look at the behavioral tendencies of the tracker when the movement
(and thus, continuous change of the situation) is taken out of the picture. We do
so by running a modified simulation in which the target remains immobile and
the agents can activate the tracker’s motors but its position remains unchanged.
We let such a situation evolve over a number of time steps and then plot a velocity
phase portrait, i.e. the tracker velocity vectors at the end of the simulation at
various target-tracker coordinate combinations (Fig. 6.7).
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From the plot we can see that, for instance, when the target is positioned in
the middle of the screen (at 0) and the tracker is placed to the left of it (e.g. at
−15), its tendency would be to adopt a highly positive velocity that would move
it to the right (towards the target). If it’s placed to the right (15), its tendency
would be to move to the left. When both are at location 0, the tendency is still
to adopt a slight positive velocity rather than 0. This might not seem adaptive
but it is consistent with an oscillatory strategy adopted by the tracker. It never
stays right on top of the target motionless but rather overshoots and undershoots
it repeatedly.
When the target is close to the left border (at −19), the tracker tries to move
left (towards the border) with a much greater velocity if it is positioned far on the
right (at 18) than if it is close to the left border or in the center. The relationship
is, however, not linear since the magnitude of velocity is very similar in the latter
two cases (even though the center is still some distance away from the border).
When the target is close to the right border (at 19), the tracker tries to move
right if it is placed close to the left border (−15) or in the center but its velocity
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is close to 0 when placed close to the border (already at 15) and in fact becomes
negative at position 19.
The asymmetry with respect to tracker velocity tendencies at different borders
underlies the difference in behavior close to those borders. Namely, it appears
that close the left border the tracker follows the target very closely, reaches the
border and then turns back (adopting a compensatory strategy in the words of
KJ). Close to the right border, on the other hand, the tracker starts turning
already before reaching it, reminiscent of the anticipatory strategy adopted by
human participants.
Now, we could try to examine how the overall tracker velocity results from
the perceptual input to both agents and their motor output. The simplest way
to visualize the perceptual function is to plot the agents’ (scaled) input – which
is the same for both agents – alongside the outputs of the neurons that are most
directly affected by these inputs.
From Figure 6.8a we can see that as a function of border perception the
only neuron that is not continuously on or off is neuron 1 of the right agent
(connected to the input from the distance to the left border) whose maximum
output corresponds to reaching the right border (being maximally distant to the
left border). Figures 6.8b and c show neuronal output in response to target
perception in two agents (we plot them separately for clarity). Here neurons 3
of the left agent and 4 of the right agent are constantly giving maximum output.
More interestingly, neuron 4 of the left agent that receives right-eye distance to
the target fires whenever the target appears on the right of the tracker. Neuron
3 of the right agent fires also when the target is to the right of the tracker but
only when it has been so for a longer duration of time. Finally, with respect to
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the auditory perception, the only neuron that seems to be differentially active is
the right agent’s neuron 5 (connected to the ear that receives input from the left
motor). However, its activity seems to be mostly correlated with the target and
tracker reaching the left border (see other trials in Appendix B.2).
In summary, it appears that the right agent that seems to be sensitive to the
movement between borders has neurons whose output parallels reaching the two
borders (see Fig.6.8). On the other hand, the left agent that controls oscillation
around the target also has one neuron that parallels the target’s position being
right of the tracker. Since the target being left or right of the tracker is mutually
exclusive (given agent anatomy), it is reasonable that sensitivity only to one of
these situations is employed to perform the task.
With regard to the agents’ motor contributions, successful velocity control
requires coordination between the magnitude of motor activations in time. We
can first examine the simple case of steady state attractors. Logically, since the
overall velocity is a sum of both motor outputs, it will be close to 0 when either
both motors are highly active or both are close to inactive. A leftward velocity
should be a result of a higher activation of the left motor than the right and
vice versa for the rightward velocity. Plotting a similar velocity dynamics grid
for both left and right motor (Appendix B.2) shows that indeed the region of
highest rightward velocity of the tracker (when target position is greater than
tracker position, except when both target and tracker are right of coordinate 10)
is a result of near-zero activation of the left motor and a high activation of the
right motor. The region of highest leftward velocity (when tracker is right of the
target) is a result of hight left motor activation and small right motor activation.
The region of small velocity when target is close to the left border and target
below about 8 is a result of both motors being highly active. It appears that the
agents use two different strategies close to the two borders.
Finally, the motor output is a result primarily of the two neurons that are
connected to the motors with motor weights - neuron 7 and 8 in both agents.
We can examine their output profiles in one of the experimental trials. Here we
clearly see that the left and right motor velocity is driven primarily by neuron 7
of the left agent and neuron 8 of the right agent respectively.
6.3.4 Information dynamics
A relatively new method that can be used to understand the behavior of MCAs
is information dynamics approach, in which several basic measures derived from
information theory are used to assess how information is processed and stored
by the network Williams and Beer (2010a); Williams (2011); Bossomaier et al.
(2016). It is important to emphasize that ‘information’ here is meant in a strictly
statistical sense, not in semantic sense. What the measures give us is simply
a way to look at statistical dependencies between the variables included in the
brain-body-environment system in a given task. For instance, in an ideal case,
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one could map out how perceptual information affects activity of certain neurons
and how activity of these and other neurons affects motor output. Again, ‘affects’
here is meant to be taken in a statistical sense since inferring actual causal links
requires intervention studies.7
The fundamental measures in information theory is Entropy, typically viewed
as the average amount of uncertainty with regard to the values of a random
variable or, equivalently, the amount of information required to predict those
values8. As such, entropy is minimal when the outcome is certain, e.g. when a
variable takes on only one value, such as a two-headed coin. It is maximal when
all outcomes are equally likely – e.g., when the coin is fair. Entropy forms the
basis for a set of associated measures, that can be used to characterize complex
systems such as MCAs (here described informally):
• Conditional Entropy (CE) between two variables X and Y is the residual
uncertainty about X when Y is known (maximal when X and Y are inde-
pendent), e.g., the amount of uncertainty about the coin flip outcome once
we know whether the coin is fair.
• Mutual Information (MI) between two variables X and Y is the amount of
reduction in uncertainty that these variables provide about each other, i.e.
it is a measure of their statistical dependence or correlation.
• Conditional Mutual Information (CMI) between three variables X, Y, Z is
the reduction of uncertainty that X provides about Y given information
about Z. CMI would be minimal if we find that X and Y are correlated just
because of some common context Z. However, CMI could also be higher than
7In general, the relationship between information measures described below and causality
are complex, see e.g. Lizier and Prokopenko (2010).
8Yet another interpretation of entropy is the average amount of surprisal associated with
learning an outcome of the variable
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MI if there is synergy in the system, e.g., between Y and Z for information
about X.9
Now, the study of systems that evolve over time requires a measure that cap-
tures not just average relationships over static variables but rather relationships
over sequences of variable states (time-series), in which a current state of one
variable might depend on its own previous states and also on some number of
previous states of another variable. A common measure aimed at capturing such
dependency is Transfer Entropy (TE):
TY→X(t) with a certain lag may be interpreted intuitively as the degree
of uncertainty about current X resolved by past Y and X, over and
above the degree of uncertainty about current X already resolved by
its own past alone (Bossomaier et al., 2016, p. 68, slightly modified).
Here the X variable is typically called a target, the Y variable – a source
and in the study of information dynamics, TE is taken to capture information
transfer from source to target, e.g. from stimulus to neuronal activation. A
complementary measure to capture just the information in the past state of the
target about its next state is called Active Information Storage (AIS) and can be
interpreted as information stored within a given process (such as in the unfolding
of neuron activation).
It is important to add, that while the definitions above specify average amounts
of uncertainty or information, the respective measures can be obtained for point-
wise (or local) relationships, i.e., between specific outcomes of the variables, in-
cluding outcomes at specific time points. As a result, one can calculate and plot
how these measures evolve over time, producing a portrait of information flow in
a given system.
As an exploratory attempt of such a study of information dynamics we have
calculated TE and AIS on our agent networks. We have used an open-source
software Lizier (2014) to produce average and pointwise measures. The procedure
and the particular settings we used can be consulted in accompanying analysis
scripts, including all resulting plots (Appendix B). Here we reproduce only the
clearest examples.
Figures 6.10a and b show TE from target-tracker distance to the activity of
neurons 4 and 7 of the left agent and their AIS in one of the faster trials. Figure
6.10c shows peaks in TE from the left agent’s neuron 8 to its left motor at points
of largest changes in motor activity. Figure 6.10d shows TE peaks in the right
agent’s neuron 8 whenever its right motor activity is rising. These results are
consistent with our investigation of motor activity in the previous sub-section.
Furthermore, a lack of clear patterns in, for instance, statistical dependencies
9How to disentangle redundancies and synergies in the system is a subject of active research,
e.g., Williams and Beer (2010b); Timme et al. (2014).
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between auditory stimuli and neuronal activity could potentially suggest that the
agents do not in fact use that information throughout the trial, i.e., do not listen
to the co-actor’s activity in ‘deciding’ about one’s own action.
6.3.5 Cross-agent relationships
The information dynamics methods described in the previous section can be used
not only to investigate relationships between particular variables but also to infer
effective networks in a given system. That is, while an MCA can be designed
according to a particular structural architecture, that is completely known to us,
its functioning will not necessarily use all the possible connections. Effective net-
work inference (ENI) procedure “examines directed (time-lagged) relationships
between nodes from their time-series data, and seeks to infer the ‘minimal neu-
ronal circuit model’ which can replicate and indeed explain the time series of the
nodes” (Bossomaier et al., 2016, p 144), i.e. their observed activity. The gen-
eral approach to network inference relies on measuring pairwise TE between all
pairs of variables, prune the connections above a certain p-value and correct for
multiple comparisons (Lizier and Rubinov, 2012).
In this study we employed this procedure to investigate whether there are de-
tectable relationships between two agents by conceptualizing a potential effective
network as a combined agent-agent system. In particular, as a co-representation
proxy we have examined whether a statistically predictive relationship can be
found between the neuronal activity of one agent and the action (motor output)
of the other agent. If such a relationship were to be uncovered, one could claim
that there is something in the brain of one agent that “represents” the forthcoming
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action of the other – in a sense of being correlated with it.
We again used an open-source software (Wollstadt et al., 2017) to run an ENI
with an estimator most suited for non-linear continuous data (the Kraskov algo-
rithm, Kraskov et al., 2004). In the procedure we only included time-series data
from a non-visual subset of the neurons (neurons 5-8) as potential sources and
an output of the motor effectively controlled by the other agent as target. In or-
der to minimize the possibility of finding spurious correlations we included target
and tracker positions as conditional variables. That is, given the constrained and
regular nature of the task, it is conceivable that one could predict motor activity
just based on the location of the target and tracker. Since we wanted to know
whether there is additional predictive power from the neural activity of one of
the agents, over and above task context, we conditioned on these positions. The
time-series data from all trials was used as separate replications of the process.
In order to get a handle on the functionality of the potential correlation,
we separately tested the relationships for two different regions within the task
environment: (1) pre-border region when the target was within 200 time steps
before reaching the border and (2) center region when the target was around
200 time steps within the center of the environment. We reasoned that since
predicting the co-actor’s action is more relevant to controlling the tracker before
the border (when potentially anticipatory strategy is required) than controlling
it when it is around the center, network coherence should be more pronounced
there.
The network plots of Figure 6.11 show ENI results for the two regions for both
agents. In these plots, x_tr and x_tg represent the variables that capture the
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tracker and target positions; motor is the left or right motor activation and n5 to
n8 are the activation of neurons 5 to 8 of the agents’ brains. The edges between
the nodes are statistically significant links between the variables they represent
while the numbers on those edges are the time lags for which (the strongest)
significant link was found (all p < 0.003).
The plots suggest that indeed in the areas around the center of the environ-
ment, the only predictive links are between the positions of target and tracker
and the motor activity of both agents. On the other hand, before the border
region there is a statistical dependence between all considered neurons of the left
agent and the motor output of the right agent and a statistical dependence be-
tween the eighth neuron of the right agent and the motor output of the left agent.
This seems consistent with a minimal notion of ‘co-representation’ we adopted.
However, whether the relationship is really functional in producing behavior and
whether it is most useful to interpret the network activity as representation re-
quires further investigation.
6.4 Discussion
In this paper we have presented a study of joint action between minimal cognitive
agents that evolved to follow a target while controlling a common tracker in a
complementary manner. We have demonstrated that the agents can emerge that
solve this task successfully, that the solution relies on their timely coordination
and that part of the solution resembles a more complex anticipatory strategy
employed by human participants in a similar task. Furthermore, we made first
steps in developing a potential method to detect “co-representation” in the agents’
brains understood as representation in one of the agents that carries information
about something in the other agent.
The study is limited in a number of ways and requires further work. Empir-
ically, we believe our next step is to find a setting which allows the agents to
coordinate by “pushing” discrete buttons rather than controlling the tracker’s ve-
locity directly. This is important because one of the charges against EEC from the
side of more traditional approaches is that it is unable to account for discrete be-
haviors. Therefore, to make a strong case for EEC, a demonstration of successful
inter-agent coordination with discrete complementary actions is required.
Methodologically, our results at present remain closer to the descriptive end
of the description-explanation spectrum. That is, we have tried to carefully char-
acterize the agents’ behavior in the task, including their sensitivity to perceptual
information and the structure of their motor outputs. However, the information
dynamics approach has not yet delivered a deeper understanding of how informa-
tion flows through the system or what are the exact contributions of the various
parts of the brain-body-environment-body-brain system operational in this task.
We devote the remainder of this section to the theoretical issues that are still
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left open with respect to the main topic of this study, i.e. the explanatory role of
(co-)representations in joint action.
6.4.1 Representations in MCAs
The question of how to characterize internal states of MCAs has received sustained
attention given the centrality of the debate over representation in EEC versus a
more traditional approach (often called cognitivism). The matters are not made
easier by the fact that there is no unique definition of mental representation that
everybody agrees upon Haselager et al. (2003).
The idea that is frequently evoked in this context is that mental representa-
tion is a state that stands in for certain external features (entities, properties,
events) and plays a direct causal role in further cognitive processing by virtue
of this relationship (Beer, 2003; Mirolli, 2012). However, what the standing in
relationship amounts to and how it can play a causal role as a representation,
i.e., in virtue of its representational, rather than, say, physical, properties, is a
subject of significant debate in philosophy. Simplifying these discussions for the
sake of the present article, one can think of just two most commonly entertained
positions on the spectrum of possibilities that we will call, after (Ramsey, 2007),
the R-representation (for Receptor) and S-representation (for Structure)10.
On the R-based view, the standing in relationship is construed as a matter of
mere causality and function. For example, certain cells in the visual cortex are
found to reliably fire in response to certain orientation of edges (Lettvin et al.,
1959). The firing presumably causes some further chain of events and has a
particular function within the behavior of the owner of that visual cortex11. If
this is all there is for an internal state being representation, then the nature
of representation is an unmysterious phenomenon within the natural world.12
However, the price to be paid here is that such representation is also ever-present
because causal links are found throughout the physical domain and it becomes
unclear in what sense it is specifically mental, how it can play a variety of roles
that cognitive science requires of it as a representation (Ramsey, 2007) or whether
it is at all useful to call this “representation” (Hutto and Myin, 2013).13.
10Another option that has frequently been discussed is a belief in symbolic representations
which undergo rule-based transformations. However, this view seems to have fallen out of favor
in cognitive science
11Unfortunately, most neuroscientific work focuses on the identification of feature-response
correlations rather than their downstream effects (de Wit et al., 2016)
12In fact, understanding how representation can be part of the natural world is a goal of any
project of naturalization of representations. R-based view is just one of the attempts to reach
that goal.
13Of course, here we are presenting a somewhat simplified version of this debate. For instance,
an unpacking of what “function” means in the causal chain from the world to behavior is seen
by some as explaining the special nature of representational contents (see e.g., Dretske (1988,
1995); Millikan (1984, 2004))
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On the S-based view, a restriction is placed on representational stand-ins
requiring that mental states represent external features only if they are part
of a general representational scheme which itself is grounded on a structural
similarity (an isomorphism) between the inner states and processes and the outer
domain that they represent, that is, a similarity between relations among the
elements, not between the elements themselves. For example, showing that the
brain activity of a rat in navigating through a labyrinth is structurally similar to
the labyrinth itself might lead to claims that the rat has an inner model of its
environment and is using this model to flexibly plan his search for food (Bechtel,
2014).
The vocabulary of inner models (also called iconic representations, Williams
and Colling, 2018) is ubiquitous in contemporary cognitive science and it seems
to justify a role of representation in explanations of complex mental processes
(Ramsey, 2007). That is, if, say, a rat has a model of the environment (similar
to a map), it can use the model to compare different possible routes to the food,
compute which one is the shortest and plan its trajectory – all in the absence of
immediate sensory information and with no need for laborious trial and error. The
research is ongoing on what exactly makes a given isomorphic internal structure
represent an external structure (see e.g., Shea, 2014), whether such structures
suffer from the same problems as R-representations (e.g., Morgan, 2014) and
how they relate to mere physical processing. However, it is believed that S-
representations do not simply reduce to R-representations (Gładziejewski and
Miłkowski, 2017 but see also Morgan, 2014). Therefore further work from the
EEC camp is required to investigate whether anti-representational arguments
equally apply here.
Given this distinction and coming back to issue of inner states in MCAs,
it has been argued that such agents do indeed possess states that covary with
external features and their effect on further processing can be given a functional
interpretation (Beer, 2003; Mirolli, 2012). At the same time, the nature of these
states is more nuanced than a typical R-representation would suggest. It is not a
mere passive “taking in” of information from the external world and processing it
to produce behavior. Rather, their meaning depends on active interaction with
the surrounding bodily and environmental context, as well as interaction history
(Mirolli, 2012). Furthermore, the function of these states is not to inform the
agent about particular state of affairs but to shape the sensitivity to upcoming
perturbations of the system’s intrinsic dynamics (Beer, 2000).
In sum, if MCAs have representations, they are representations of how the
world relates to the agent’s ongoing behavior, not of the world as it is objectively
(cf. Gibson’s 1986 optic flow). Given the nature of R-representations in general
and how they appear in MCAs, EEC researchers typically conclude that calling
such states “representations” is superfluous (van Gelder, 1998).14 What remains
14Please note that a portrait of a “typical cognitivist representation” is sketched here from
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unclear at present is if MCAs are also capable of S-representations and how their
presence and function could be established. Presumably, it would require some
way to measure the similarity between the evolved internal structure and what it
represents and a way to determine whether the similarity itself plays a functional
role in the cognitive process. To our knowledge, no such work has been carried
out yet – at least with respect to MCAs.15
As things currently stand, however, any MCA investigation into representation-
hungry tasks must specify what kind of representation is implied by the interpre-
tation of task requirements. This becomes particularly relevant when moving to
the specific case of co-representation.
6.4.2 Joint action co-representations
In our view, all of the more complex forms of joint action that traditional cognitive
scientists postulate as being beyond the reach of EEC require not R- but S-
representation in the form of inner models of another agent. The content of these
models can vary in abstraction. For instance, in the context of the theory of
common coding (Prinz, 1997, 2013) or mirroring (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010),
the representations involved are relatively low-level, sensori-motor. According to
these theories, acting relies on certain representations, which, depending on the
particular theory of action control, can be representations of goals and intentions,
of ensuing motor commands and of their predicted sensory consequences (Wolpert
et al., 2003). With experience, associations are learned between the elements that
participate in this process. Subsequently, given the broad structural similarity
between people, merely observing somebody execute a particular movement (e.g.
seeing a hand trajectory of somebody grasping a cup) or lead to a particular
outcome in the environment (e.g. grasped and displaced cup), can activate the
same motor commands and intentions in the observer.
On a higher level, representations can be based not on sensori-motor invariants
but on shared tasks, as already mentioned in the Introduction. Sharing a task
representation then means that an individual represents a task set of the co-actor
in addition to one’s own: their assigned stimuli, required responses and relations
between them. While it is possible to construe this in a minimal way (Vesper et al.,
2010), it is maintained that in majority of cases such representations involve the
joint goal (what we want to do together), the tasks that reach that goal and who
will do what part of the task, when and where. In addition, the other agent’s
representation may include their observable and unobservable properties (body
shape, abilities, knowledge).
a perspective of a typical (and oversimplified) EEC critique. Many cognitivists might disagree
with this portrait.
15There is related work on categorization in neural networks (Laakso and Cottrell, 2000),
however, that could be taken as an inspiration.
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Whether such representations are sensori-motor or more abstract, what is
common to them is that they instantiate functional similarity between two in-
dividuals and it is in virtue of this similarity that coordinated joint action can
ensue. That is, it is not just that agents have certain internal states that are
caused by and/or correlate with, say, a particular characteristic of the co-actor
(which would make it a case of R-representation). Rather, it seems crucial to
joint action theories that agents have structured representations that are similar
in both and it is because of this similarity that the representation can serve as a
model and used for a variety of purposes. For instance, to predict what the co-
actor will do, how, when and where (Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009b) and, thereby,
adjust one’s own action to this and the joint outcome prospectively rather than
after the fact.
What is offered by the MCA methodology is a way to operationalize any par-
ticular notion of representation – including those used in joint action studies –
more precisely and then test its applicability to the agents equipped with very
minimal neural and cognitive resources. In the current study, the minimal defini-
tion of co-representation we adopted was closer to R-representation and we found
some evidence that it can be detected in the evolved agents. Future work needs
to corroborate this evidence but also move beyond this limited notion towards
a richer concept of S-representation, as a way to extend the reach of the EEC
domain.

Chapter 7
Pantomime in Gestural Language
Evolution
This paper examines a popular trend of postulating that gestures have played a
crucial role in the emergence of human language. Language evolution is frequently
understood as a transition from a system, in which signals (whether vocal or man-
ual) have fixed meanings and are used asymmetrically by senders and receivers,
through specific cognitive and neurological changes, to a system, in which signals
are (1) flexibly referential, i.e., can stand for a variety of ideas and (2) intersub-
jective, i.e., can be used equally in production and comprehension with any member
of the community. The function assigned to gestures in gesture-first theories is to
provide a first version of the more advanced open-ended communication in the form
of spontaneous pantomimes that initiates a subsequent expansion of this system, its
conventionalization and eventually a switch to the vocal modality. In the present
paper I examine a particular theory that claims that pantomime was enabled by
changes within the system of complex action recognition and imitation. I argue that
while the theory is promising, the notion of a pantomime it employs, presupposes
two sophisticated abilities that themselves are left unexplained: symbolization and
intentional communication. I point out two ways to remedy the situation, namely,
constructing a leaner understanding of pantomime or supplementing the theory
with an explanation for the emergence of these abilities. In this paper I pursue
a third option: identifying an alternative mechanism that can lead to a suitably
complex language precursor while avoiding pantomime and its problematic cogni-
tive bases altogether. This mechanism is ontogenetic ritualization, a well-known
process responsible for the development of gestures in non-human primates. I out-
line the possibility that when placed in appropriate socio-cultural circumstances, in
which complementary actions around objects are required, this process can lead to
signals that are modestly referential and intersubjective.
7.1 Introduction
Theories that propose that human language emerged from gestures, rather than
directly from vocalizations, have been around for a long while (Hewes, 1976).
What often fuels this idea is a common intuition that expressing and understand-
ing our thoughts in gestures is somehow cognitively easier or more natural because
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there is a possibility for signals to resemble the meaning to be conveyed1.
There is a great variety of gestural theories and not all subscribe to the
same claims. Some maintain that gestures really came first in evolution (Ar-
bib, 2005; Corballis, 2002; Stokoe, 2001), while others insist on a multimodal
beginning (Goldin-Meadow, 2011; Kendon, 1973; McNeill, 2012). Some see the
primary role of gestures in their semantic potential (Arbib, 2012; Corballis, 2002;
Tomasello, 2008), while others focus on their proto-syntactic qualities (Armstrong
and Wilcox, 2007; Stokoe, 2001). There is a difference in whether the first gestural
expressions were more like words (Hewes, 1973) or more like complete propositions
(Arbib, 2012). And finally, certain theories are pitched at a more personal level of
explanation (Zlatev, 2007), while others pursue a more sub-personal, mechanistic
route (Arbib, 2012; Corballis, 2002). In this paper I will restrict myself to one
particular instantiation of a gestural theory in order to examine one particular
notion that seems central to many of them, namely pantomime. I consider the
critique to be made in the paper applicable to any gestural theory that relies on
this concept.
Pantomime is a spontaneous bodily mode of communication, in which mean-
ing is conveyed through resemblance. For example, molding your hand into a
round shape and moving it close to your lips might signify cup or drinking. This
communicative trick is often presented as more powerful than what is available
to non-human primates and our last common ancestor (LCA) but less powerful
than conventional and compositional language proper. At the same time, because
it is bodily and can rely on similarity between form and meaning, it is seen as
not requiring much sophisticated cognitive machinery and therefore potentially
within easy evolutionary reach for our LCA.
The suggestion that pantomime is necessarily cognitively easy has been chal-
lenged from the perspective of cognitive development and language acquisition
(Irvine, 2016). What I wish to do in the present paper is contribute to this chal-
lenge by situating the discussion of pantomime in a larger theoretical context.
Specifically, reliance on pantomime in gestural accounts betrays several assump-
tions about what human language is and what was required for its emergence2.
The two key properties ascribed to our communicative system are symbolization
and communicative intentions. The first is defined along Piagetian 1962 lines as
an ability to differentiate between a signal and its referent and understand that
the former stands in for the latter. The second is frequently unpacked as the
1Another common motivation for gestural theories is the claim that in non-human primates
(and our last common ancestor) gestures are more voluntary and flexible than vocalization and
therefore could have provided a communicative scaffolding long before we acquired full vocal
control. This view has been recently challenged (Slocombe et al., 2011).
2By far the most important underlying assumption is that language is seen as primarily
a business of getting a message across, transmitting ideas between individuals. Since this
“externalization view” underlies most of current language evolution theories and is extensively
discussed elsewhere (Hawkey, 2008; Smit, 2016), I will not address it in this paper.
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speaker demonstrating his intention to communicate and the hearer having to in-
fer that intention. Neither of the two is uncontroversially easy and if pantomime
requires them, then any theory that relies on pantomime needs an explicit account
of how they emerged.
In mounting the challenge to the role of pantomime in language evolution,
the paper proceeds in three stages. In the first stage (section 7.2), to make the
discussion more concrete, I describe one specific recent gestural theory: the so-
called Mirror System Hypothesis (MSH) of Arbib (2012). The choice is motivated
by the fact that the communicative breakthrough that pantomime is supposed to
provide, cries for an explicit mechanistic account of what exactly changed in the
minds and brains of our ancestors and how it happened. The MSH is a theory
that proposes that it is changes to the mirror neuron system (MNS) that enabled
the key transition.
In the second stage (section 7.3) I start by explaining the features of symbol-
ization and communicative intentions and highlight their controversial status. I
also show that pantomime does indeed rely on them both and consider whether
MSH provides a clear account of how such sophisticated skills appear in evolution.
I argue that in fact the account cannot yet be considered complete.
In the third stage (sections 7.4-7.5) I suggest that the shortcomings of a
pantomime-based account do not warrant abandoning a gestural theory. I pro-
pose considering a different mechanism for an expansion of a gestural repertoire:
ontogenetic ritualization transformed through changing socio-cultural settings.
Ontogenetic ritualization is a well-known simple process in which communicative
gestures emerge from repeated social interactions. I outline the possibility for
this process leading to gestures which are sufficiently complex to constitute vi-
able precursors to language, but which at the same time do not face the problems
inherent in reliance on pantomime. Circling back to the example of MSH, I con-
clude by discussing the effect of abandoning the concept of a pantomime for a
theory that employs it.
7.2 The Mirror System Hypothesis
The discovery of mirror neurons (neurons that fire when executing and observing
an action) and specifically their location in the primate homologue of the Broca’s
area has fueled the proposal that the system for grasping and imitation could
have served as a basis for the emergence of gestural intentional protolanguage
(Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998). This preliminary suggestion has been elaborated
into the Mirror System Hypothesis (MSH) by Arbib 2012 as a neurological imple-
mentation of the gestural language evolution scenario and has been since adopted
by many of its other proponents (Corballis, 2010; Zlatev, 2008).
It is important to note from the start that MSH does not state that the pos-
session of a Mirror Neuron System (MNS) automatically leads to either action
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understanding (as some have interpreted Gallese and Goldman, 1998) or language,
only that it provided the basis for mechanisms that transformed a non-linguistic
brain into a language-ready brain that could support manual protolanguage. Ob-
viously, considering the changes to social and technological life of our ancestors
would still be needed to fully spell out the details of such an account but that is
not the focus of MSH. The focus is rather on describing the changes to the MNS
(and systems “beyond the mirror”) that would be required to result in a gestural
protolanguage sufficiently different from a simple gestural communication system,
such as that currently present in non-human primates, that it could jump-start
a series of transitions that would eventually lead to human language.
Specifically, Arbib 2005; 2012 proposes seven stages of language evolution.
In the first three stages the capacities are shared with the LCA of humans and
other primates. What we have there is an action system for grasping (stage
1), a MNS which responds to the perception of grasping (stage 2) and allows
both current primates and our ancestors to respond to and imitate simple object-
directed actions (stage 3). The discussions about the difference between imitation
in non-human primates and humans are still ongoing but there seems to be an
overall consensus that several kinds of this skill can be distinguished. For example,
stimulus enhancement is apparent imitation resulting from one’s attention being
directed to a particular part of the environment and executing appropriate action
on that part. Emulation is observing an action and attempting to reproduce its
result without copying the manner in which it has been achieved. Arbib calls both
of these mechanisms simple imitation and distinguishes it from true or complex
imitation, in which a novel action, which is outside the imitator’s own repertoire is
replicated in detail by recognizing that the overall action is composed of familiar
sub-actions3.
Only humans seem to be capable of complex imitation and hence the emer-
gence of this capacity is assigned to the truly novel stage 4. The (extended) MNS
that subserves this type of imitation is able to recognize not only single actions
but also compound sequences, not only transitive actions but also intransitive
sub-components, i.e. movements not explicitly and directly related to a visible
goal-related object. No claim is made on whether such imitation evolved because
of its usefulness in acquiring language or for other reasons, such as, for instance,
tool-use. What is claimed, however, is that the new capacity is recruited for
communication purposes4 and begins a chain of changes that eventually lead via
pantomime (stage 5a) to the emergence of an open-ended range of convention-
alized, progressively abstract gestures called protosigns (stage 5b), protospeech
3Note that this process may still require fine-tuning and involve flexibility of execution,
what matters is that what is delivered at the end is a replication of means, not just ends of the
overarching action.
4This is necessary because the theory holds that gestures already present in apes are a result
of simple imitation and therefore something else is required for gestural protolanguage, see a
diagram in (Arbib, 2012, p. 215).
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(stage 6) and then multimodal syntactically structured human language (stage
7). As the changes related to complex imitation and resulting pantomime seem
to be the most crucial, I focus here on stages 4 and 5a.
Now, complex imitation is said to be the key novelty because it provided a
foundation for pantomime. As such, pantomime in MSH is said to rest on three
abilities (to be explained below):
• the recognition that a partial action A serves to achieve the overall goal G
of the behavior of which it is part;
• using the recognition that a partial action A that serves to achieve the goal
G for assisting the other in the achievement of G;
• the reversal of that recognition to consciously create actions that will stand
in metonymic5 relationship to some overall goal, whether praxic or commu-
nicative (Arbib, 2012, pp. 218-219).
All three abilities are normally used for imitation of complex hierarchically
structured actions. In the praxic context, the overarching goal G of an action is
an achievement of some praxic aim and the means for achieving it are intransitive
sub-components A1...An of an overall behavior. The first property means simply
that recognizing one of the component As might lead to the recognition of G.
The second property means that if one can recognize the purpose of the sub-
components (their sub-goals in relation to G), one can assist the other in achieving
G (perhaps given some cooperative motivation). Finally, one acquires a reverse
insight (the third property above) that performing appropriate sub-components
will achieve G, constituting a case of complex imitation. At the same time,
however, this praxic mechanism gets exapted for communicative purposes, namely
performing a sub-action A with the hope that the other will recognize G and assist
in completing the action. In this case the movement becomes communicative
because the goal is now to get the other to think of G and thereby elicit a desired
response.
Why do the mechanisms underlying complex imitation get transformed in
this way? It is suggested that our ancestors learned that producing imitative
movements in instrumentally inappropriate contexts leads to desired effects and
this got reinforced as a communicative strategy. What is more, what starts out
as a stock of pantomimes about manual actions is soon extended to “the ability
to in some sense project the degrees of freedom of movements involving other
effectors, [other animals, such as a bird flying,] and even, say, of the passage
of wind through the trees” (pp. 214-215). As a result, representing non-human
actions or objects via gestures becomes available.
Arbib argues that crucial to this latter transition is the class of so-called quasi-
mirror neurons, which are to be distinguished from potential mirror neurons.
5part-whole
144 Chapter 7. Pantomime in Gestural Language Evolution
The latter are the neurons that as a result of experience can acquire mirroring
properties. Quasi-MNs, by contrast, are those that connect observed actions not
to exactly the same own actions (such as when I try to imitate my conspecific
using a tool), but to “somewhat related” movements. For example, they could be
active when one tries to flap one’s arms to imitate a bird flying for the purpose
of miming bird or flying6.
In the end, what emerges is a flexible ability and social practice of producing
and understanding pantomimes for a variety of meanings, which lays the basis for
future, more conventional, gestural protolanguage. It is said to exhibit certain
properties definitional of language and therefore constitute an adequate language
precursor. These are:
• parity of meaning – the understanding of the signal is shared between its
sender and receiver, so that the same individual can both produce and
understand the same signal
• symbolization – an individual can associate an open set of communicative
forms with an open class of events
• intended communication – the signal is meant by the sender to have a
particular effect on the receiver
Parity of meaning follows relatively straightforwardly from the properties of
the MNS: my firing of the mirror neurons helps me understand instrumental
actions but also communicative manual actions by extension7. Symbolization is
ensured by “projecting the degrees of freedom” from a variety of actions, objects
and events. And finally, intended communication is based on the goal-directed
hierarchical nature of both instrumental and communicative actions: the fact that
gestures are driven by an overarching goal G and require recognition of that goal
on the part of the receiver. The responses are thus not elicited directly because
of some reinforced connection.
7.3 Symbols and communicative intentions
As advertised in section 7.1 and should be clear from the exposition of MSH above,
Arbib explicitly relies on pantomime defined in terms of symbolization and com-
municative intentions. It should also be clear that it is these two features that
are held up as crucial to initiating a transition away from limited communica-
tive repertoires of our LCA and toward the richness of human language. This is
6One should note that both the existence of such quasi-MNs and their supposed role in
pantomime has yet to be demonstrated empirically, although see (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2012) for
systems level evidence of understanding conspecifics with substantially different bodies.
7This is not as straightforward because mirror neurons are mere pattern detectors and in
order to furnish “understanding” their firing needs to be seen in the context of the whole extended
mirror neuron system. But let us grant Arbib that the basic insight holds.
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unproblematic if one of the two holds: (1) both features can be shown to be cog-
nitively lean enough to smoothly emerge from LCA’s communicative precursors
without e.g. themselves requiring language or (2) both features are not cogni-
tively lean but MSH shows how they developed from other LCA’s capacities. I
will now tackle both options in turn.
7.3.1 Definitions and controversies
Symbolization, as the name suggests, is an ability to use symbols. A symbol
can be understood in different ways. One, rather non-standard way to define
it, is to say that a symbol is a sign which derives its meaning partially from its
relationship to other signs in the system (Deacon, 1996). Pantomime is not a
symbol in that sense since it arises when there is no yet a (protolanguage) system
to speak of. A more frequent way to define a symbol, following Peirce 1958, is
as a sign in which relationship between its form and meaning is arbitrary, based
on convention. For example a word “dog” in no way resembles a dog. This is
to be contrasted with an index, in which relationship is based on some causal
connection, e.g., smoke means fire; and with an icon, in which the connection lies
in similarity, e.g. a drawing of a dog. Pantomime is clearly not symbolic in this
sense, it is rather an instance of an icon8.
When somebody says pantomime displays a feature of symbolization they
follow a definition initiated by Piaget 1962. According to Piaget one of the devel-
opmental milestones reached by the child is an attainment of symbolic function,
i.e. a differentiation, from the subject’s own point of view, between the signifier
and the signified. For example, a child understands that a picture of a dog and a
word “dog” are not the same as the actual animal but rather represent it.
The notion of intentionality is yet another polysemous term in language evo-
lution debates. On one reading, communicative act is intentional when it is
goal-directed and under voluntary control, rather than reflexive. According to a
set of criteria proposed in primate studies, a gesture is taken to be intentional
in this sense when it is directed at an audience, persistent and flexible, that is,
can be changed when the desired response is not obtained (Leavens et al., 2005).
The discussion about whether primate gestures are so intentional is ongoing but
there seems to be a general agreement that even if the answer is yes, it is not this
kind of intentionality that is distinctive about human language and that makes
it more powerful (Liebal et al., 2014, Ch. 8). Rather, intentionality implied in
pantomime is specifically the notion that figures in “communicative intentions”.
Communicative intentions (CIs) come from a theory of meaning proposed by
Grice (1957). On this account a speaker is said to mean p when an utterance that
8Gestural theories typically hold that pantomimes eventually turn into Peircean symbols,
usually through the process of cultural transmission, in which the forms are progressively ab-
breviated and conventionalized and the initial similarity link is lost (see Garrod et al., 2007, for
experimental evidence of such a process).
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expresses p was produced with the intention of inducing a belief in the receiver
via receiver recognizing the underlying intention of the speaker. This definition
allows Grice to make a distinction between natural meaning where, e.g. an animal
produces a cry of pain involuntarily and receives a reflex-like response, and more
complex non-natural meaning, where the same animal A would produce a cry
voluntarily9 with the intention of getting the receiver B to believe that A is in
pain in order to evoke a specific response. The latter happens, furthermore, not
just because B recognizes that A is in pain but rather because he recognizes that
A has produced the signal with a particular speaker intention.
Grice’s theory has been subsequently developed and the most popular cur-
rent model is that of ostensive-inferential communication (Scott-Phillips, 2015b).
Here speakers are analyzed as having two intentions: (a) an informative intention
to make a certain actual or desired state manifest to the hearer (b) a communica-
tive intention to achieve the informative intention by making it mutually manifest
to the hearer that she has this informative intention (Origgi and Sperber, 2000;
Sperber and Wilson, 1995). An informative intention is most frequently under-
stood as the speaker trying to influence the mind of the hearer, aiming at the
hearer forming a particular belief, intention, goal etc. A communicative intention
is then the speaker signaling that he is in fact trying to communicate, i.e. it is the
intention on the part of the speaker that the hearer recognizes that the speaker
has an informative intention. The task of the hearer is to infer both intentions
and thereby arrive at the meaning intended by the speaker. It is widely believed
that CIs understood in this way is what makes human language so open-ended
because communication can then be based on flexible reading of each other’s in-
tentions, rather than laborious formation of associations (see e.g. Scott-Phillips,
2015a, for a recent evolutionary account of this type).
Now that the definitions are in place, to see that both features figure in pan-
tomime consider the following example. Suppose you are walking with a friend
in a forest and you see a deer in the bushes nearby. Since you love animals, you
are thrilled and you want to share your excitement with the friend. In order not
to scare the dear off, you tug on your friend’s sleeve, put a spread out hand to
the top of your head and point in the direction of the bushes. The friend sees the
deer and smiles.
What happened in this pantomime (skipping the tugging and the pointing
for simplicity) is that you spontaneously mapped deer’s antlers onto your hand,
while at the same time realizing that the two are not the same but rather the
hands represents the antlers (and the deer by extension). You then attempted to
convey the deer idea to your friend wishing for him to recognize that you are in
fact trying to communicate something and not merely scratching your head in an
awkward way. Moreover, you wish the friend to recognize that what you wanted
9Communicative intentions thus depend on communication being intentional in a goal-
directed sense but also require something more.
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to communicate is that there is a deer and it is exciting and you want to share the
excitement, rather than asking your friend if it is in fact a deer or requesting him
to go and kill it so you can hang the antlers above your fireplace. The fact that
your friend saw the deer and smiled indicates that he was successful in inferring
your intentions.
Now, if pantomime requires both symbolization and CIs, can it be viewed as
cognitively lean? Presenting a thorough analysis of these two features would go
beyond the scope of this article. However, I do wish to point out that in wider
debates on mind and language both are not uncontroversial.
Given the terminological confusion about the notion of a symbol and symbolic
reference10, it is hard to pinpoint what specific capacity constitutes evidence for
an ability to differentiate between signal and referent. It has been suggested, for
example, that a chimpanzee using a particular gesture to request some response
from a conspecific must be differentiating between that gesture and the response
(Zlatev et al., 2005). This would place symbolization before the pantomime stage
postulated by MSH and would deny that symbolization is the source of flexibility
of specifically human language. At the same time, however, developmental evi-
dence (De Loache, 2004; Zlatev et al., 2013) suggests that an ability to appreciate
the representational function of various semiotic vehicles (e.g. points, pictures)
is acquired relatively late by children, which would mean that perhaps some ex-
perience with symbolic culture is necessary for symbolic skill to emerge. This of
course would imply a reverse dependency with respect to that suggested in MSH.
Treading these dangerous waters means that any theory of language evolution
must be clear on what symbolization specifically means and how it appears on
the evolutionary scene.
The issue of CIs is a subject of more heated debates. Despite some similarity
with intentionality in the sense of goal-directedness, it is generally not assumed
that communicative acts based on CIs fall out of goal-directed communicative
acts for free. Rather, some further cognitive advance is thought to be required,
mostly unpacked in terms of mindreading abilities (Scott-Phillips, 2015b). That
is, having and inferring CIs requires some understanding of the other’s mental
states and possibly an understanding of the other’s understanding of one’s own
mental states (since I want you to recognize my intention directed at your mental
state, which is second-order intentionality). However, postulating that such ca-
pacities precede language just pushes the question back. We are now required to
first answer how our ancestors became proficient mindreaders pre-linguistically,
and given that mindreading itself could be dependent on language (Astington
and Baird, 2005), the whole theory might just become circular (Bar-On, 2013).
10despite the fact that “more philosophic ink has been spilled over attempts to explain the
basis for symbolic reference than over any other problem” (Deacon, 1996, p. 43).
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7.3.2 The MSH solutions
As presented in section 7.2, pantomime as it is currently conceived within MSH
explicitly invites an analysis in terms of symbolization and standard CIs. There-
fore, it needs an explicit account of an emergence of these cognitive capacities, a
demonstration of why they are unproblematic or a re-description of pantomime in
a way that does not rely on them. The latter could involve, for example, adopting
a more minimal account of CIs or restricting pantomime in some way.
To recall, Arbib maintains that complex action recognition and imitation
played a key role in language evolution. Equipped with these skills, an observer
is able to recognize some novel action as composed of familiar sub-actions or their
variants, which are directed at sub-goals of the overall action goal. This allows for
approximating that novel action by an assembly of familiar sub-actions or trying
to reach sub-goals by trial and error. Both allow an observer to recognize and
imitate actions outside their repertoire. At this point, although we might quarrel
with this particular understanding of complex imitation (see e.g. Catmur et al.
(2007) and Cook et al. (2014) for a view that does not require recognizing goals),
no issue with symbolization or mindreading mechanisms arises. However, it does
become problematic once we try to envision the functioning of this process in
communicative settings.
We are told, namely, that pantomime emerges when our ancestors are able
to “consciously create actions that will stand in metonymic relationship [to X]
. . . with the intention of getting the observer to think of a specific action or
event” (Arbib, 2012, pp. 218-219). I now have to perform an action with the
intention that the hearer recognizes my goal and as a result of that recognition
performs compatible actions11. Perhaps we could still say this happens somehow
automatically (forgetting the emphasis on conscious intentions), just by virtue of
MN firing and some cross-talk with other brain systems. This is not Arbib’s aim,
though, because the same mechanism should hold for more complex scenarios, i.e.
miming a shape of the object or other animals. Clearly, if I am to start flapping
my arms to signify bird, I will not be able to move the hearer to respond appropri-
ately directly. An automatic MN response would lead her to perhaps imitate my
flapping, which is not the response I want. Instead, I need to have an intention
to instill the image of a bird in the hearer, together with an understanding that I
am communicating and of the reason for why I am communicating bird and hope
11The definition of a pantomime has recently been updated by Arbib (2016, personal commu-
nication) to (1) X performs an intransitive action A that resembles an action B which might
occur within a context C to achieve goal G with the intention that some observer Y will “get
the message” concerning some aspect of C or G ; (2) Y recognizes that A does indeed resemble
B and, knowing that action B might occur within a context C’ with goal G’ infers that the
message is some aspect of C’ or G’ (which might not be completely equivalent to the C or
G intended by A). However, while this specification lowers the requirements on recognizing
the goals and meanings in precise manner and drops reference to conscious intending, it still
requires production and perception of messages with a communicative intention.
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she will recognize my intention.
Perhaps, quasi-MNs that allow for “projecting the degrees of freedom” from
birds to arms explain how I am able to accomplish the symbolic mapping. Alter-
natively, mirroring has nothing to do with the process and other brain systems
are the solution. After all, there must have been a way for our ancestors to
recognize animals and their characteristic motions. One could then tell a story
of how the brain regions responsible for this recognition got connected to brain
regions that guide manual actions. However, this could not be a mere association
because otherwise any associative link would automatically be referential. What
we need is an explicit account of what makes the association an instance of a
standing in relationship. For example, it is unclear at present why a sub-action
of some larger action sequence should stand in for the overall goal, just as it is
unclear how recognizing a bird flight could lead to representing that bird or flight
with one’s hands. Saying, for example, that the required mechanism “involves
not merely changes internal to the mirror system but its integration with a wide
range of brain regions” (Arbib, 2012, p. 215) amounts to saying that we need to
explain the changes to the whole brain. In this case, however, the crucial explana-
tory force is yet to come from an account of this integration in communicative
contexts.
In response to the problematic nature of CIs, current efforts in the field of
language evolution go in a direction of providing a more minimal interpretation
of this construct. For example, Zlatev’s theory (Zlatev et al., 2005; Zlatev, 2008)
relies on a notion of bodily mimesis, rather than pantomime. This is defined as a
bodily act which (1) involves a cross-modal mapping between exteroception and
proprioception; (2) is under conscious control and corresponds to some action,
object or event, while at the same time being differentiated from it by the subject;
(3) is intended by the subject to stand for some action, object or event for an
addressee (and for the addressee to recognize this intention); (4) is not conven-
tional and not compositional. Pantomime is a prime example of bodily mimesis.
The second property above corresponds to symbolization in MSH and the third
is a restatement of CIs.
One could argue, although no explicit attempt has been yet made by Zlatev,
that on this reading CIs are not at all problematic because bodily mimesis does not
rely on higher-order propositional attitudes, only on simulation12. CIs realized in
simulation would mean that the speaker simulates the hearer’s simulation of the
speaker in order to convey his communicative intention while the hearer simulates
the speaker’s intentions in order to understand the utterance. Since mirror neuron
activity has been frequently linked to simulation, this reply could salvage MSH.
However, it is not at all clear that simulation version of CIs would be cog-
12A version of such an argument has been provided by Hutto (2008b). However, he so far
has not explicated how specifically mimesis-based CIs are to be understood within a larger
non-representational view on cognition that he advocates.
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nitively cheaper than operating with something like higher-order propositional
attitudes, typically invoked in discussions of CIs. Mathematical analyses show
that at least a particular formalization of intentional communication (as Bayesian
inference) is computationally intractable (van Rooij et al., 2011). In general, if
a certain problem is found to be intractable, this is regardless of the algorithm
that implements it13 (Van Rooij, 2008, 2012). This is likely because the source
of complexity is not the type of representations that implement the mechanism
but the layered structure of CIs as described in a post-Gricean tradition. That
is, if CIs are defined as a speaker’s capacity to intentionally affect mental states
of the addressee and appreciate that they need to recognize the speaker’s inten-
tions directed at their mental states, the key feature of this capacity is the lay-
ered, second-order structure. Whether this structure is realized in propositional
attitudes or bodily perspective-taking skills is irrelevant to the computational
complexity of the skill.
Another solution that is currently on the market is reconceiving CIs in terms of
speakers trying to influence the hearer’s behavior, rather than their states of mind
(Moore, 2015, 2016). The idea here is that once overly mentalistic description of
what is going on in a communicative act is abandoned, the troubling features of
CIs can disappear as well. The speaker now does not need to hold higher-order
beliefs about mental states of the hearer, all he needs is intending to change the
hearer’s behavior. For example, when I am pointing out a deer to you, I do
not intend that you believe there is a deer but that you look at the deer. The
MSH could perhaps take this reanalysis on board but, again, it has to be made
specifically clear how such a re-description fits into a network of mechanisms that
implement complex imitation and other brain systems. For example, instead of
saying that pantomime is aimed at “getting the observer to think” of something,
one could say that by performing a sub-action of a larger action, the mimer aims
at getting the audience to complete that action. And perhaps, there is not even a
desire to get one’s CI recognized, but only an appreciation that pantomime needs
to be seen to be effective. However, it then should be spelled out how the same
mechanisms can be applied to sophisticated pantomimes such as miming a bird
flying, or, if they cannot be so applied, what needs to be added.
To sum up this section, neither symbolization nor communicative intentions
are yet explicitly addressed within the MSH framework. In the meantime, then,
I wish to consider an alternative response to the pantomime conundrum. The
strategy here will be to see if one can get a gestural protolanguage that goes
a little beyond what is available to non-human primates but does not require
flexible and open-ended pantomime as its central building block. It should be
stressed that an alternative account is not necessarily at odds with other solutions
discussed above and could, for example, be combined with a leaner reanalysis of
13That is, to make the claim that simulation-based CIs are unproblematic, one would need
to formalize them and show that communication based on such CIs is tractable.
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CIs.
7.4 Communication reenvisioned
In a recent critique of a Gricean view on language evolution, Bar-On (2013) sug-
gests that rather than searching for the origins of CIs, perhaps a more straight-
forward approach would be to investigate how non-Gricean signals that are char-
acteristic of non-human primates (and presumably our LCA) could have changed
gradually so as to take on a more linguistic character. That is, in order to fill
the role of a language precursor, a communicative system has to exhibit proto-
semantic and proto-pragmatic features that go beyond what researchers find in-
sufficient in contemporary non-human primate communication systems but at
the same time avoids presupposing symbolization or CIs. Bar-On postulates that
expressive communication could fit this job description.
Expressive communication is often discussed in the context of natural mean-
ing, such as a cry of pain described above. What is often said of such communi-
cation is that it is rigid, emotional, merely imperative and merely dyadic. That
is, expressive signals are produced involuntarily as part of a general state of an
animal and they move the receiver in a reflexive kind of way. They are not used
to communicate intentionally and certainly not to talk about states of affairs.
Clearly, if we think language proper is exactly the opposite, it is hard to see how
to build a bridge from one to another. However, perhaps we were simply too
quick in characterizing expressive signals as being so inadequate.
Bar-On argues that acts of expressive communication are in fact flexible (indi-
vidually variable, context-sensitive, learnable) and while they do not refer to the
world, they can nevertheless be world-involving. At least some expressive signals
express not only producer’s internal state but also the external cause or object
of that state and thereby direct the receiver’s attention to that object. They can
show how the producer is disposed to act with respect to some part of the world,
giving the receiver an opportunity to respond appropriately. At the same time,
there is no need to postulate a desire to inform or a (conscious) intention to affect
the other’s state of mind and a response can be based on some type of simple
resonance, rather than reading producer’s intentions.
How does all this relate to the gestural language evolution theory? If one
wishes to focus on explaining the emergence of a gestural protolanguage that
goes beyond what could be available to our LCA with non-human primates, one
needs to focus on a particular kind of expressive communication, namely, one
realized in manual modality. Gestural theories invoke such communication as
one of the reasons for even considering a gestural protolanguage (e.g. due to
their flexibility, see ft. 1). However, it is also often noted that they are limited
in precisely some of the ways that make expressive communication inadequate.
That is, even though primate gestures are seen as relatively flexible, they are
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also said to be invariantly dyadic (not referring to the world), imperative rather
than declarative and insufficiently intersubjective14, i.e. they have meaning which
holds for particular dyads that employ them and that meaning is often specific
to particular individuals within a dyad, rather than having a status of a shared
form with meaning that holds for both parties concerned or for the whole group.
The reason for the inadequacy of gestures is often sought in the mechanism
through which they emerge. The consensus seems to be that while some gestures
seem to have evolved specifically for communicative purposes, most originate
from instrumental movements through phylogenetic or ontogenetic ritualization
(OR). The latter involves a transformation of instrumental social actions which
are used to affect the behavior of a conspecific into communicative actions by
repeated interaction between individuals. Specifically,
In ontogenetic ritualization two organisms essentially shape one an-
other’s behavior in repeated instances of a social interaction. The
general form of this type of learning is:
1. Individual A performs behavior X;
2. Individual B reacts consistently with behavior Y;
3. Subsequently B anticipates A’s performance of X, on the basis
of its initial step, by performing Y; and
4. Subsequently, A anticipates B’s anticipation and produces the
initial step in a ritualized form (waiting for a response) in order
to elicit Y.
The main point is that a behavior that was not at first a communica-
tive signal becomes one by virtue of the anticipations of the interac-
tants over time (Tomasello and Zuberbühler, 2002, p. 205).
For example, if an individual A wants to embrace another individual B, they
might start out by pulling B closer and embracing them. Over time, B will begin
to anticipate the desire of A in just the beginning of a pull and A will learn that
already an abbreviated pull (which would be motorically ineffective), will elicit
the correct response from B. As a result, the pull will be abbreviated even further
and a communicative “embrace me” gesture will emerge (Liebal and Call, 2012).
The evidence for OR as a mechanism for the emergence of gestures is a high
degree of variability in individual repertoires which are specific to particular cou-
ples of individuals15. For example, Halina et al. (2013) conducted a study trying
14“Intersubjectivity” is a term that normally means a lot more in different fields of philosophy
and psychology. Here we will merely take it to mean that a sign is understood in roughly the
same way when produced and comprehended and, moreover, understood in a similar way by all
members of the community.
15Of course, even in this case certain degree of uniformity is to be expected, given that social
interactions in which individuals participate (and from which gestures derive) are relatively
similar across the group.
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to trace the emergence of gestures through OR in bonobos. They focused on a
mother-infant carry action and gesture asking (1) whether there is indeed sub-
stantial variation among gestural repertoires within the group and (2) if gestures
are structurally similar to their originating actions. They found the predicted
variability between dyads but also that the gesture form depends on the role of
the individual in the shared activity. That is, mothers use gestures that stem
from their carrying the infant and infants use gestures that are a result of their
being carried.
Now, a gesture acquired through ontogenetic ritualization is a routinized ex-
pressive gesture. It is used to express a particular motivational state of the animal
and elicits a response directly because it has been acquired in tandem with the
emergence of the signal itself. While one could describe OR gestures in terms of
symbolization and CIs, nobody seems willing to do so. For example, Tomasello
(2008, p. 296) himself states that
the meaning or communicative significance of intention-movements is
inherent in them, in the sense that they are one part of a pre-existent
meaningful social interaction . . . individuals do not need to learn . . . to
connect the signal with its ’meaning’ – the ’meaning’ comes built in.
That is, the meaning of an OR gesture does not consist in an explicit signifier-
signified relation and does not need to be conveyed or recovered with the help
of communicative and informative intentions. For the same reason, however, OR
and gestures it leads to are viewed as insufficient to scaffold the emergence of
human language as they can only mean whatever they developed to mean in a
particular context for a particular dyad. As a consequence, they seem to lack the
properties that create an open-ended system in which infinitely many signals can
be created and understood almost on the spot. Thus, Tomasello abandons OR in
favor of recursive mindreading, shared intentionality and cooperative motivations.
Arbib deems it necessary to propose an intermediate stage of the emergence of
complex imitation before primate-like gestures can be turned into more proper
gestural protolanguage.
Hurford (2007), another language evolution researcher, discusses OR in the
context of possible learning mechanisms that could form the seed of human lan-
guage. This evolutionary target is defined in terms of “signals with an arbitrary,
non-iconic, non-indexical, and not physically causal, relationship to their func-
tion” (p. 200), possessing a quality of reciprocity, i.e. can be used from the sender
or receiver side indicating that the signal is understood intersubjectively. Given
these criteria he also finds OR insufficient because it occurs predominantly in
asymmetric interactions and the resulting gestures are often tied to a particular
ontogenetic stage, not persisting as signals when they are no longer needed. Fi-
nally, since OR requires a history of interaction and gradual mutual shaping of the
gestures, “it would not be possible, in a large social group, for each individual to
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participate in such a history of interaction with all the others, so ontogenetic rit-
ualization as a direct source of group-wide arbitrary learned illocutionary signals
. . . is unlikely” (pp. 200-201).
Interestingly, Hurford also notes that things could be different if the social
situation were changed, e.g. family ties being more extended. He dismisses this
quickly because there are no reports of this, i.e. of more complex forms of OR-
derived gestures. We need to consider, however, if this is a relevant objection.
After all, we are trying to tell an evolutionary story about the stages of commu-
nication which cannot be observed and which fit into the gap between what we
think our ancestors (and their brains) were capable of and current language. Just
because there are no reports of something at present does not mean that it is a
logical impossibility.
Let us then redefine a strategy for a plausible gestural language evolution
account. Our explanatory target will be a gestural protolanguage16, which does
not require symbolization or CIs, while at the same time possessing more lin-
guistic qualities than gestures currently observed in non-human primates. It is a
communicative system in which gestures are:
• triadic, i.e. relate to objects in some way (this replaces symbolization)
• reciprocal, i.e. the signal can be used equally by senders and receivers
• intersubjective in a wider sense, i.e. the same signal can be used with
multiple partners (the last two properties capture parity of meaning)
Our new explanation will be a simple OR mechanism, which in non-human
primates produces dyadic, imperative, non-reciprocal gestures. What I want to
probe is whether it is conceivable that the processes of ritualization could under
certain conditions lead to a gestural protolanguage as defined above. I will suggest
that indeed it is, given appropriate socio-cultural changes.
7.5 Joint actions and a gestural alternative
The route to gestural protolanguage I will investigate is through an increased
involvement of joint action and use of objects. Most attention in the study of
language evolution has been devoted to the role of particular kinds of objects
in our LCA’s life, namely Oldowan and Acheulean stone tools. For example, in
theories that focus on the emergence of syntax, the ability to process complex
hierarchical action sequences is seen as promoting the emergence of hierarchical
structure in grammar (Stout and Chaminade, 2012). In relation to MSH, Arbib
16For the purpose of this article I assume that some type of gestural scenario is correct and
hence we inherit all the theoretical issues associated with it, e.g. how gestural protolanguage
could have switched to vocal modality. I believe that there is in fact a need for a more multi-
modal account but I merely focus here on the potential changes to gestural modality.
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(2011) makes a link between language evolution and tool use through the MNS:
evolving abilities to monitor and plan one’s own manual actions, including tool
use, led to the capacity for complex imitation, which then enabled pantomime.
Theories of this type undoubtedly have a lot of merit and it is not my intention
to oppose them. However, I want to emphasize that our data on technological
skills available to our ancestors is limited by archaeological record. In this case,
the conclusions that are drawn from tools to language and cognition are based
on objects that are preservable due to their material (stone). This is limited in
several ways. First, according to the recent estimates, the split between humans
and chimpanzees has been placed at around 7 mya (White et al., 2009; Young
et al., 2015) while the earliest pre-Oldowan stone tools date to about 3.3 mya
(Harmand et al., 2015). This creates plenty of time in which tools made of
organic materials (stones, sticks, bones, shells) might have been used but were
not preserved. Second, the archaeologically preserved tools can tell us something
about the process of their production but they do not preserve the context in
which they were made and used. Most importantly, for my purposes, we cannot
easily infer the social context of interaction with objects. Finally, tools are just
one type of object that could have played a role in language evolution, everyday
items like food might have been equally important.
Despite archaeological uncertainties, in discussions of tools and language it is
often assumed that object-based interactions were solitary. In contrast to this
view, Reynolds (1993) emphasizes that one of the main differences in tool use
between humans and other primates is its social dimension:
Tool making is usually presented as an artisan working alone. In
reality artifacts are usually constructed together, in a chain of com-
plementary actions guided largely by anticipation of what the other
participant will do. The basic principles of a manufacturing system
[is] task specialization, symbolic coordination, social cooperation, role
complementarity, collective goals, logical sequencing of operations, as-
sembly of separately manufactured parts . . . The essence of human
technological activity is anticipation of the action of the other person
and performance of an action complementary to it, such that the two
people together produce physical results that could not be produced
by the two actions done in series by one person (p. 412).
Apparently, across the globe, even if tasks are “simple” enough to perform on
one’s own, they are always performed together, with complementary roles and
division of labor. By contrast, when primates use objects, they do so individual-
istically and hence also without role complementarity. Such an activity as using
sticks to dig holes in termite nests and fish termites out of them is not performed
jointly by chimpanzees.
If Reynolds is right in emphasizing sociality, there must have been a point in
time where activity around objects did become more social. One could argue that
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language enabled this transition but it could also be that such increased sociality
actually enabled language. Furthermore, if he is right that “the essence of human
technological activity is anticipation of the actions of the other”, we could conceive
of a language evolution stage where triadic ontogenetic ritualization (TOR) is a
route through which gestures that involve objects can be created.
Let us suppose now, that due to some changes in hominid evolution there is
an increased pressure for tool use and joint action more broadly. Such a change
is acknowledged by all of the language evolution researchers mentioned above.
Let us also suppose, however, that rather than these two pressures acting inde-
pendently, there arises a need to make or use tools and other objects together,
cooperatively, leading to an increase in triadic interactions in the community (i.e.
interactions between two individuals around an object, rather than merely be-
tween two individuals). If such interactions are sufficiently regular, it is plausible
that similar process of ritualization can occur, just by virtue of motor simplifica-
tion and anticipation, resulting in gestures. By analogy to dyadic OR, we could
envision the following sequence of events:
1. Individual A performs behavior X with respect to object T;
2. Individual B reacts consistently with behavior Y towards the
object T;
3. Subsequently B anticipates A’s performance of X, on the basis
of its initial step, by performing Y; and
4. Subsequently, A anticipates B’s anticipation and produces the
initial step in a ritualized form (waiting for a response) in order
to elicit Y towards the object T (e.g. making the joint action
more efficient or initiating it).
For example, in a hunting scenario, one could conceive of the following. A is
chasing a wild pig (or some other small animal) and trying to hit it by throwing
stones at it but the pig keeps running away. B joins the chase and tries to
maneuver the pig closer to A’s position by making loud noise and waving his
arms. Both succeed, kill the pig and a whole tribe feasts on it. The hunting trick
gets repeated until A can anticipate that making stone throwing movements in
the presence of a pig is enough to request B to execute his maneuvering routine.
If the scenario above is too contrived or complex, consider another one. A
and B walk through the forest and encounter a tree with a large amount of tasty
fruit on it. Since they have evolved a more upright posture and become larger,
and the fruit hangs on rather thin branches, they cannot reach it by climbing the
tree. By trial and error they discover that if one of them pulls on the branch and
brings it down, the other one can pick the fruit and both can feast on it. The
interaction is repeated until A can make a reaching motion towards the branch
to request B to help pick the fruit.
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What would such a view on gestural language evolution entail? Our target ex-
planandum has been a gestural protolanguage that possesses proto-semantic and
proto-pragmatic qualities (being triadic, reciprocal and intersubjective) without
requiring complex abilities for symbolization and CIs. We have seen that OR-
produced gestures do not seem to be appropriately described in terms of such
abilities. The gestures that emerge in the context of previous history come with
a meaning built in and so do not rely on an ability to connect some linguistic
form with an internally generated meaning that the form stands in for. Being
an instance of expressive communication, an OR gesture also does not rely on
production and comprehension of CIs. Does it mean that both symbolization
and CI are dispensed with altogether? And does communication based on TOR
gestures have sufficient complexity to play a role of a stepping stone to language?
I believe the general strategy for answering these questions would be to em-
phasize that we should not expect a miracle solution in which symbolization and
CIs emerge as general cognitive skills that enable flexible communication about
arbitrary actions, objects and events. Rather, we should look for a slow build-up
of a variety of extensions to simpler communicative systems, where only at the
end of this process something that can be described as symbolization and CIs are
in place. That is, they are not enabling conditions for flexible communication but
an emergent result of such communication. The extension that TOR provides is
just one achievement in this lengthy process.
Since TOR gestures emerge in triadic interactions, they are effectively im-
perative gestures for acting on an object in a specific way and in that sense are
weakly referential. They are referential in the same way that widely discussed
vervet monkey alarm calls are “functionally referential”. That is, these monkeys
are famously said to emit particular calls in response to particular natural preda-
tors that lead to particular responses on the part of their receivers. The calls
are referential because they are in some sense “about” the predators but they are
weakly so because they are also innate, relatively inflexible and apparently not
produced on the basis of symbolization and CIs (Wheeler and Fischer, 2012, for a
recent critical overview). In addition, there does not seem to be a way to decide
whether e.g. an eagle alarm call means “Eagle!” or “Hide in the bushes!”, that
is, whether the call is a declarative sign for the object or an imperative sign for
the action and whether the signal is providing information or manipulating the
receiver (Rendall et al., 2009; Seyfarth et al., 2010). In the same way, a TOR
gesture employed in a fruit picking scenario could mean “Lower the branch”, “Let
us feast on this tasty fruit”, “pull down”, “branch” or “fruit”. There is no fact of
the matter which of these meanings is the correct interpretation and therefore
whether a TOR gesture is merely imperative or already declarative and therefore
stands for some object (cf. Wittgenstein’s 2009 analysis of language games).
At this point, a defender of a pantomime-based account might insist that we
still need an explanation for how a TOR gesture might get transformed into one
that really refers to objects. After all, pantomime based on a general capacity for
158 Chapter 7. Pantomime in Gestural Language Evolution
symbolization, has the advantage of giving our ancestors a way to express a variety
of ideas about actions, objects and events. What is more, within MSH, it is the
ability to entertain such diverse thoughts and a need to distinguish pantomimes
“for action” from pantomimes “for objects” that lead to the practice of introducing
small modifications into them, thus fueling the transition to conventionalized
protosigns and paving the road to language.
I would counter this insistence by noting that such a proposal is based on a
view in which speaking is an expression of fully formed thoughts with determinate
contents and therefore mental richness precedes linguistic sophistication and is
its evolutionary source. A different view is possible, however (along the lines
of Vygotsky (1987)). Namely, that a distinction between linguistic forms that
express actions or objects emerges from a growing set of signals as they come to
function in differing contexts, including the context of other signals. For example,
the same TOR gesture could come to be accompanied by different sounds and
thereby acquire a function of requesting an action whereas the sounds come to
stand for the different objects on which the action is requested (Hutchins and
Johnson, 2009). It is this development in turn that would enable thoughts with
determinate contents, i.e. thoughts that refer to objects vs thoughts that request
actions.
Before such a stage, what matters is that a TOR-gesture is functionally about
objects and flexibly acquired in development. In this way, it is a step beyond the
communicative systems of non-human primates, whether they are monkey alarm
calls or dyadic OR gestures.
Moving on to reciprocity and intersubjectivity, the TOR alternative holds that
they can be a result of new types of interactions. That is, primate OR gestures are
in some sense private and asymmetric because they emerge from interactions that
do not go beyond the dyad and in which the bodily roles are complementary but
the background is only of one’s own know-how. As a result, a single individual is
typically only on the producing or a receiving end of a certain gesture. However,
if more complex interactions enter the life of the group, part of these interactions
could be such that they occur between grown-up individuals who are similar in
their background practical knowledge and action possibilities, allowing for their
roles to be in principle interchangeable. That is, I can pull the tree branch so
that you collect the fruit or vice versa. After ritualization of such a scenario, the
same individual would have an opportunity to both produce a certain gesture and
respond to it, creating a reciprocal gesture in Hurford’s terminology17. Finally,
if such cooperative interactions are important enough for the whole group and
scaffolded by the use of the same types of objects, there is no in principle reason
17In fact, such a situation, in which an individual is in some sense aware of the meaning
of one’s own gesture because they have experienced it from both sides, as a producer and an
addressee can be seen as a source of symbolization on socio-cultural accounts of cognition such
as that of Vygotsky (1987) or Mead (1962). Developing this argument goes beyond the scope
of this paper.
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why a single individual cannot enter the same interactions with multiple others
and therefore the gestures that emerge cannot go beyond a single dyad.
In sum, the novel features of TOR gestures with respect to the types of ges-
tures in contemporary non-human primates would not be a result of an entirely
new cognitive mechanism. Instead, they would be a result of the same mechanism
employed in the context of a new set of social practices.
7.6 TOR in relation to MSH
Having started from MSH, a particular pantomime-based account, a few more
words on how it compares to the ideas presented here are in order. The precise
comparison would of course require two things: clarity on what constitutes the
central ingredients of MSH and a fully developed TOR-based account. In par-
ticular, if it is absolutely essential to MSH that there is a stage of pantomime,
which in turn requires symbolization and CIs, while a fully developed TOR ac-
count somehow precludes such a pantomime, then the two would be incompatible.
However, if what is central to MSH is an involvement of MNS together with com-
plex imitation (stages 1-4 in MSH), some form of a gestural protolanguage stage
(5) and a subsequent emergence of language proper (stages 6-7), and if a TOR
idea can accommodate all these, then the two could be merged modifying thereby
the original MSH. While a TOR-based account is not yet fully developed, I can
offer some broad strokes of where it is headed, which suggest adopting the latter
option.
More specifically, I see a TOR-based gestural communication positioned just
before the emergence of complex imitation. This possibility is particularly plau-
sible given the developments that occurred within the MSH framework in the
past few years, namely explicit modeling of ontogenetic ritualization as it occurs
between interacting individuals.
Arbib et al. (2014) present a computational model of the emergence of a ‘beck-
oning’ gesture through a history of “changes in the brains of two agents during
interactive [mutual] behavioral shaping”. The underlying neural architecture em-
ployed by the authors is a model of the MNS, which implements a planning of
sub-actions that serve a particular goal. In the simulation, the model starts from
a child’s goal to bond socially with the mother, which is initially accomplished by
tugging. The mother’s MNS enables her recognize the bonding goal of the child
from haptic information (of tugging) and she responds by moving closer and em-
bracing it. Over time the mother’s MNS learns to recognize the goal earlier in the
trajectory from increasingly more abbreviated haptic and then visual information
until it is sufficient for the child to reach towards the mother to accomplish the
goal. On the other hand, the child learns to associate proprioceptive reaching
state with the distal goal (bonding), leading to the formation of a new beckoning
gesture.
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This model has not been explicitly postulated to fit into the broader MSH evo-
lutionary trajectory and it is not yet clear whether the activity of the MNS indeed
plays a role in the formation of primate gestures. What is widely acknowledged,
however, is its involvement in recognition of object-directed actions, especially
if such actions are within the observer’s own repertoire. It has also been found
to be active when a complementary action is required (Newman-Norlund et al.,
2007). If two individuals frequently perform object-directed actions jointly, espe-
cially if their roles are interchangeable, it is very plausible that the MNS would
facilitate action recognition in such contexts. It is also not difficult to imagine
that just as in the OR model described above, the MNS of one individual would
learn to recognize the collaborator’s goals based on visual information of their
manual movements until these movements are abbreviated into gestures, and still
respond to them appropriately.
Now, at the end of such a process one would have a MNS responsive to in-
creasingly intransitive manual movements (ritualized gestures) just as in complex
imitation. This responsiveness would, however, be a result of the gesturing expe-
rience itself, not an exaptation of mechanisms originally employed in instrumental
actions and put to use in communicative settings. Such a view is consistent with
an associative view on the MNS and its evolution, according to which mirror-
ing properties to a certain type of input are acquired through experience of that
particular type (Cook et al., 2014).
What has additionally been argued from the perspective of an associative
view (e.g. Heyes (2010, 2013)) is that the evolutionary changes to the MNS and
other brain systems do not need to be seen as an acquisition of specific novel
functions (such as a capacity to imitate or produce pantomimes). These changes
can be more subtle - increased attention to certain type of input, faster learning
and processing, improved motor control. If this is so, then as the process of
ritualization became more important, it could also lead to an increased speed
with which such gestures can emerge, improved execution and perhaps an ability
to learn them by imitation.
In sum, the TOR alternative would not be an argument against the role of the
MNS or complex imitation in the emergence of gestural protolanguage. Rather,
it sets up a scenario in which a simple associative mechanism can lead to ges-
tures that occur in triadic contexts and then mirroring properties enhance this
process in various ways leading to an even greater repertoire of such gestures.
As the repertoire increases, cultural transmission can then result in the emer-
gence of structure and convention. Whether this process still requires a stage
of pantomimes and strictly gestural protosigns, or rather it brings us straight to
a multi-modal language is up for debate. I believe the latter is more parsimo-
nious and conducive to a multi-modal view. However, one could see the growing
TOR-repertoire as laying a groundwork for pantomime-ready brain and a certain
convention of triadic communication.
The proposal presented in this paper is obviously incomplete and in need of
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further development. However, I hope to have shown that it is a viable option to
be explored.

Chapter 8
Conclusions and future work
This thesis is a collection of articles and an extended theoretical introduction
that all center around social interaction and communication from a perspective
of Radical Embodied Cognition. In Chapter 2 I have attempted to make clear
that even though there is a variety of ideas presented here, there is a single
thread that runs through them all, i.e. an attempt to expand the reign of REC to
issues and topics that are still viewed by the mainstream as lying in the domain
of Traditional Cognitive Science. Any such project of pitching two approaches
against each other requires a measure of respect for the opponent. In this thesis I
have striven to contribute to REC by taking seriously several components of TCS:
what it tries to explain (such as language and joint action), the way it tries to
explain it (mechanistic model of explanation), the notions it considers important
(e.g. representation), as well as the empirical paradigms and results that are part
of its recent history.
In this concluding chapter I will reflect on what has and has not been accom-
plished and on what lies ahead. I will do so by considering some of the questions
that motivated the different chapters, in the order in which these questions ap-
peared (which does not exactly parallel the order of the chapters).
What could be a REC-compatible theory of language evolution?
Since language is one of the skills often invoked by the opponents of REC as
somehow hard to explain without relying on representational brain-bound struc-
tures, it stands to reason that providing a solid REC theory of language function,
development and origin is one of the best ways to advance REC. In this thesis I
have chosen to focus on the latter.
Now, what would a solid theory of language evolution be? If REC is really
to answer TCS objections, it would need to be a theory that can capture unique
features of human language (as compared to animal communication) that are
recognized as requiring an explanation by the wider community of cognitive sci-
entists, linguists, anthropologists and so on. That is, there seems to be an overall
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agreement, for instance, that symbolic reference, i.e., flexibly using signs to stand
in for something else, is an important feature of human language. A REC theory
of language evolution needs to explain the emergence of such features. This is
regardless of whether in the REC view something like reference does not really
exist and that language is really just a set of dynamical bodily patterns. The
point is that some of these patterns look like reference and deserve an explana-
tion1 and the same goes for patterns which resemble grammar or communicative
intentions.
In an attempt to start constructing a REC-compatible theory of language
evolution, I have taken my departure from a Maturanian (1978; 1988b; 1988a)
view on language as “coordinations of coordinations of behavior”, which is a “re-
cursion” on “coordinations of behavior”. I have not provided an account of what
“recursion” exactly means here and it remains a topic for future research (see
Villalobos and Abramova, 2016, for some first steps in this direction). However,
from Maturana’s mentions of “coordination” – e.g., as emerging from recurrent
interactions between autopoietic systems – I surmised that his view suggests at
the very least that at the basis of language lies a more basic ability for social
interaction with respect to each other and common environment. Therefore, a
theory of language evolution needs to be built upon a theory of sociality.
What REC theory of social interaction is needed for a theory of language evolu-
tion?
In the spirit of building bridges to the wider community, I initially looked
at the dynamically developing field of language evolution to see if perhaps there
already exists a theory which explicates how language emerges on top of social
interaction and that refers to embodiment as a key component of this process.
One of the popular recent theories of this type is the gestural language evolution
theory, according to which the changes in the functioning of the Mirror Neuron
System (which is a system involved in social cognition) provided the basis for a
gestural protolanguage which subsequently turned into language proper (Arbib,
2012; Zlatev, 2008). The theory is promising in that both the system for action
understanding and gestures seem very bodily. However, upon closer inspection
it appeared that embodiment implied in this theory is a weak, “sanitized” (Gal-
lagher, 2015) embodiment. That is, the coordinating bodies are there to provide
input to the brains of the interactants while language is still about sending and
receiving informative messages through those bodies. Clearly, a REC version of
such a theory has to do better.
I have therefore proposed an alternative (Chapter 7) that places greater em-
phasis on the role of interacting bodies in constructing communicative routines
and views language as a way of influencing each other’s behavior instead of the
1In fact, it seems that even some REC theorists recognize the need to explain symbolic
reference Froese (2012)
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transmission of predefined meanings. I have suggested that two crucial proper-
ties of language, the referential and intersubjective character of signs, can emerge
without presupposing complex cognitive processing or preexisting symbolic skills
if we focus on triadic complementary interactions, i.e., interactions around ob-
jects in the environment. This, however, shifted the focus of the project to the
need to provide a compatible REC account of such interactions.
While work on social interaction is ongoing in the REC community, most of
resulting accounts seem concerned with other types of questions, such as the ex-
perience of interaction with an agent, the emergence of dyadic synchronization
or the explanatory status of supra-individual level of organization. To address
specifically triadic scenarios, we therefore proposed a new account (Chapter 4).
Taking inspiration from an ecological strand of REC that conceptualizes action
as responsiveness to the field of affordances (an array of action possibilities in
the environment), we suggested that joint action can be seen as a change in this
field induced by the co-actor. To acknowledge the variety in possible joint ac-
tion situations, we also distinguished between two types of action coordination:
distributive and contributive, depending on the kind of change to the field of af-
fordances it involves. Specifically, in our account distributive action coordination
captures those scenarios in which one person’s (potential) actions reduce one’s
own field of affordances allowing joint effects to emerge from each participant
carving out their own portion of the environment, so to say. Contributive action
coordination is instead an expansion of one’s own field via the contribution of the
co-actor.
This joint action proposal led to further questions. Most importantly, we
have not said anything about the precise relationship between two modes of ac-
tion coordination. That is, while both modes describe a change in the field of
affordances, the change is in two different directions: reduction or expansion. Fu-
ture work should address whether and when either of the modes of coordination
is predicted to ensue if the account is to be more than an a posteriori description
of patterns of interaction. A reflection on this issue, in turn, triggered an even
broader question regarding the explanatory status of the proposed account.
Is the affordance-based theory of action coordination explanatory?
Affordances and other notions frequently evoked in REC theories are often
taken to be explanatory at face value. In response to such theories, however,
a frequent complaint from a TCS side of the debate is that a mere mention of
these notions is a description, not an explanation, and that without a precise
mechanism to go with such a description, it does not eliminate the possibility
that on a deeper level the process is just as representational as the original TCS
theories that REC is trying to replace. While we provided some suggestions for
how affordance-based action coordination could be modeled, we did not specify
how mutual shaping of the fields of affordances works. As a result, one could
claim that our appeal to, for instance, the possibility to perceive the affordances
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for others (which then changes one’s own field) requires some form of mindreading,
a kind of projection of oneself into the other’s shoes to perceive the environment
from her spatial point of view, together with inferring her bodily capacities and
acquired skills – which would undermine the REC-iness of the account.
We think the best way to counter this objection is to admit that at this
point an appeal to fields of affordances is indeed merely a high-level description
of coordination (a what), not an explanation (a how). It is a heuristic tool to
facilitate thinking about affordances in relation to interaction and communication
as an alternative to mindreading or co-representation based narratives. This
description needs to be combined with a mechanistic level that makes explicit
how affordance-based coordination does not rely on processing representations of
other minds. Providing such an account is a target for future research. In the
meantime we focused instead on defending a possibility of a mechanistic yet REC-
compatible approach – which by most REC-ers would be considered an impossible
combination. In Chapter 3 we argued that the current REC complaints about a
mechanistic framework are unfounded and that indeed REC mechanisms of social
interaction are possible.
The defense offered in Chapter 3 cannot be considered complete. Some REC-
ers might still argue that there are other reasons to reject a mechanistic ac-
count, e.g., they might think mechanisms are necessarily representational. Oth-
ers might claim that proper REC explanations should be dynamical (or historical
or teleological) and that such explanations are genuine explanations, not mere
descriptions. Still others will insist that a “non-linear dynamical extended non-
representational mechanism” is no mechanism at all; that the notion so diluted
becomes devoid of its original content and therefore serves no purpose beyond
non-mechanistic explanations. All of these issues require more careful considera-
tion than we had space to offer in this thesis and should be addressed. However,
I hope to have shown that an explicit explanatory framework should be provided
by REC-ers if further progress is to be made and that the prospects for a mech-
anistic version of such a framework look good.
Is affordance-based theory of action coordination born out empirically?
I have stated at the start of this Chapter that taking the wider cognitive sci-
ence community seriously means not just reflecting on its explanatory framework
but also considering the empirical body of research that it has produced. The rel-
evance of this point became apparent when we considered examples of distributive
and contributive action coordination scenarios. One particular case is discussed
in Chapter 5 and was originally suggested by a reviewer of the affordance-based
action coordination article as a counter-example to the distributive action coor-
dination proposal. Namely, one of the popular experimental paradigms in TCS
joint action literature is the Joint Simon Task (JST), in which participants re-
spond to two types of stimuli by performing two types of actions. Their respective
halves of the task are not related but it is nevertheless frequently found that they
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are affected by each other’s stimulus-response mappings. That is, the task seems
like a case of distributive action coordination but typical results show that the
affordance available to one person does not get eliminated from the field of af-
fordances of another. We have wondered whether this could be due to the way
the task is set up and whether a more “embodied” setting would still produce the
same effect.
The study reported in Chapter 5 was a version of the JST in which partici-
pants had to respond by moving a computer mouse rather than pressing discrete
buttons. We obtained several key results. First, we did not find an effect in the
joint setting suggesting that at least in some conditions the predictions based on
distributive action coordination possibility are born out. It might be that when
a division of the common environment is more salient or when the coordination
can be oﬄoaded into bodily movement (recurrent movements with a computer
mouse), distributive action coordination is more likely to arise. Second, we found
that individual participants in the study adopted slightly different strategies sug-
gesting that the mode of coordination might depend on other factors than just
those manipulated by the experiment – perhaps some individual preference for
how to coordinate with other people, a personal history of interactive experience
and so on. Overall, the experience taught us that taking a TCS task and trying
to approach it from a REC perspective is a valuable strategy as it forces one
to not just divide and conquer but face the challenge of providing a competing
explanation for the same phenomenon head on.
Can joint action research provide clues on potential enactive mechanisms?
There was another, more theoretical result from the Joint Simon study. Namely,
getting involved in the wider discussions of the so-called Joint Simon Effect (JSE)
led me to a possible answer to the previous question: of the specific mechanisms
potentially compatible with REC. This is not discussed in the thesis but I believe
it should be mentioned here as a promising future extension.
The JST has received two contrasting interpretations. The social account
holds that the effect in this task is due to one person co-representing the task of
the co-actor, i.e. a representation whose content is the other’s task rule, action,
or perhaps their perspective on the task environment. The alternative, domain-
general account, holds that it is rather that the presence of the other person affects
one’s own perception of the environment and action tendencies. That is, instead
of looking for distinctly social cognitive mechanisms (like mindreading or co-
representation) that operate in social situations, domain-general mechanisms (like
spatial coding of responses, attentional orienting) could produce similar effects
and mediate navigating in social situations (see also Heyes, 2014). While some of
these mechanisms might not be compatible with REC, there are reasons to take
them seriously.
First, sensitivity to affordances can be usefully thought of as a domain-general
mechanism and in fact affordance-based action coordination is very similar in
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spirit to what a domain-general account of the JSE proposes. Second, the mech-
anisms might be very general, such as an ability to form associations (or habits,
in REC’s parlance, Barandiaran and Di Paolo, 2014). Since associationism is not
just old-fashioned behaviorism (Heyes, 2010) and behaviorism is not satanism
(Barrett, 2015), there might be value in looking to these regions of contemporary
cognitive science for support in defining REC-y answers to how-questions. Per-
sonally, I believe associative mechanisms are fully compatible with the view on
organisms as plastic dynamical systems, allow for taking context into account, for
constructing updated notions of representations as dynamic extended patterns
(Slors and Abramova, 2018, in preparation) and explaining social mechanisms
in ways that do not hinge on mindreading (Catmur et al., 2007; Di Paolo and
De Jaegher, 2012). I intend to pursue this avenue in the future.
Can REC make sense of co-representation in joint action?
At the start of this chapter I have also suggested that a response to TCS
challenges to REC needs to consider the concepts it holds dear. Undoubtedly the
concept over which most ink has been spilled is that of representation. Since I was
mostly interested in joint action, this meant dealing with a more specific concept
of co-representation. A typical REC strategy to banish representations is to say
that they are explanatorily useless because what is often mean by “representa-
tion” is some other phenomenon (e.g. correlation) that can do all the explanatory
work but does not have the properties that are required of this concept. Apart
from philosophical arguments, a method that can be employed to show that this
is the case is cognitive modeling. Artificial agents are evolved to perform some
cognitively interesting task, their brains analyzed and it is then concluded that
whatever is contained in those brains does not resemble full-fledged representa-
tions. We decided to apply a similar strategy to a task that seemingly requires
co-representation.
Our study reported in Chapter 6 is an example of contributive action coor-
dination in which agents jointly control a movable tracker which is required to
closely follow a continuously moving target. The results showed that the agents
can evolve to solve this task. In an effort to provide a minimal operationalization
of co-representation we asked: is there any evidence for something in one of the
agent’s brains that corresponds in some way to the action of another agent? The
analysis of their internal dynamics suggested that indeed there is some correlation
of this type and if this were all there was to co-representation then the standard
REC arguments would apply (i.e., that there is no explanatory value in calling
such a construct “representation”).
I believe, however, that co-representation is a more complex notion, as what
it implies is not mere correlation but a structural similarity between one person’s
action system and that of the co-actor. How to disarm such structural representa-
tion from a REC perspective needs to become part of the REC agenda. Cognitive
modeling methodology is one way to address this issue in a tractable manner.
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How is the affordance-based theory of joint action connected to the theory of lan-
guage?
Finally, circling back to the beginning of the project and the last chapter of
the thesis, an open challenge for the future is to provide a comprehensive REC
account that ties all the elements presented here together. Such an account would
start from an explanation of the mechanisms of joint action and then show how it
can lead to basic forms of communication in evolutionary timescale. At the same
time, it would extend to language development and function. Once this work is
complete, TCS has no chance against the project of RECtification.

Appendix A
Supplementary Material to Chapter 5
A.1 Source code and data
Source code1 for running the experiments:
https://bitbucket.org/kabramova/simontask/
Source code for data analysis reported:
https://github.com/kabramova/sse_data
Raw data collected has been archived and can be accessed here:
https://doi.org/10.17026/dans-xgy-wzvt
A.2 Experimental instructions
The instructions displayed to the participants in the experiments reported in
Chater 5 are provided below. The content of page 2 was the same in all exper-
iment runs. The content of page 1 varied by block, condition and experiment.
The block and condition variations are indicated in square brackets. The content
that varied by experiment is reproduced separately.
Experiment 1 (Individual Simon Task)
[p.1]
In this experiment, you are requested to respond to two different colors
by moving the mouse to one of the response boxes that will appear in
the top corners of the screen.
1Upon publication this code will be publicly available. Until then it is available only upon
request.
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At the start of every trial you will see a small gray rectangular frame
at the bottom of the screen. We call it a "start button". You need to
click on it to begin the trial. Please make sure that when you click,
the cursor is completely inside the start button. If you do not click
the start button within 1.5 seconds, the trial ends. You will see the
screen turn black briefly and a new trial will begin.
If you do click the start button within the required time, you will
see two gray response boxes appear at the top of the screen. You
are required to start moving upwards as soon as you see the response
boxes. You will have 1.5 seconds to start moving. Again, if you do
not meet the deadline, you will see a black screen and a new trial will
begin.
If you do start moving as requested, a color cue will appear on the
screen, on the left or on the right side. If the cue that appears is
[blue/red], you should move to the [left/right] response box and click
on it, irrespective of where the cue appears. If the cue that appears
is [red/blue], you should move to the [right/left] response box and
click on it, also irrespective of where the cue appears. You will have
2 seconds to complete this part of the trial.
Press the right arrow to go to the next page.
[p.2]
You will be given 3 practice rounds to make sure you understand the
task.
The first round of 10 practice trials involves no time deadlines and
you will be given feedback on your responses. The second round of
10 practice trials involves time deadlines but you will still receive
feedback on your responses. The last round of 20 practice trials is
just like the actual experiment - time deadlines and no feedback.
The instructions for each of the practice rounds will be presented on
the screen again before the round begins.
You may now ask questions if anything is unclear.
Press the left arrow to go to the previous page.
Press space to begin the practice.
Experiment 2 (Individual Go-NoGo Simon Task)
In this experiment, you are requested to respond to two different colors
by moving the mouse to one of the response boxes that will appear in
the top corners of the screen.
A.2. Experimental instructions 173
At the start of every trial you will see a small gray rectangular frame
at the bottom of the screen. We call it a "start button". You need to
click on it to begin the trial. Please make sure that when you click,
the cursor is completely inside the start button. If you do not click
the start button within 1.5 seconds, the trial ends. You will see the
screen turn black briefly and a new trial will begin.
If you do click the start button within the required time, you will
see two gray response boxes appear at the top of the screen. You
are required to start moving upwards as soon as you see the response
boxes. You will have 1.5 seconds to start moving. Again, if you do
not meet the deadline, you will see a black screen and a new trial will
begin.
If you do start moving as requested, a color cue will appear on the
screen, on the left or on the right side. If the cue that appears is
[blue/red], you should move to the [left/right] response box and click
on it, irrespective of where the cue appears. If the cue that appears is
[red/blue], you should do nothing. You will have 2 seconds to complete
this part of the trial.
Press the right arrow to go to the next page.
Experiment 3 (Joint Simon Task)
In this experiment, you and your partner are requested to respond to
two different colors by moving the mice to one of the response boxes
that will appear in the top corners of the screen. The mouse cursor
of your partner will [not] be visible to you.
At the start of every trial you will see a small gray rectangular frame
at the bottom of the screen. We call it a "start button". You and
your partner need to click on it to begin the trial. Please make sure
that when you click, the cursor is completely inside the start button.
If either of you does not click the start button within 1.5 seconds, the
trial ends. You will see the screen turn black briefly and a new trial
will begin.
If you do click the start button within the required time, you will
see two gray response boxes appear at the top of the screen. You
are required to start moving upwards as soon as you see the response
boxes. You will have 1.5 seconds to start moving. Again, if you do
not meet the deadline, you will see a black screen and a new trial will
begin.
If you do start moving as requested, a color cue will appear on the
screen. If the cue that appears is blue, you should move to the left
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response box and click on it, irrespective of where the cue appears.
If the cue that appears is red, your partner should move to the right
response box and click on it, also irrespective of where the cue appears.
You will have 2 seconds to complete this part of the trial.
Press space to go to the next page.
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B.1 Source code and data
Source code for running the experiments can be found at this address:
https://github.com/kabramova/JointAction_cythonized
Source code for data analysis reported in the article can be found at this address:
https://github.com/kabramova/JointAction_cythonized/blob/master/paper_
plots.py
B.2 Additional graphs
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Figure B.1: Agent behavior in all test trials.
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
20 x target
x tracker tr 1
x tracker tr 2
x tracker tr 3
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
20
x target
x tracker tr 4
x tracker tr 5
x tracker tr 6
Figure B.2: Left agent performing trials alone.
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Figure B.3: Right agent performing trials alone.
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Figure B.4: Start position generalization trials.
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Figure B.5: Velocity generalization trials.
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Figure B.6: Environment width trials.
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Figure B.7: Steady-state velocity vector field for left and right motors.
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Figure B.8: Left agent neural output in all test trials.
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Figure B.9: Right agent neural output in all test trials.
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Figure B.10: AIS
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Lay Summary
Everybody knows the tale of a group of blind men who come across an elephant
and attempt to understand what kind of creature it is, as they have never en-
countered one before. One man feels the sturdy elephant’s side and decides that
the elephant is like a wall. Another man feels its thick leg and proclaims it’s like
a tree. A third man touches the pointy husk and compares the elephant to a
spear. A fourth man seizes the moving tail and describes it as a rope. Finally,
the blind man who happens upon the elephant’s trunk is convinced that it’s just
like a snake.
Now imagine that instead of merely arguing about the nature of the elephant
(or coming to blows with each other according to some versions of the story), each
blind man gathers a group of other blind men and starts applying for research
grants to further investigate their Snake-Trunk Theory of the Elephant (STTE)
or a Tree-Leg Theory of the Elephant (TLTE), to focus on just two examples.
The first group (STTE) begins with a metaphor of a flexible cunning snake
and spends decades on developing particular methods of examining the adaptive
behavior of the elephant’s trunk that can grab tiny things like a blade of grass,
that can forcefully strike a helpless human, that can breath, soak up water, be
used as a communication device with other elephants or as a manipulation tool
to solve the ingenious puzzles presented to the elephant by the scientists. The
representatives of the STTE catalog these marvelous functions of the trunk and
conclude that the whole elephant is really its trunk because it enables the animal
to do so many wonderful things. It’s almost as if the trunk was actually an
independent being and the rest of the elephant is only a trunk’s shell, necessary
for carrying it around and keeping it alive. Since the functions of the trunk are
so broad and at the same time so similar to what the men themselves are capable
of, the STTE enjoys a popular position among both the scientific community of
Elephant Studies and the general public.
The TLTE group is instead inspired by the metaphor of a tree grounded in
the earth by a network of roots, its branches moved by the forces of the wind and
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providing shade for the inhabitants of the forest. They decide to focus on the
structure of the elephant’s sturdy legs and their interactions. The TLTE research
labs analyze the forces that act on the elephant in motion with its incredible
weight (about 3-4 tons). They record the elephant moving on different terrains
and analyze the way its feet are placed and what patterns the four different legs
produce as the elephant walks on a flat terrain versus going downhill. They also
record how these patterns change at different speeds or how the elephant’s gait is
actually quite unique in the world of other quadruped creatures. They also ask
themselves how the animal is able to learn its walking behavior in relation to its
changing body mass and therefore study elephant development, enjoying hours
of interaction with baby elephants. They construct a theory which claims that
an elephant is a living, breathing, moving entity, it is part of a biological and
physical world and that in order to understand it, we need to study its behavior
in interaction with the environment as it unfolds over time. Unfortunately, when
the TLTE researchers try to talk to the general public or the representatives of
the STTE, they are met with puzzled looks. They are told that of course baby
elephants are cute and all these videos and graphs of elephants walking are very
interesting, but it doesn’t reflect what the elephant is really like. It’s just a small
part of the elephant that doesn’t explain how the elephant is able to talk to
other elephants or why they conduct funerals (which they do using their trunks,
naturally!). The battle between STTE and TLTE continues.
This thesis is precisely about such a battle, only instead of the STTE and
TLTE its main players are the Traditional Cognitive Science (TCS) and the Rad-
ical Embodied Cognition (REC) representatives; and instead of studying the ele-
phant, the two approaches study the mind. Both are trying to understand how
something as ephemeral as the mind (clearly nobody has actually seen thoughts
or feelings just as the blind men have never seen the elephant) can be part of the
overall physical, chemical and biological nature. However, they employ different
metaphors, different methodologies and produce different bodies of research that
are often difficult to compare. TCS begins with a metaphor of the mind as a
computer and focuses its efforts on the functioning of the brain and relatively
sophisticated cognitive capacities like reasoning, language, or decision-making.
REC, on the other hand, views the mind as inherently entangled with not just
the brain as an organ but also the rest of the body and the surrounding envi-
ronment. TCS-ers often appreciate REC efforts, but typically complain that the
body-centric view cannot account for a variety of complex mental capacities. In
this thesis such objections are examined specifically with regard to the phenom-
ena of joint action (i.e. how people manage to coordinate their actions together,
such as jointly moving a table) and language. These phenomena are addressed
from a REC perspective but using experimental paradigms from the TCS camp
(Chapters 5 and 6). Theoretical proposals on how to expand REC to address
TCS worries are offered in Chapters 4 and 7. Chapter 3 presents a reflection on
how the two camps can attempt to formulate their theories in a common explana-
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tory framework so that their accounts of the same phenomena can be more easily
assessed side by side. Finally, Chapter 2 is a historical and theoretical overview
of TCS and REC that should allow the reader to better understand the ongoing
disagreements and the purpose of this thesis.
Returning to our tale of the blind men, the main message of the thesis is that
in order to really understand the full elephant, they need to detach from their
preferred elephant’s body part and start examining the rest of its magnificent
presence together.

Samenvatting
Iedereen kent het verhaal van een groep blinde mannen die voor het eerst een
olifant tegenkomen en proberen te begrijpen met wat voor dier ze te maken
hebben. Eén man voelt aan de stevige flank van het beest en concludeert dat
olifanten op muren lijken. Een andere man betast een dikke poot en besluit dat
olifanten net als bomen zijn. Een derde man raakt de puntige slagtand aan en
vergelijkt het dier met een speer. De volgende man grijpt de wiegende staart en
beschrijft de olifant als een touw. De vijfde man, die de slurf verkent, is overtuigd
dat olifanten op slangen lijken.
Stel je nu voor dat deze mannen niet slechts (zoals in het verhaal) in een verhit
debat terechtkomen over de aard van de olifant, maar dat elk van hen een groep
van andere blinde mannen om zich heen verzamelt en aanvragen gaat doen voor
onderzoeksbeurzen om hun specifieke theorie over olifanten nader uit te werken,
of het nu de Slang-Slurf Theorie van de Olifant (SSTO) of de Boom-Been Theorie
van de Olifant (BBTO) betreft.
De eerste onderzoeksgroep (SSTO) werkt vanuit de metafoor van een flexibele,
slimme slang, en besteedt tientallen jaren aan het ontwikkelen van gedetailleerde
methoden voor het bestuderen van het adaptieve gedrag van de slurf van de
olifant. De gedragsmogelijkheden zijn bijzonder uitgebreid: van het oppakken
van minuscule dingen zoals grassprieten, het krachtig meppen van ’n hulpeloze
omstander, het kunnen ademen, water opzuigen, als communicatiemiddel fun-
geren, tot dienen als een instrument om de ingewikkelde puzzels op te lossen
waar de wetenschappers het mee confronteren. De SSTO-aanhangers catalogis-
eren deze indrukwekkende functies en concluderen dat de slurf de essentie van
de olifant moet zijn omdat de slurf het dier in staat stelt om zoveel prachtige
dingen te doen. Het is bijna alsof de slurf een zelfstandig wezen is, en de rest
van de olifant slechts een behuizing is om de slurf in leven te houden en rond te
dragen. Omdat de slurf zoveel kan en omdat wat het kan in belangrijke mate
weerspiegelt wat de onderzoekers zelf ook kunnen, wordt de SSTO zowel onder
Olifantkundigen als onder het algemeen publiek een populaire positie.
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De BBTO-groep laat zich daarentegen inspireren door een andere metafoor:
een boom, gebonden aan de aarde door een netwerk van wortels, met takken die
zwieren in de wind en die schaduw bieden aan de andere bewoners van het bos.
Deze onderzoekers richten zich op de structuur en onderlinge interacties van de
stevige poten van de olifant. Het BBTO-onderzoekslab analyseert ook de krachten
die inwerken op de olifant wanneer deze zijn geweldige massa (ongeveer 3-4 ton)
in beweging zet. Ze maken opnames van de bewegende olifant op verschillende
ondergronden en overpeinzen de patronen waarin hij zijn poten neerzet wanneer
hij vlak loopt of omlaag. Ze noteren ook hoe deze patronen veranderen bij ver-
schillende snelheden en dat de manier van lopen van de olifant anders is dan bijna
alle andere viervoeters. Ze vragen zich ook af hoe het dier zijn loopgedrag leert
aanpassen aan zijn veranderende lichaamsgewicht tijdens de groei, en brengen
zodoende vele plezierige uren door met baby-olifanten. De BBTO-onderzoekers
construeren een theorie die stelt dat een olifant een levend, ademend en bewegend
wezen is dat onderdeel is van een biologische en fysische wereld, en dat we daarom
voor een goed begrip van olifanten moeten kijken hoe zij door de tijd heen inter-
acteren met hun omgeving. Helaas kunnen de BBTO-onderzoekers rekenen op
verbaasde blikken wanneer zij deze theorie voorleggen aan het algemeen publiek
of SSTO-aanhangers. Ze krijgen dan vaak de respons dat baby-olifanten natu-
urlijk schattig zijn, en dat alle video’s van lopende olifanten en de indrukwekkende
grafieken weliswaar interessant zijn, maar dat daarin niet de ware aard van de
olifant weerspiegeld wordt. Het is maar een klein onderdeel van de olifant, dat
niet verklaart hoe het kan dat olifanten communiceren of begrafenissen organis-
eren (wat ze natuurlijk met hun slurven doen!). Er blijft zodoende frictie bestaan
tussen SSTO en BBTO.
Dit proefschrift gaat precies over zo’n frictie, alleen in plaats van SSTO en
BBTO zijn de hoofdrolspelers ‘Traditional Cognitive Science’ (TCS) en ‘Radical
Embodied Cognition’ (REC), en in plaats van de olifant is het onderzoeksonder-
werp mind. Beide kampen proberen te begrijpen hoe iets ongrijpbaars als mind
(niemand heeft ooit werkelijk gedachten of gevoelens ‘gezien’, net zoals de blinde
mannen nooit de hele olifant gezien hebben) onderdeel kan zijn van de bredere
fysische, chemische en biologische wereld. Ze gebruiken daarbij evenwel verschil-
lende metaforen, verschillende onderzoeksmethodieken, en produceren bovendien
verschillende onderzoeksresultaten die vaak moeilijk te vergelijken zijn. TCS-
aanhangers beginnen met een metafoor van mind als een computer, en richten
hun aandacht op de werking van het brein en relatief geavanceerde cognitieve
capaciteiten zoals redeneren, taalgebruik of het nemen van besluiten. REC-
aanhangers daarentegen, begrijpen mind als inherent verstrengeld met niet alleen
het brein, maar ook de rest van het lichaam en de omgeving waarin het func-
tioneert. TCS-ers waarderen vaak de bijdragen van REC, maar geven als kritiek
dat het lichaam-centrisch perspectief niet de variëteit en complexiteit van men-
tale capaciteiten kan verklaren. In dit proefschrift worden dergelijke kritieken
geëvalueerd, in het bijzonder in relatie tot de fenomenen van gezamenlijk han-
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delen (i.e. hoe mensen het voor elkaar krijgen om hun handelen op elkaar af te
stemmen, bijvoorbeeld wanneer ze samen een tafel verplaatsen), en taalgebruik.
Deze fenomenen worden bekeken vanuit een REC-perspectief maar met experi-
mentele paradigma’s uit het TCS-kamp (hoofdstukken 5 en 6). In hoofdstukken
4 en 7 worden theoretische voorstellen besproken om REC uit te breiden om tege-
moet te komen aan TCS-kritieken. Hoofdstuk 3 is een reflectie op hoe de beide
kampen hun theorieën in een gemeenschappelijk verklarend raamwerk kunnen
verwoorden zodat hun weergaven van dezelfde fenomenen makkelijker met elkaar
vergeleken kunnen worden. Hoofdstuk 2, tenslotte, geeft een historisch en theo-
retisch overzicht van TCS en REC dat de lezer in staat stelt de onderlinge frictie
tussen beide kampen, alsook het doel van dit proefschrift, beter te begrijpen.
Als we nu terugblikken op het verhaal van de blinde mannen, dan zien we
daarin de belangrijkste boodschap van dit proefschrift gereflecteerd: dat we ons
voor een volledig begrip van de olifant niet moeten richten op slechts één lichaams-
deel, maar het grandioze geheel in ogenschouw moeten nemen.
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